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1 Introduction 
Driven by the rise of digital business models (Teece, 2018) and other megatrends, many 
established corporations find themselves confronted with the need to renew their existing 
innovation strategies (Ernst, Witt, & Brachtendorf, 2005; Gaba & Bhattacharya, 2012). The 
utilization of corporate venture capital (CVC) units is considered a promising approach to 
combine internal research and development (R&D) resources with external knowledge 
(Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006). Such CVC units acquire minority equity stakes of young and 
innovative startups (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006), thus forming a triad encompassing the CVC 
unit itself, the corporate mother, and the startup (Weber & Weber, 2011). Today, numerous 
corporations are following the example of the early adaptors such as Lucent, Panasonic, Intel 
or Cisco in using CVC units to renew their innovation strategies (Chesbrough, 2002; CB 
Insights, 2018a). 
 
The phenomenon of CVC has already attracted considerable attention from researchers 
and the extant literature sheds light on several ways in which CVC units are important for the 
startup ecosystem. Depending on their type (Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess, 2005; Dushnitsky, 
2006), CVC units can provide crucial value-added activities to support the sustainable 
development of their portfolio companies. Startups receive not only financial support but also 
assistance in recruiting employees and convincing customers and new partners, and also 
acquire new insights about competitors and technologies (e.g., Maula, Autio, & Murray, 
2005). This also leads to other benefits relating to their innovation output (e.g., Park & 
Steensma, 2013; Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016) or financial metrics (e.g., Park & 
Steensma, 2012) that help CVC-backed startups to outperform their competitors backed by 
independent venture capitalists (IVCs). 
 
The use of CVC is strongly associated with taking risks, yet large corporations are as a 
whole considered rather risk averse. The adoption of CVC practices by large corporations 
carries the risk of a conflict between their core business and the risks associated with startup 
investments. This inner conflict contributes to the popularity of the CVC from an academic 
point of view. Additionally, the versatility of observable phenomena within the CVC context, 
provides the academic community with a unique research setting. Therefore, several 
perspectives can be observed in published articles. In this regard, many authors base their 
argumentation on real options (e.g., Van de Vrande & Vanhaverbeke, 2013), signaling (e.g., 
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Wang & Wan, 2013) or property rights (Dimov & Gedajlovic, 2010) alongside network 
theory (e.g., Noyes, Brush, Hatten, & Smith-Doerr, 2014). However, due to its complexity 
and the diverse range of theoretical perspectives being applied to it, the CVC phenomenon 
encapsulates many unanswered questions. In particular the investment motivation of CVCs or 
the interplay of CVC investments and subsequent acquisition of the supported startups 
demand academic scrutiny, and accordingly constitute the research focus of this dissertation. 
 
The remainder of the dissertation’s introduction is structured as follows: Section 1.1 
highlights the CVC phenomenon’s relevance to and relationship with other entrepreneurial 
activities of established corporations, thereby providing a theoretical anchor for the articles 
presented in this dissertation. Subsequently, Section 1.2 outlines the dissertation’s scope and 
motivation, while Section 1.3 summarizes the dissertation’s articles by outlining their 
underlying structure. 
 
1.1 Disentangling the entrepreneurial activities of large corporations 
Since the early 1980s, the academic world has investigated and tried to explain the 
adaption of entrepreneurial activities of large and established corporations (e.g., Von Hippel, 
1977; Rind, 1981; Burgelman, 1983; Ellis & Taylor, 1987). Consequently, in recent decades, 
a vast body of labels and typologies for CVCs has emerged, all of which share the idea that 
established corporations can benefit from the use of entrepreneurship (for an overview of 
definitions see, Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). Grounded in the corporate entrepreneurship (CE) 
literature, corporate venturing (CV) is seen as a bundle of actions to stimulate the creation of 
new business organizations either within the existing boundaries (known as internal corporate 
venturing, ICV) or outside of them (known as external corporate venturing, ECV) (Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999; Narayanan, Yang, & Zahra, 2009). Accordingly, the current literature (e.g., 
Keil, 2000) considers non-equity alliances, joint ventures, acquisitions, and spin-offs to be 
instruments of ECV. Likewise, CVC is embedded in the ECV context, and the phenomenon 
of CVC is particularly used to highlight the benefits for established corporations. 
 
For instance, scholars observed greater innovational output (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005a), a higher valuation (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006), and leverage effects on other 
financial outcomes (Zahra & Hayton, 2008) through the use of CVC. In addition to specific 
investigations of the effect of CVC, several authors investigate the comparative use of CVC 
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and other ECV instruments such as acquisitions (Schildt, Maula, & Keil, 2005; Keil, Maula, 
Schildt, & Zahra, 2008; Benson & Ziedonis, 2009; Benson & Ziedonis, 2010; Tong & Li, 
2011; Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2011; Masulis & Nahata, 2011), joint 
ventures (Schildt et al., 2005; Keil et al., 2008), and alliances (Schildt et al., 2005; Keil et al., 
2008; Dushnitsky & Lavie, 2010; Van de Vrande et al., 2011; Van de Vrande & 
Vanhaverbeke, 2013). In a broader sense, CVCs are formed to transform the idea of 
independently acting VCs to suit the corporate context. As a consequence, CVC vehicles 
compete with other players from the VC ecosystem to invest in young and innovative 
startups. It is therefore unsurprising that the comparison of CVC and IVCs features in answers 
to research questions (e.g., Maula et al., 2005; Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016) or in 
describing underlying research objects (e.g., Bengtsson & Wang, 2010; Dimov & Gedajlovic, 
2010). 
 
1.2 Purpose of this dissertation 
As mentioned above, the adaption of entrepreneurial structures within established 
corporations is important to the academic and practical discourse. Therefore, this dissertation 
sheds further light on several aspects of the CVC phenomenon, thereby contributing to the 
ongoing development of the research field as such. The studies presented in this dissertation 
do so by scrutinizing empirical issues and also by enhancing the foundational CVC research 
front through the introduction of a data-driven CVC definition and a computer-aided text 
analysis (CATA) based measure of a CVC’s isomorphic tendencies. 
 
Accordingly, in addition to the structural literature review (Section 2) the following two 
studies focus on the motivational drivers within the CVC dyad. First, the investment 
motivation is observed at the CVC level, investigating how CVC units interpret their mission 
as delegated by the corporate mother. Second, the underlying innovation strategy of the 
corporate mother itself is examined by drawing on the concept of exploration and 
exploitation. My co-authors and I seek to go beyond the well-established either-or approach 
of previously-published articles (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006) by focusing on the 
continuum between the financial and strategic investment motivation of CVC units. Due to 
the fact that the investment motivation is derived from the CVCs mission statement, they are 
an expression of how CVC units interpret their existence. In addition, Section 4 focuses on 
the general innovation strategy of the corporate mother. Therefore, the relevant study applies 
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the degree of exploration and exploitation (March, 1991; Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006; 
Lavie, Stettner, & Tushman, 2010; Phene, Tallman, & Almeida, 2012) to the relationship of 
two instruments found in the CV context—CVC investments and acquisitions—that have thus 
far largely been analyzed in a comparative setting. The final two articles then address the 
development of new approaches; one to stimulate the use of isomorphic tendencies in the 
CVC context, and the second to develop a data-cleaning procedure to enable future scholars 
to achieve academic rigor by identifying CVC units among the data records of information 
providers. The new data-cleaning approach is suggested because authors observing CVCs 
base their analysis mainly on secondary data from two powerful information providers, Dow 
Jones VentureSource and Eikon from Thomson. However, those data providers largely 
disregard the underlying definition of a CVC, which leads them to exclude what should be 
defined as CVCs but are labeled as other investment vehicles and vice versa. The study thus 
extends the findings of other articles (Lerner, 1994, 1995; Kaplan, Strömberg, & Sensoy, 
2002; Maats, Metrick, Yasuda, Hinkes, & Vershovski, 2011) that help researchers with the 
selection of secondary data sources. Finally, this dissertation also proposes a unique 
measurement of isomorphic tendencies using the Jaccard index. By explaining how and why 
such tendencies vary over time, the study presented in Section 6 directly follows the work of 
Souitaris, Zerbinati, and Liu (2012). Research based on the isomorphism of CVC units is rare, 
and therefore I am confident the study contributes to the ongoing discussion. 
 
As a whole the dissertation aims to shed light on several research questions grounded in 
the CVC context. The dissertation also contributes to the general development and academic 
rigor of the whole research front by introducing new procedures and measurements that pave 
the way for future research. 
 
1.3 Underlying structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation comprises a literature review and four empirical articles that shed light 
on various aspects of the CVC phenomenon. To provide an overview, Figure 1 summarizes 
the dissertation’s structure and collates further information about each study highlighting the 
applied analytical methods and information regarding the data set. The following paragraphs 
outline the studies incorporated in this dissertation by briefly introducing each article’s 
purpose and scope. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the studies included in this dissertation 
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The first study, Exploring the Landscape of Corporate Venture Capital: A Systematic 
Review of the Entrepreneurial and Finance Literature is presented in Section 2 and provides a 
holistic overview of empirical articles published in the field of CVC. The article follows a 
structured literature review approach as described by Transfield, Denyer, and Smart (2003) 
and Paré, Trudel, Jaana, and Kitsiou (2015). The study is based on a total sample of 65 
articles, all published between 1987 and 2015 and sourced from the dominant databases for 
peer-reviewed literature, such as Scopus and Web of Science (WoS). To visualize the 
development of the research front, the literature review introduces bibliographic coupling—a 
bibliometric method in which two articles are seen as related if they cite the same source—
into the field of CVC. In doing so, the derived networks revealed that the domain is 
dominated by two different research domains, management and finance, which interestingly 
tend to avoid cross citation. The network perspective also provides visual information on the 
development of the CVC research front over time by separating older from more-recently 
published articles. Consequently, the literature review serves as a profound basis for the 
studies comprising this dissertation. 
 
Section 3 presents a study called, A World of Difference? The Impact of Corporate 
Venture Capitalists’ Investment Motivation on Startup Valuation. The study examines the 
relationship between a CVC’s investment motivation and a startup’s valuation using a unique 
sample of US-based investment rounds. By drawing on several data collection procedures 
(text analysis and secondary data) and statistical methods (cluster analysis and hierarchical 
linear modeling, HLM) the article postulates a fine-grained view of a CVC’s investment 
motivation. To date, the majority of authors have focused on an either-or approach (i.e., 
strategic or financial) when addressing the two dominant investment motivations (e.g., 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). Using word lists and hierarchical clustering, the article draws a 
multifaceted picture by identifying a set of four investment motivations applicable to CVCs. 
Subsequently, the identified investment motivations (strategic, financial, analytic, and 
unfocused) were used to explore the relationship with a startup’s valuation relying on a 
sample comprising 52 CVC vehicles and 147 startup valuations logged on Dow Jones 
VentureSource between January 2009 and January 2016. 
 
Section 4 is titled From Investment to Acquisition: The Impact of Exploration and 
Exploitation on CVC Acquisition. The study examines the relationship between a corporate 
mother’s degree of explorative and exploitative orientation and the likelihood of its acquiring 
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startups previously backed by its own CVC. The study answers the call of Dushnitsky and 
Lavie (2010) by addressing different corporate venturing activities undertaken to foster 
external knowledge as collaboratively managed mechanisms. By focusing on acquisitions 
within a CVC setting, the study contributes to a widely under-researched area (Masulis & 
Nahata, 2011; Dimitrova, 2015). To answer the research question, we build a data sample 
consisting of 901 US-based startup acquisitions undertaken between 1996 and 2016; of that 
number, 124 transactions (14 %) were CVC acquisitions. The study draws on textual analysis 
and logistic regression to address its research question and also takes the relationship between 
the product market relatedness of a startup and that of its acquirer into account. Owing to the 
non-linear nature of the logistic model, the study uses a simulation-based method (Zelner, 
2009) to evaluate and visualize the statistical significance and directions of the interacting 
variables. 
 
The next study, Identifying Corporate Venture Capital Investors – A Data-Cleaning 
Procedure is presented in Section 5. It reports on the data-cleaning issues my co-authors and I 
faced when conducting the previously mentioned research and offers a potential remedy. We 
examine the scope and consistency of the two most popular databases among CVC 
researchers, namely Dow Jones VentureSource and Eikon from Thomson Reuters. Based on 
four extensive data samples ranging from January 2000 to December 2015, the article 
introduces a data-cleaning procedure to identify CVC investors from those databases, even if 
they are defined as other types of investment vehicle. In doing so, several criteria derived 
from the literature were discussed and applied. The article itself serves as a reference for 
researchers within the field of CVC to focus more acutely on the technical definition of their 
samples and thereby increase the replicability, comparability, and validity of their results. 
 
Section 6 presents the final study titled, The Devil Inside? Organizational Voids 
Within Corporate Venture Capital Dyads. The study is based on the phenomenon of 
isomorphic tendencies, and follows the argumentation of Souitaris et al. (2012) that CVC 
units are influenced by two entirely different environments simultaneously—the startup 
ecosystem and the corporate environment. The purpose of the study is to answer the question 
of how isomorphic tendencies can be measured and to investigate the influence of those 
tendencies over time. To achieve its purpose, the study draws on the Jaccard index to 
automatically compare the overlap between two organizational written mission statements. 
The isomorphic distances between the CVCs and their corporate mothers serve as indicators 
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for the direction and magnitude of the isomorphic tendencies. The study applies a qualitative 
approach to investigate potential drivers of those tendencies over time based on interviews 
with reputable CVC investors from Germany. 
 
Section 7 closes the dissertation with a short summary of the articles’ findings and of the 
overarching contribution of the dissertation to the field of CVC. 
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2 Exploring the Landscape of Corporate Venture Capital: A 
Systematic Review of the Entrepreneurial and Finance 
Literature1 
 
Abstract 
The influence of corporate venture capital investments within the venture capital 
industry, that is, equity stakes in high technology ventures, has stimulated the academic 
literature on this specific research area. Generally, CVC is strongly associated with the 
concept of corporate venturing and plays a vital role in the strategic renewal of established 
companies. Owing to the multifaceted nature of the CVC phenomenon, the existing literature 
is rather fragmented. Therefore, the purpose of this article is twofold: first, bibliographic 
coupling is introduced to the field of CVC to reveal the underlying structure of the current 
research front. Second, a content-related review is conducted to shed light on nascent research 
streams and shortcomings within the CVC literature that indicate promising avenues for 
future research. The systematic review of a comprehensive set of 65 articles reveals that the 
prevailing CVC literature is mainly driven by two dominant logics, management and finance, 
that tend to separate themselves from one another. Moreover, nascent research streams are 
identified that will broaden and enrich the academic discussion. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
CVC, that is, direct minority investments from established firms in high technology 
small ventures, plays a central role in the venture capital (VC) ecosystem (Dushnitsky, 2006). 
The formation of a CVC triad through the interaction between a corporate mother firm, the 
CVC unit, and a venture, can deliver some key benefits for all parties concerned. Acting as an 
intermediary, CVC units provide ventures with access to complementary assets (Chesbrough, 
2002). Ventures, which primarily operate in dynamic environments, can benefit from the 
technical support associated with CVC investments and can often overcome financial 
restraints (Maula et al., 2005). CVC investments provide a vital instrument through which 
corporate mothers can foster the innovation behavior of a venture (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
                                                 
1 This study is published with the kind permission of Springer Nature. The original publication Röhm (2018) 
appeared in: Management Review Quarterly, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. 279-319, which can be found at the following 
address https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11301-018-0140-z. 
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2005a). Hence, a growing number of corporations are extending their existing innovation 
portfolios through the adoption of CVC practices. In 2014 alone, the total number of 
transactions with a CVC involvement in the US increased by 11% (792 deals), according to 
the MoneyTree Report provided by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (NVCA, 2015). Besides the most influential and active CVC 
programs of Google, Intel, Salesforce, and Qualcomm (CB Insights, 2015), 183 further 
investment vehicles of US-based companies supported ventures. 
 
Such peaks in the investment behavior of corporations are recurrent. Several articles 
(Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; Boston Consulting Group, 2012) have 
described the cyclical nature of CVC investments since the 1960s. As Gompers and Lerner 
(2000) reported, the instigation and abandoning of CVC programs are strongly influenced by 
exogenous shocks such as the disruption of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the early 1970s, 
or the stock market crash in 1987.  
 
However, from an academic point of view, the interest in CVC continues unabated. 
During the past two decades, the phenomenon of CVC has captivated scholars and led to a 
rapid growth in the number of articles on the subject. To gain a fundamental understanding of 
the ongoing academic discussion, some previously published literature reviews limit their 
search results to specific journals and time frames (Narayanan et al., 2009) or particular 
aspects of the CVC phenomenon (Leten & van Dyck, 2012). In consequence, the objectives 
of the following article are twofold: first, the underlying research front of the CVC literature 
is revealed using an explorative bibliographical approach, thereby extending the status quo by 
introducing bibliographic methods into the field of CVC. Second, the prevailing literature 
within this particular branch of research is thoroughly examined and upcoming research 
streams and shortcomings are discussed to identify issues that merit future research.  
 
To meet these objectives, the remainder of the study is organized as follows: First, an 
overview of both the underlying objectives of CVC vehicles and the corresponding theoretical 
phenomenon of corporate venturing is provided. Second, building on that overview, the data 
collection method is described. Third, the current research front within the field of CVC is 
revealed, applying bibliographic techniques. Fourth, major research streams and shortcomings 
are summarized and discussed. The paper closes with a conclusion. 
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2.2 Corporate venture capital as an external venturing mode 
Since the early 1980s, an increasing number of articles has targeted the entrepreneurial 
activities within organizations (Burgelmann, 1983; Miller, 1983; Sharma & Chrisman, 1999). 
As a branch of corporate entrepreneurship, corporate venturing can be described as a set of 
processes and practices to explore and exploit new markets and industries by creating new 
businesses (Narayanan et al., 2009). Literature on the subject further distinguishes between 
internal and external modes of CV (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999; Keil, 2000; Miles & Covin, 
2002). While Ellis and Taylor (1987, p. 528) define CV as the adoption of the “structure of an 
independent unit […] to involve a process of assembling and configuring novel resources”. 
Keil (2000) introduced a more fine-grained taxonomy to explain how CV activities can be 
used to transfer the entrepreneurial spirit to established companies. Figure 2 illustrates this 
relationship between CE, CV, and CVC.  
 
Figure 2: Corporate venture capital taxonomy2 
 
 
However, while internal CV activities focus on creating new businesses within existing 
organizational boundaries, external modes such as venturing alliances, transformational 
arrangements, and CVC foster innovation across organizational boundaries through semi-
                                                 
2 The taxonomy is adopted from Keil (2000) and Sharma and Chrisman (1999). 
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autonomous or autonomous entities (Sharma & Chrisman, 1999; Keil, 2000; Narayanan et al., 
2009). A further distinction is evident regarding the underlying structure and organization of 
CVC programs. CVC units that provide ventures with equity can be organized as self-
managed funds within the corporation’s structure or operate as a limited partner (LP) in 
pooled and dedicated funds, typically managed by third party investors such as IVCs 
(McNally, 1995; Keil, 2000). Acting as an intermediary between the corporate mother and the 
ventures, the fundamental perception of the CVC therefore determines the governance of 
these programs. Thereby the use of CVC is associated with the idea of accruing both financial 
and strategic benefits from the supported ventures (Ernst et al., 2005); hence, the difference 
between those investment objectives is well documented (Winters & Murfin, 1988; 
Chesbrough, 2002; EY, 2002; Ernst et al., 2005; Weber & Weber, 2005; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006; Röhm, Köhn, Kuckertz, & Dehnen, 2018). 
 
2.3 Method of review 
This literature review aims to provide deep insights into the phenomenon of CVC and to 
specify the current research front. Hence, the design of the study follows a systematic scoping 
approach (Paré et al., 2015). In line with previously published literature reviews (Crossan & 
Apaydin, 2010; Nijmeijer, Fabbricotti, & Huijsman, 2014; Hu, Mason, Williams, & Found, 
2015), structured literature reviews are mainly based on two dominant databases, Thomson 
Reuter’s WoS (formerly ISI Web of Knowledge) and Scopus from Elsevier. Because journal 
coverage varies (Mongeon & Paul-Hus, 2016),3 both databases were used to identify CVC-
related articles. To ensure a decent quality of the academic work, only peer-reviewed journal 
articles written in English were considered. Hence, monographs, Ph.D. theses, working 
papers, editorial notes, symposia, presentation slides, and book reviews were excluded from 
the search. However, in contrast to other literature reviews in the field of CVC, this study 
does not limit the search results to specific journals and timeframes (Narayanan et al., 2009) 
or specific aspects of the CVC phenomenon (Leten & van Dyck, 2012).   
                                                 
3 During the data collection process, the following differences were identified: While the Strategic Management 
Journal is only available on Scopus for issues from 2011 onwards, Web of Science does not cover the following 
journals: Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, World Review of 
Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development and the Management Research Review. 
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The first step in the identification process involved searching Scopus and WoS for the 
appearance of the term corporate venture capital in the title, abstract, or keywords of all 
articles published up until September 2015. This search generated a total of 98 unique articles. 
Because the phenomenon of CVC has captivated scholars from various research streams, 
resulting in a continuous development of the underlying definitions, a supplementary survey 
was conducted to ensure the inclusion of relevant CVC articles. Therefore, all 98 articles were 
downloaded and analyzed using WordStat by Provalis Research, a text analysis software 
designed to reveal knowledge and trends from an underlying text corpus, to extract 
synonymous search terms for corporate venture capital. Consequently, all phrases with a 
minimum of two words and at least three appearances were retained for further analysis, 
resulting in a wordlist comprising 1469 phrases. Each phrase was then reviewed by two 
researchers acting independently to identify CVC synonyms. The interrater reliability was 
calculated using Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) (κ=0.7164) and Krippendorf’s Alpha 
(Krippendorff, 1980) (α=0.7156), which indicated a substantial agreement between the two 
raters. Discordant opinions were resolved through discussion. This broad set of additional 
search strings helped to ensure all CVC synonyms and variations were encompassed. As a 
consequence, the final wordlist comprises 13 search terms, each summarized in Table 1.  
 
In total, 15 further CVC-related articles were added to the 98 articles initially 
identified. To balance feasibility and comprehensiveness, as suggested by Tranfield et al. 
(2003) and Paré et al. (2015), the total sample of 113 articles was narrowed down. Four 
articles were dropped because they did not exclusively address CVC-related topics, and six 
owing to the fact that they were themselves literature reviews of related research areas, 
including open innovation (Herskovits, Grijalbo, & Tafur, 2013), technology 
commercialization (Markman, Siegel, & Wright, 2008) or CE as such (Corbett, Covin, 
O'Connor, & Tucci, 2013). The largest group of articles were excluded because they were 
neither theoretical in nature nor applying either a multivariate analysis method or a case-study 
approach (38 articles). This step includes mainly practically oriented articles (e.g., Reaume, 
2003; Dushnitsky, 2011) and academic articles providing bivariate statistics for overview 
purposes (e.g., Cumming, 2006; Fujiwara & Kimura, 2011). 
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Table 1: Overview of the applied search terms4 
Search term Search string in context Author Additional articles 
Corporate venture capital 
“The activity is often managed by a corporate venture capital program that seeks a mix of financial 
returns as well as strategic gains” 
Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky 
(2016) 
98 
Corporate fund “would not provide the right results on the headquarter[s’] incentives to setup a corporate fund”  Riyanto & Schwienbacher (2006) 0 
Corporate VC 
“similar to private VC firms, corporate VC firms are both the agent of their corporate parents and the 
principal of funded ventures”  
Wang & Wan (2013) 7 
Corporate ventur* “external innovation is the most important strategic goal of corporate venturing activities” 
Ernst, Witt, & Brachtendorf. 
(2005) 
5 
CV activit* 
“making decisions about using external CV activities raises several additional challenges for 
managers”  
Narayanan, Yang, & Zahra (2009) 0 
CV fund “which resulted in major losses to VC and CV fund valuations in Europe and the U.S.”  
Hill, Maula, Birkinshaw, & 
Murray (2009) 
0 
CV program “some corporations consider their CV program a key link to the VC community”  Narayanan, Yang, & Zahra (2009) 1 
CV unit “the relational context of the CV unit is defined as the set of relationships with the key resource holder”  Hill & Birkinshaw (2014) 0 
CVC 
“especially successful CVC managers will join independent VC companies and therefore leave CVC 
activities with no future”  
Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess (2005) 2 
External CV* 
“external CV can take the form of joint ventures or spinoffs, but the most important and prominent 
example is corporate venture capital (CVC)”  
Reimsbach & Hauschild (2012) 0 
External ventur* “by engaging in external venture financing, corporate investors are better able to learn”  Benson & Ziedonis (2009) 0 
Firms invest in new ventures “in particular, some firms invest in new ventures to provide a window on new technologies”  Dushnitsky & Lenox (2006) 0 
IVC counterparts 
“suggest that corporate investors have a stronger preference than their IVC counterparts for new 
venture investees”  
Park & Steensma (2013) 0 
                                                 
4 A wildcard (*) at the end of a search term signals Scopus and WoS to include all subsequent letters. Consequently, “CV activit*” will also include “CV activities” and “CV 
activity” in the search process. 
15 
Consequently, this process yielded a final sample of 65 articles. Figure 3 depicts the 
number of CVC-related articles in both higher and lower-ranked journals based on their 
impact factors. Articles published in the Journal of Business Venturing (14%, n=9), the 
Strategic Management Journal (12%, n=8), the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal (11%, 
n=7), the Academy of Management Journal (6%, n=4) and Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice (5%, n=3) dominate the sample. The remaining 37 articles are distributed across 26 
other journals. Since the seminal publication of Gupta and Sapienza (1992) the number of 
articles has burgeoned. It is notable, that from 2005 onwards highly ranked journals such as 
the Strategic Management Journal (first publication within the sample in 2005) or 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (first publication within the sample in 2004) are 
outperforming their lower-ranked counterparts. In this vein, the phenomenon of CVC is now 
clearly established in the context of rigorous academic discussion, thus cementing the 
importance of CVC vehicles in the VC industry (NVCA, 2015). 
 
Figure 3: Development of CVC-related articles in higher and lower-ranked journals 
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2.4 Revealing the structure of the CVC landscape using bibliographic 
coupling 
In accordance with its explorative approach, this study applies a bibliographical method 
to reveal the current status of the CVC-related literature. The idea behind all bibliographic 
methods is that frequently cited articles tend to shape a given research stream through the 
association of ideas (Garfield, 1955). The aim of these particular methods, bibliographic 
coupling, co-occurrence, co-citation, and co-authorship, is to capture the underlying structures 
within a particular line of research, and accordingly the methods are commonly used by 
scholars of management and organizations (Zupic & Cater, 2015). In contrast to the co-
citation approach, where two articles are related if they are cited together (Small, 1973), 
bibliographic coupling is a measure of relatedness based on the total number of references 
articles have in common (Kessler, 1963). Therefore, the connection between two articles is 
static over time (Jarneving, 2005). Consequently, this article builds a bibliographic coupling 
network by applying the Visualization of Similarities (VOS) approach introduced by Van Eck 
and Waltman (2009a). The corresponding software tool, VOSviewer, has already been used in 
a vast number of research articles (e.g., Rafols, Leydesdorff, O’Hare, Nightingale, & Stirling, 
2012; Wikhamn & Wikhamn, 2013). This tool provides a reliable code to visualize all forms 
of bibliometric networks using a distance-based approach. After conducting a normalization 
process, called association strength normalization (Van Eck & Waltman, 2009b), VOSviewer 
optimizes the position of the observed items in a two-dimensional space. By minimizing the 
weighted sum of the squared Euclidean distances, an algorithm arranges all items in such a 
way that strongly-connected items are located close to each other, and less-strongly connected 
ones are placed far away from each other. An optimization process ensures that strongly-
connected items are centered in the network, while nodes with a weaker connection will 
appear at the edges of the network depiction (Van Eck & Waltman, 2009a; Waltman, Van 
Eck, & Noyons, 2010). Because several databases were used, a standardization process was 
applied. Articles exclusively available on Scopus were transformed to a Web of Science 
standard using the Scop2WOS tool, provided by Loet Leydesdorff (for a similar approach see 
Leydesdorff, Moya‐Anegón, & Guerrero‐Bote, 2015). Furthermore, I used an additional 
standardization macro to detect inconsistencies within the downloaded references to improve 
the data quality. For instance, different forms of journal title were adjusted (e.g., from 
VENTURE CAPITAL to Venture Capital) as were forms of authors’ names (e.g., from 
M.V.J. Maula to MVJ Maula).  
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To provide deep insights into the rapidly growing CVC literature, bibliographic 
coupling networks with different units of analysis were constructed based on the bibliographic 
information of the sample (65 articles). The first step involved producing a general 
bibliographic coupling network based on the journal information (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Journal map based on bibliographic coupling linkages 
 
 
Accordingly, each circle represents a journal. The size of the circle is influenced by 
the total number of studies a journal published in the field of CVC. For instance, the Journal 
of Business Venturing published nine articles between 1992 and 2011, whereas the 
International Journal of Technology Management (bottom center) published only the work of 
Bassen, Blasel, Faisst, and Hagenmuller (2006). Related journals, based on bibliographic 
coupling, are placed close to each other, thus indicating that articles published in those 
journals tend to cite the same references. Not surprisingly the visualization of the journal-
based network paints a clear picture. Prestigious journals like the Journal of Business 
Venturing, the Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, the Academy of Management Journal, the 
Strategic Management Journal, and Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice are centered in the 
network and therefore tend to cite the same management-related articles. The distinction 
between management and finance-related journals also becomes obvious upon applying the 
integrated clustering method of VOSviewer (Waltman et al., 2010). While financially-oriented 
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journals, such as Financial Management, belong to the green cluster (middle right), 
management-oriented journals are affiliated to the red cluster, indicating that the field of CVC 
is quite dichotomous with two prevalent points of view. This result is driven by the fact that 
both disciplines are strongly home biased, in other words, the authors prefer to publish in their 
own research field. In this vein, Cumming (2015) pointed out that especially editors and 
referees of financial journals tend to have a low opinion on cross-citations to other disciplines, 
thus causing a natural selection effect.  
 
A more fine-grained analysis (see Figure 5) illustrates the resulting relationships 
between all 65 articles. Accordingly, the unit of analysis was shifted from journals to single 
documents. Following the same logic, each node represents an article. Additionally, the size 
of each node relates to the number of times an article has been cited, while the colors indicate 
when each article was published. The colors employed range from purple, denoting 
publication dates from 2005 or before, to red (2015 onwards). 
 
Figure 5: Document map based on bibliographic coupling linkages 
 
 
The findings of the calculated map thus contribute to the understanding of the current 
research front in three ways: First, frequently cited articles are highlighted through the size of 
the nodes. In this vein, articles written by Dushnitsky (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006) and Keil (e.g., Keil, 2004; Keil et 
al., 2008) have shaped the CVC discussion and therefore acquired must-cite status within and 
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beyond the discussion of the CVC phenomenon. In addition, the work of Gupta and Sapienza 
(1992), Schildt et al., (2005), Wadhwa and Kotha (2006), Hill and Birkinshaw (2008), and 
Zahra and Hayton (2008) attracted a great deal of attention, according to the number of their 
citations. Second, in contrast to the journal map (Figure 4) the document map provides 
information on the development of the CVC research front over time. As already shown in 
Figure 3, articles focused on CVC are growing steadily. Thereby, the network map helps to 
separate older from more-recently published articles. For instance, the work of Gupta and 
Sapienza (1992) and Pahnke, Katila, and Eisenhardt (2015) were published 23 years apart. 
Accordingly, it is evident that the focus within the CVC field moved from learning aspects 
(on the left-hand side, blue and purple) over more outcome-related articles (on the right-hand 
side, green) toward the organizational settings of CVC units (on the top-right, yellow and 
red). Third, as expected and predicted by Cumming (2015), the separation of finance and 
management publications is also evident on the document level. The publications of Masulis 
and Nahata (2009, 2011), Benson and Ziedonis (2010), Ivanov and Xie (2010), Kim, Kim, 
and Lee (2011), Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014) and Guo, Lou, and Pérez‐Castrillo 
(2015) and are therefore placed in the bottom right corner, because they tend to cite the same 
financially-oriented references. 
 
2.5 Overview of the articles considered 
After the underlying structure of the CVC research front had been revealed, all articles 
within the sample were thoroughly examined. In this vein and in line with other literature 
reviews (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Keupp, Palmié, & Gassmann, 2012; Lour, Lu, Yu, & 
Chang, 2014; Köhn, 2018), I subsequently collected information from each published article 
on the authors, the main data sources, the sample’s geographical coverage, the sample size 
and period, the industry focus, the underlying methodology (conceptual vs. empirical), the 
main analytical method, and the paper’s main focus. The results are summarized in Table 3. 
The findings of the bibliographic analysis enhance the understanding of the structural status 
quo of the CVC literature, highlighting that the field of CVC is driven by two dominant 
logics. In particular, it was revealed that both literature streams fail to take their 
interrelationship into consideration. Accordingly, the following review aims to present and 
restructure the main findings of those two logics by transferring the articles’ results into a 
holistic framework. To do so, the relevant focus of all 65 papers in the analysis, presented in 
Table 3, were used as a starting point to iteratively group the articles’ main results. Building 
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on the work of Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li (2010), this process resulted in the identification of 
five different research streams. The resulting framework, which is depicted in Table 2, 
provides a logical structure for the review’s findings. To clearly distinguish between the level 
of analysis, that is, the corporate mother firm, the CVC unit, and the venture (the CVC triad), 
the framework also includes information on the research object (for a similar approach see 
Narayanan et al., 2009). 
 
Table 2: Overview of the extracted research streams 
Research stream Research object Research focus 
Drivers of CVC adoption Corporate mother Firm level drivers 
Industry level drivers 
CVC governance aspects CVC unit CVC staff and compensation 
Organizational structure 
CVC investment procedure CVC unit Pre-investment phase 
Post-investment phase 
Value-added contributions Portfolio companies Implication for a venture’s innovation performance 
Implication for a venture’s financial performance 
Various implications 
Implications for corporate mothers Corporate mother Strategic Learning 
Financial effects 
CV mode interaction 
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Table 3: Examined articles on CVC 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source5 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
period 
Industry6 Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Alvarez-Garrido & 
Dushnitsky (2016) 
Thomson One USA 545 ventures thereof 
34% with CVC-
backing 
1990–2003 Biotechnology Quantitative Probit regression, 
Negative binomial 
regression 
Innovation 
performance of CVC- 
backed ventures 
Anokhin, Örtqvist, 
Thorgren, & 
Wincent (2011) 
Thomson One, 
Corporate Venturing 
Directory & Yearbook 
n/a7 163 corporations 
with CVC 
investments 
1998–2001 No restrictions Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Syndication network 
centrality 
Bassen, Blasel, 
Faisst, & 
Hagenmuller 
(2006) 
-/- Germany 1 CVC unit n/a7 Manufacturing Qualitative Case study Performance measuring 
of CVCs 
Basu & Wadhwa 
(2013) 
Thomson One USA 477 corporations 1990–2000 No restrictions Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Strategic renewal of 
corporations 
Basu, Phelps, & 
Kotha (2011) 
Thomson One USA 477 corporations 
thereof 83 with CVC 
investments 
1990–2000 No restrictions Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Driver of CVC 
investments 
Bengtsson & Wang 
(2010) 
TheFunded,  
Thomson One 
USA 526 investors thereof 
2.9% CVCs 
2007–2009 No restrictions Quantitative ANOVA, 
Logit regression 
Entrepreneurs’ stated 
preferences on VC 
abilities 
Benson & Ziedonis 
(2009) 
Thomson One, 
VentureSource 
USA 34 corporations with 
CVC investments 
1987–2003 Information technology Quantitative OLS regression Venture acquisition 
performance 
                                                 
5 All data sources were standardized to the latest available denotation. 
6 Owing to considerable variations in the use of SIC codes the industry sectors used were not standardized. 
7 Not applicable due to missing specifications. 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Benson & Ziedonis 
(2010) 
Thomson One, 
VentureSource 
USA 61 corporations with 
CVC investments 
1987–2003 Information technology Quantitative OLS regression Venture acquisition 
performance 
Bertoni, Colombo,  
& Croce (2010) 
RITA 2004 Italy 379 ventures thereof 
33 with CVC-
backing 
1994–2003 High-tech and service Quantitative GMM regression Cash flow sensibility of 
VC-backed ventures 
Bertoni, Colombo,  
& Grilli (2013) 
RITA 2004, 
Thomson One, 
AIFI 
Italy 531 ventures thereof 
24 with CVC-
backing 
1994–2003 High-tech and service Quantitative GMM regression Growth of VC-backed 
ventures 
Bjørgum & Sørheim 
(2015) 
Survey Denmark, 
Finland, 
Norway, 
Sweden 
6 ventures thereof 3 
with CVC-backing 
2012 Pre-commercial and 
marine energy 
Qualitative Case study Value-added 
contributions of CVCs 
Chemmanur, 
Loutskina, & Tian 
(2014) 
Thomson One USA 
 
2129 ventures, 
thereof 462 with 
CVC-backing 
1980–2004 All other than finance, 
insurance and real estate 
Quantitative OLS regression, 
Tobit regression, 
Probit regression 
Innovation 
performance of CVC- 
backed ventures 
Dimov & Gedajlovic 
(2010) 
Thomson One USA 3557 investors 
including 763 CVC 
units 
1962–2004 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression, 
Logit regression 
Investment decisions 
among VC types 
Dokko & Gaba 
(2012) 
Thomson One, 
Corporate Venturing 
Directory & Yearbook 
USA 70 CVC units 1992–2008 Information technology Quantitative GMM regression Career experience of 
CVC managers  
Dushnitsky & Lavie 
(2010) 
Thomson One USA 372 corporations 29 
thereof with CVC 
investments  
1990–1999 Software Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Interplay of CVC 
investments and 
alliance formation 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Dushnitsky & Lenox 
(2005a) 
Thomson One USA 2289 corporations 
247 thereof with 
CVC investments 
1969–1999 No restrictions Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Variation of corporate 
innovation rates 
through the use of CVC  
Dushnitsky & Lenox 
(2005b) 
Thomson One USA 1171 corporations 
115 thereof with 
CVC investments 
1990–1999 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression CVC adaption drivers 
Dushnitsky & Lenox 
(2006) 
Thomson One USA 1173 corporations 
171 thereof with 
CVC investments  
1990–1999 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression Creation of value 
through CVC 
investments 
Dushnitsky & 
Shapira (2010) 
Thomson One USA 2830 investors 
including 300 CVC 
units 
1990–1999 High technology Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression, 
OLS regression, 
Logit regression 
Investment practices 
and performance of VC 
types 
Dushnitsky & 
Shaver (2009) 
Thomson One 
 
USA 167 CVC 
investments by 87 
CVC units 
1990–1999 No restrictions Quantitative Logit regression IPP regime and 
industry overlaps in the 
formation of CVC-
venture relationships 
Gaba & 
Bhattacharya (2012) 
Thomson One, 
Corporate Venturing 
Directory & Yearbook 
USA 71 CVC units 1992–2003 Information technology Quantitative OLS regression Adoption and 
termination of CVC 
units based on 
innovation 
performance 
Gaba & Dokko 
(2016) 
Thomson One, 
Corporate Venturing 
Directory & Yearbook 
USA 70 CVC units 1992–2008 Information technology Quantitative Probit regression CVC implementation 
choices on CVC 
abandonment 
Gaba & Meyer 
(2008) 
Thomson One, 
Corporate Venturing 
Directory & Yearbook 
USA8 264 corporations 
including 94 CVC 
adoptions  
1992–2001 Information technology Quantitative Probit regression CVC adaption drivers 
                                                 
8 The authors limit their geographical scope to VCs headquartered in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Guo, Lou, & 
Pérez‐Castrillo 
(2015) 
Thomson One USA 437 CVC units 1980–2004 All other than finance Quantitative OLS regression, 
Probit regression, 
Logit regression 
Investment, duration 
and exit strategies 
Gupta & Sapienza 
(1992) 
Pratt’s Guide to 
Venture Capital 
Sources 
USA7 169 VCs 1987 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression VCs investment 
preferences 
Hill & Birkinshaw 
(2008) 
Survey 8 countries from 
North America, 
Asia, and Europe9 
95 external CVs 2001–2003 No restrictions10 Quantitative ANOVA, 
OLS regression, 
Logistic regression 
CV typology and the 
influence on 
performance and 
survive 
Hill & Birkinshaw 
(2014) 
Survey 8 countries from 
North America, 
Asia, and Europe9 
95 external CVs 2001–2003 No restrictions10 Quantitative ANOVA, 
Path analysis 
Influence of 
ambidexterity on CV 
survival 
Hill, Maula, 
Birkinshaw, & 
Murray (2009) 
Survey 8 countries from 
North America, 
Asia, and Europe9 
95 external CVs 2001–2003 No restrictions10 Quantitative ANOVA, 
Seemingly  
unrelated regression 
 
CVC implementation 
choices on performance 
Ivanov & Xie (2010) Thomson One n/a7 1510 IPOs 219 
thereof with CVC-
backing 
1981–2000 No restrictions Quantitative Probit regression, 
OLS regression, 
Three-factor model 
regression 
CVC value-added 
contributions 
Keil (2004) Interviews Europe 2 corporations with 
external CVs 
1996–2000 Information and 
communication 
Qualitative Case study Building new 
capabilities through CV 
 
                                                 
9 The authors do not provide further information on the country level. 
10 The majority of the survey responses were observed in the following industries: high technology, oil and gas, automotive, manufacturing, consumer goods, transportation, 
and professional services. 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Keil, Autio, & 
George (2008) 
Interviews n/a7 5 corporations with 
CVC units 
1998–2002 Information and 
communication 
Qualitative Case study Relationship of 
learning and 
developing capabilities 
in the CVC context 
Keil, Maula, & 
Wilson (2010) 
Thomson One USA 358 corporations 
with CVC 
investments 
1996–2005 No restrictions Quantitative GMM regression, 
Tobit regression 
CVC resources and 
syndication network 
positions 
Keil, Maula, Schildt, 
& Zahra (2008) 
Thomson One USA 110 corporations 1993-2000 Information and 
communication 
Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression, 
Poisson regression 
Innovation 
performance and the 
choice of external 
venturing modes 
Kim, Kim, & Lee 
(2011) 
Korean Financial 
Supervisory Service 
South Korea 934 ventures 291 
thereof with CVC-
backing 
1999–2001 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression CVC contribution 
effects 
Lee, Kim, & Jang 
(2015) 
Thomson One USA 29 corporations with 
CVC investments 
1995–2005 Information and 
communication 
Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
 
Knowledge transfer 
through CVC 
investments 
LiPuma (2006) CorpTech USA 1348 ventures 158 
thereof with CVC-
backing 
2003 High technology Quantitative Logit regression Influence of VC types 
on ventures’ 
internationalization 
Masulis & Nahata 
(2009) 
Thomson One USA 273 CVC units 
invested in 177 IPO 
ventures 
1996–2001 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression, 
Tobit regression 
Financial contracting in 
CVC-backed IPOs 
Masulis & Nahata 
(2011) 
Thomson One USA 245 ventures 60 
thereof with CVC-
backing 
1991–2006 No restrictions Quantitative Probit regression, 
Logit regression, 
Logistic regression 
Influence of VC 
backing on venture 
profitability 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Maula, Autio, & 
Murray (2003) 
Survey USA 91 ventures with 
CVC-backing  
2000–2001 Biotechnology, 
Medical, Internet, 
Communication, 
Software, Hardware 
Quantitative Structural equation 
modelling 
Creation of social 
capital through CVC 
Maula, Autio, & 
Murray (2005) 
Survey USA 91 ventures with 
CVC-backing  
2000-2001 Biotechnology, 
Medical, Internet, 
Communication, 
Software, Hardware 
Quantitative ANOVA, 
t-Test 
Value-added 
contribution along 
IVCs and CVCs 
Maula, Autio, 
Murray (2009) 
Survey USA 91 ventures with 
CVC-backing 
2000–2001 Biotechnology, 
Medical, Internet, 
Communication, 
Software, Hardware 
Quantitative Structural equation 
modelling 
Relationship-based risk 
and learning benefits 
Maula, Keil, & 
Zahra (2013) 
Thomson One, 
SDC Platinum, 
LexisNexis,  
Mergent 
n/a7 139478 VC 
investments with 
250462 alliance ties 
1989–2000 Information and 
communication 
Quantitative Cox proportional 
hazards regression 
CVC as an alert 
mechanism for 
technology changes 
Noyes, Brush, 
Hatten, & Smith-
Doerr (2014) 
Thomson One USA 150 corporations 
with CVC 
investments 
1996–2003 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression Interlocking boards and 
CVC investments 
Pahnke, Katila, & 
Eisenhardt (2015) 
Thomson One, 
VentureSource 
USA 198 ventures 36 
percent thereof with 
CVC-backing 
1986–2007 Medical device Quantitative GEE negative 
binomial difference-
in-difference 
analysis 
Institutional logics and 
venture innovation 
performance 
Park & Steensma 
(2012) 
Thomson One, 
LinkSV 
USA 508 ventures 271 
thereof CVC-backed 
1990–2003 Wireless 
communications, 
computer hardware, 
semiconductors 
Quantitative Probit regression Value-added 
contributions of CVCs 
on venture performance 
Park & Steensma 
(2013) 
Thomson One USA 508 ventures 271 
thereof CVC-backed 
1990–2003 Wireless 
communications, 
computer hardware, 
semiconductors 
Quantitative Probit regression, 
Negative binomial 
regression 
 
Selection and nurturing 
effects of corporate 
investors 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
Period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Sahaym, Steensma, 
& Barden (2010) 
Thomson One USA 400 industries 1997–1999 Manufacturing Quantitative Tobit regression Industry level effects 
on the use of CVC 
Schildt, Maula, & 
Keil (2005) 
Thomson One USA 110 corporations 1989–2001 Information and 
communication 
Quantitative Logistic regression Choice of external 
venturing modes 
Smith & Shah 
(2013) 
Thomson One USA 128 CVC-venture 
dyads 
1978–2007 Medical device Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
User knowledge as 
antecedents of CVC 
investments 
Souitaris & Zerbinati 
(2014) 
Interviews n/a7,11 13 CVC units 2002, 2011–12 12 industries Qualitative Case study CVC investment 
practices 
Souitaris, Zerbinati, 
& Liu (2012) 
Interviews USA and Europe 6 CVC units 2002 6 industries Qualitative Case study Institutional 
isomorphism within 
CVCs 
Teppo & 
Wüstenhagen (2009) 
Interview North America 
and Europe12 
11 CVC units and 16 
VCs 
2003–2005 Energy Qualitative Case study Determinants of fund 
survival  
Tong & Li (2011) SDC Platinum USA 546 investments by 
99 CVCs 
2003–2005 All other than finance Quantitative Probit regression Choices between CVC 
and acquisitions 
Van de Vrande & 
Vanhaverbeke 
(2013) 
Thomson One USA 78 corporations with 
CVC investments 
1990–2000 Pharmaceutical Quantitative Log–log regression Alliance formation 
through prior CVC 
investments 
                                                 
11 Souitaris and Zerbinati (2014) only report the geographical investment preferences of the observed CVC units. 
12 In detail: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
Period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Van de Vrande, 
Vanhaverbeke, & 
Duysters (2011) 
Thomson One USA 153 corporations 1990–2000 Pharmaceutical Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Creation of innovation 
through external 
venture modes 
Wadhwa & Basu 
(2013) 
Thomson One USA 248 investments by 
43 CVC units 
1996–2000 Telecommunication, 
Semiconductor, and 
Computer 
Quantitative Tobit regression Resource commitment 
and exploration in 
CVC investments 
Wadhwa & Kotha 
(2006) 
Thomson One USA 36 corporations with 
CVC investments 
1989–1999 Telecommunication Quantitative Negative binomial 
regression 
Knowledge creation 
through external 
venturing 
Wang & Wan (2013) SDC Platinum, 
Thomson One 
USA 200 ventures with 
VC backing  
2000–2007 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression IPO underpricing of 
VC-backed ventures 
Weber & Weber 
(2010) 
Interviews Germany 7 CVC-venture 
dyads 
n/a7 n/a7 Quantitative Regression analysis13 Social capital and 
knowledge relatedness 
in CVC dyads 
Weber & Weber 
(2011) 
Interview Germany 6 CVC triads 2002 Media and high 
technology 
Qualitative Case study Antecedents of social 
liabilities in CVC triads 
Yang (2012) Survey, 
Thomson One, 
Corporate Venturing 
Directory & Yearbook 
USA 232 CVC unit 
investments 
1996–2000 No restrictions Quantitative OLS regression Organizational learning 
based on governance 
characteristics 
 
                                                 
13 Weber and Weber (2010) provide no further information regarding the regression-based analysis used. 
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Table 3: Continued 
Study 
(Year) 
Main CVC 
data source 
Geographical 
focus 
Sample size Sample 
Period 
Industry Methodology Analytical 
method 
Relevant focus 
Yang, Narayanan,  
& De Carolis (2014) 
Thomson One USA 189 corporations 
with CVC 
investments 
1990–2004 All other than finance Quantitative OLS regression Portfolio 
diversification on firm 
value 
Yang, Narayanan,  
& Zahra (2009) 
Thomson One USA 166 corporations 
with 2110 CVC 
investments 
1990–2001 No restrictions Quantitative Logit regression, 
Negative binomial 
regression 
Performance and 
valuation identification 
ability 
Zahra & Hayton 
(2008) 
Survey, 
Lexis Nexis 
Worldwide  217 corporations 2000–2003 Manufacturing Quantitative OLS regression Use of international 
CVC investments on a 
corporate’s 
performance 
Zu Knyphausen-
Aufsess (2005) 
Interviews USA and 
Germany 
8 CVC units 1998–2002 Consulting, 
Manufacturing, 
Financial, Publishing, 
High technology 
Qualitative Case study Value-added 
contributions of CVC 
investors 
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2.6 Drivers of CVC adoption 
When implementing CVC practices, established corporations tend to struggle with 
internal resistance such as the excessive diversion of management time and the general 
corporate mindset (Bannock Consulting, 2001). To overcome these obstacles, an emerging 
research stream introduced several drivers on both the firm and industry levels that influence 
the adoption and intensity of corporate investment activities. 
 
2.6.1 Firm level drivers 
Astonishingly, a relatively small number of articles uses historical accounting data or 
other firm-specific measurements to examine the conditions under which established 
corporations are most likely to support ventures through CVC investments. Among those, 
Basu, Phelps, and Kotha (2011) noted that a high level of marketing expenditure and a 
corporation’s technological resources could stimulate the use of CVC. In addition, Dushnitsky 
and Lenox (2005b) highlighted the role of a corporation’s cash flow and innovation stock as 
antecedents of CVC investments. 
 
2.6.2 Industry level drivers 
Some articles direct attention to mimetic behavior within a corporation’s peer group. 
Noyes et al. (2014) presented a network derived from interlocking boards as a possible 
antecedent of a firm’s commitment to CVC investments. Within those networks, two 
corporate mothers are considered to be related when they share at least one board member. 
The authors argue that interlocking boards play a vital role in the diffusion and adoption of 
management practices. Therefore, if a corporation has direct ties to a firm that is already 
engaged in CVC activities, it can optimize the information inflow and hence increase the 
engagement in CVC investments.  
 
Moreover, Gaba and Bhattacharya (2012) rely on an organizational decision making 
perspective to answer the question of under which conditions firms are willing to accept the 
organizational risks associated with the use of CVC investments. When evaluating their 
performance, organizations use a predefined aspiration level as a reference point to compare 
their outcomes either with their past performance or that of their peers. In fact, differences 
between aspirations and the actual observed performance outcomes can motivate 
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organizations to review their risk-taking behavior and subsequently adopt CVC practices. A 
major finding of this study is that corporations tend to establish a CVC unit when their 
innovation performance is close to their social aspirations.  
 
Gaba and Meyer (2008) focused on management innovations (i.e., the adoption of 
CVC practices) that can spread through social networks and thus cross organizational 
boundaries within a corporation’s peer group. The authors argue that the general popularity of 
CVC within a corporation’s peer group, the status of early CVC adaptors, the geographical 
proximity of corporations to existing CVC units, and the outcome experience of those prior 
adopters can be interpreted as a contagious impulse that influences the likelihood of 
establishing a CVC program. The same also holds for impulses originating from the IVC 
industry. For instance, by taking the weighted average of the geographical distance of the 
three predominant VC clusters (Silicon Valley, New York, and Route 128) the probability of 
a CVC adoption increases, if the firms’ headquarters are located close to one of the IVC 
clusters.  
 
Moreover, several other drivers on the industry level such as, the competitiveness of 
an industry (Basu et al., 2011), the intellectual property regime (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; 
Basu et al., 2011), the technology-related circumstances (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; 
Sahaym, Steensma, & Barden, 2010; Basu et al., 2011), the total factor productivity, the 
environmental munificence, and the R&D intensity within a firm’s industry (Sahaym et al., 
2010) could also influence the attractiveness of CVC. 
 
2.6.3 CVC governance aspects 
Dushnitsky (2006) notes that the governance of CVC activities is a multifaceted topic. 
Owing to limited data availability, only a few articles address governance-related topics, 
including the work of Hill, Maula, Birkinshaw, & Murray (2009), Teppo and Wüstenhagen 
(2009), Dushnitsky and Shapira (2010), Souitaris et al. (2012), Hill and Birkinshaw (2014), 
and Gaba and Dokko (2016). 
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2.6.3.1 CVC staff and compensation 
Among the published articles, only a small number discuss the importance of 
personnel-related aspects (e.g., staffing of the CVC unit and the compensation of investment 
managers) in the CVC setup. For instance, staffing decisions in general and a CVC managers’ 
career experiences in particular are important aspects of the longevity and efficiency of such 
CVC initiatives. Gaba and Dokko (2016) found that putting a staff manager with considerable 
firm-specific experience with the corporate mother in charge can be detrimental to a CVC unit 
because internal hires struggle to acquire the depth of knowledge necessary to understand the 
value of CVC practices for the firm. Furthermore, internal hires tend to view CVC 
investments as a primary tool to deliver strategic benefits for the corporate mother, and 
therefore might neglect financial objectives. On the other hand, staffing a CVC unit with 
managers with an IVC background could increase the CVC vehicle’s longevity. 
Furthermore, Dokko and Gaba (2012) investigated the effect of individuals’ career 
experiences on the extent of variation in practice. The research was spurred by the recognition 
that individuals who implement and manage adopted practices from the IVC industry also 
play a vital role in the interpretation and translation of those practices in the corporate context. 
The results indicated that CVC units staffed by managers with IVC experience tended to 
adopt the prevailing practices from that particular environment to leverage financially-
oriented goals through investments in early-stage ventures. In addition, CVC units staffed 
with managers with prior firm-specific and engineering experience tend to prioritize strategic 
benefits over financial ones and tend to invest in later-stage ventures.  
 
Beyond the staffing aspects, the compensation of CVC managers is an emerging topic 
within the governance-related research stream. While Dushnitsky and Shapira (2010) found 
evidence that the compensation schemes used by CVC vehicles could influence the overall 
performance of a CVC unit, some authors showed that the use of an IVC incentive scheme 
could also have negative consequences: For instance, Hill et al. (2009) highlight that the use 
of high-powered equity-based compensation to reward and incentivize managers has a 
positive effect on the financial performance of the CV unit, but astonishingly does not 
stimulate strategic performance. In addition, Yang (2012) observed in a survey based on 18 
participants (generally CVC managers or executives responsible for new business 
development) that an IVC-like incentive scheme could reduce the strategic innovativeness of 
the corporate investor.  
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2.6.3.2 Organizational structure 
Besides staffing and compensation related governance topics, some articles discuss the 
organizational structure of CVC programs. While some authors highlight the autonomy (Hill 
et al., 2009; Teppo & Wüstenhagen, 2009) and cultural aspects (Teppo & Wüstenhagen, 
2009), a widely neglected topic investigates the fundamental view on CVC within existing 
organizational boundaries.  
 
Among those, Hill and Birkinshaw (2008) initially analyzed different organizational 
configurations of CVC units. Beyond that, Hill and Birkinshaw (2014) drew on the well-
established interplay of exploration (building new capabilities) and exploitation (using 
existing capabilities) to link the general orientation of CV units to their survival rates. The 
results indicate that CV units relying on an ambidextrous approach in the form of the 
simultaneous use of CV as an instrument to explore and exploit capabilities, have a higher 
survival rate than those with a clear focus. Those units are typically characterized by a high 
level of interaction with all parties involved, such as senior executives, business units, and 
members of the VC community.  
In addition, Souitaris et al. (2012) observe how new organizational units, such as 
CVCs, reconcile the competing forces from two different institutional environments. CVC 
units might focus their organizational structures on either their corporate parents 
(endoisomorphism) or on the IVC industry (exoisomorphism). The direction the unit favors is 
influenced by staffing decisions and the legitimacy the CVC units seek. CVC units aligning 
with their parent’s norms (endoisomorphism) are more likely to develop mechanistic 
structures with command-like communication, concentrated decision making, fixed and 
written procedures, and a clear division of labor into specific tasks. In contrast, CVC units 
aligning with the norms of the IVC industry (exoisomorphism) are usually characterized by a 
consultative style of communication, flexible and unwritten procedures, evenly distributed 
decision making, and overlapping responsibilities. Owing to the relatively small sample of six 
cases, Souitaris et al. (2012) could not relate the concept of isomorphism to performance.  
 
Finally, the organizational structure also defines the way in which CVC performance 
is measured. This issue raised by Teppo and Wüstenhagen (2009) includes how corporations 
measure CVC success and deal with failures. This article is one of those addressing the fact 
that CVC units need to act accept risk and be innovative in an environment characterized by 
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error avoidance. Thus, the work of Bassen et al. (2006) suggested a solution might be to adopt 
a “Balanced Scorecard” approach to connect both worlds. 
 
2.6.4 CVC investment procedure 
The following section discusses the issue of how CVC investors structure and monitor 
their investments. The prevailing literature outlines a well-documented investment process 
(Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Wright & Robbie, 1998) that is essentially oriented toward IVCs, 
and therefore does not entirely suit the managerial investment practices of CVC units. 
Souitaris and Zerbinati (2014) drew on their previously formulated concept of isomorphic 
tendencies to develop a conceptual model of corporate investment practices. The authors 
describe the CVC deal-making process through outlining eight subsequent stages which can 
be summarized as relating to either the pre-investment or post-investment stage. 
 
2.6.4.1 Pre-investment phase 
As a first step, CVC units can source potential deals internally or rely on contacts 
within the VC industry. By communicating regularly with their VC peers, CVC investors spot 
new investment opportunities and acquire insights into the required capabilities of established 
IVCs (Hill et al., 2009). Accordingly, attention should be paid to several search patterns 
CVCs tend to use. For instance, the industrial overlap and the IP regime of a potential 
portfolio company play a crucial role in the investment decision process of CVCs. This topic 
was raised in several articles such as those by Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b) and Dushnitsky 
and Shaver (2009). Above, Wadhwa and Basu (2013) showed that the technological and 
market-related overlap of investor and investee is also a good predictor of the financial 
commitment of a CVC unit.  
 
Driven by the power of available databases a wide range of articles observe the 
decision to syndicate investments with IVCs and other complementary funds such as CVCs or 
governmental VCs. By syndicating these investments (Jääskeläinen, 2012), a CVC can reduce 
its risk exposure, gain a central position within the VC network, and simultaneously improve 
its ability to identify ventures with a strong strategic fit (Yang, Narayanan, & Zahra, 2009). 
Some articles indicate that the participation of a CVC vehicle increases the total number of 
co-investors (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010), which can influence the overall financial 
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performance positively (Hill et al., 2009). For instance, Keil, Maula, and Wilson (2010) 
investigated 358 corporate investment vehicles and observed how CVC units rapidly attained 
central positions within a syndication network. Owing to the fact that IVCs in particular tend 
to seek prestigious co-investors with the same central network position, new entrants face 
considerable barriers to entry into the VC market. By providing a fundamentally different 
resource base to IVCs, new corporate entrants can bridge peripheral network positions by 
syndicating their investments with IVCs despite being newcomers. Illustrating another point 
of view, Anokhin, Örtqvist, and Thorgren (2011) noted that, in addition to a central network 
position, the investment strategy pursued is a key factor for CVC units in highly concentrated 
industries. The authors argue that CVC units limit their potential benefits by placing 
themselves in the middle of the syndication network while supporting as many ventures as 
possible. In contrast, the most appropriate strategy for CVC investors in these industries is to 
keep away from the center of the syndication network by investing in portfolio companies 
without the participation of well-positioned co-investors. The so-called maximizing 
isolationist strategy is the exact opposite of the second-best investment strategy, which 
combines reduced investment activity with a central position in the syndicate network 
(minimizing centralist). 
 
2.6.4.2 Post-investment phase 
Nevertheless, once an investment is made, investors can employ various instruments 
to influence the behavior of their portfolio companies and to overcome agency problems. 
First, CVC vehicles can organize their investment in such a way that financing is only 
released when predefined milestones are met (known as investment staging). Second, lead 
investors usually receive a seat on the board to be able to monitor the management’s behavior. 
Besides Gompers and Lerner (2000), Yang (2012) argued that representation on a venture’s 
board of directors is a crucial instrument in exercising control rights and at the same time 
helps to stimulate knowledge outflow through the absorption of information in terms of 
industry trends and technological insights. Surprisingly, the study of Yang (2012) could not 
find a significant link between board representation and knowledge outflow. However, CVC 
units with a complementary relationship to their supported ventures are granted more 
representation on boards than their counterparts whose parents are potential competitors of 
their portfolio companies. In addition, if CVCs are lead investors they receive significantly 
lower board seats than lead IVCs (Masulis & Nahatan, 2009). Ivanov and Xie (2010) argue 
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that strategically oriented CVCs tend to have a higher level of board representatives than their 
financially oriented counterparts. However, the topic of social interaction between investor 
and investee is discussed in several articles (e.g., Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2003; Maula, 
Autio, & Murray, 2009; Weber & Weber, 2010; Weber & Weber, 2011). 
 
2.6.5 Value-added contributions 
As already mentioned, the behavior of ventures backed by VCs is strongly influenced 
by the institutional logic their investors rely on. Their different resource bases and 
complementary assets mean that CVC units can make various value-added contributions to 
their portfolio companies. The value-added activities flowing from CVC investors are well 
documented and have been analyzed in a wide range of studies that also take account of the 
value adding potential of different types of CVC investors (Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess, 2005) 
and other investment vehicles such as business angels and IVCs (Bjørgum & Sørheim, 2015). 
 
2.6.5.1 Implication for a venture’s innovation performance 
Recent CVC literature focuses far more on the interaction between a VC funding event 
and a venture’s patenting activity than was the case previously. In general, the support of a 
VC investor can stimulate innovation output through diminishing financial constraints. 
Consequently, the availability of further financial resources increases the R&D investments of 
these ventures and helps them to outperform their counterparts lacking VC backing (Bertoni, 
Colombo, & Croce, 2010). Comparing ventures based in the US, the work of both Park and 
Steensma (2013) and Alvarez-Garrido and Dushnitsky (2016) demonstrates that the 
innovation output of these ventures is sensitive to the relevant investor type. In both studies, 
the innovation output of CVC-backed ventures outperformed that of their IVC-backed 
counterparts, whether measured through patents granted or patent applications. Chemmanur et 
al. (2014) also used the patent outcome measure in their research and found support for the 
innovation performance implications. In contrast to these findings, Pahnke et al. (2015) argue 
that this potential benefit could be narrowed through the corporate logic on which the CVC 
units rely. In this case, the participation of CVC investors within a funding round has no 
effect on the level of technological or commercial innovation. 
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2.6.5.2 Implication for a venture’s financial performance 
In addition to the literature adopting a purely patent-driven view, a small research 
branch also takes alternative measures into account when evaluating the value-added 
contributions of CVC investors. While Kim et al. (2011) observed no difference between the 
investment of dependent and independent VCs, and the performance of ventures (i.e., sales, 
employees, R&D intensity, and return on equity (ROE), Park and Steensma (2012) 
demonstrated there were conditions under which ventures with CVC funding could 
outperform IVC-backed ones. By evaluating the IPO and failure rates of ventures, the study 
shows that new ventures, particularly those seeking specialized complementary assets or those 
operating in uncertain environments, profit from the participation of a CVC unit in terms of 
higher IPO fractions and lower failure rates.  
 
Furthermore, Ivanov and Xie (2010) found that CVC vehicles add value to 
entrepreneurial companies only if those ventures have a strategic fit to the corporate mother. 
In this case, strategic CVC-backed ventures had a higher IPO valuation than their purely IVC-
financed peers. However, if the ventures are strongly associated with the strategy of the 
corporate mother, CVC-backed targets also attract higher takeover premiums in the case of an 
acquisition. Furthermore, the study of Wang and Wan (2013), which is based on signaling 
theory, demonstrates that the investment of a CVC unit can be interpreted as a positive signal 
for the quality of a venture, in the sense that CVC-backing helps to attract a sufficient number 
of subscriptions without diminishing the offer price. Hence, a high level of involvement of the 
CVC unit can reduce the risk of an IPO being underpriced. Additionally, Masulis and Nahata 
(2011) show that CVC-backing leads to higher announcement returns compared with ventures 
backed by IVCs.  
 
Alongside exit events, Bertoni, Colombo, and Grilli (2013) examined the employment 
and sales growth of 531 Italian ventures and concluded that CVC-associated investments have 
positive effects on their portfolio companies. Based on the same data set, Bertoni et al. (2010) 
observed investment behavior after a successful VC finance round. The authors argue that the 
financing event can be interpreted as a removal of financial constraints and thus one that 
positively influences the investment rate of ventures. This effect holds for both IVC and 
CVC-backed ventures. From a long-term perspective, the equity origin affects the sensitivity 
levels of investments. While IVCs reduce investment-cash flow sensitivity through the 
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constant withdrawal of a venture’s financial constraints, CVC investors fail to do so in the 
long term.  
2.6.5.3 Various implications 
Maula et al. (2005) compared the value-added activities of IVCs and CVC vehicles 
using data from ventures that received funding from both investor types. In both cases, 
ventures could benefit substantially from their investors. The study highlights that CVC units 
outperformed their independent counterparts by helping their portfolio companies to attract 
new foreign customers and acquire valuable information on new technologies. On the other 
hand, IVCs offered more assistance in recruiting key employees and in the process of 
restructuring the organization. The results regarding the internationalization behavior of 
CVC-backed ventures emphasize that corporations can support their portfolio companies by 
bridging the so-called liability of alienness through their own track records. Regarding the 
internationalization of CVC-backed ventures, LiPuma (2006) found contradictory results. 
Based on a sample of 1348 ventures the author could not find a positive relationship between 
CVC funding and the internationalization intensity of ventures.  
 
From a founder’s perspective, Bengtsson and Wang (2010) investigated how 
entrepreneurs evaluated the cooperation with their investors. By obtaining data from a unique 
online community named TheFunded, where entrepreneurs anonymously rate and share their 
experience within the VC industry after a funding event, the authors showed that 
entrepreneurs prefer funding from IVCs. The entrepreneurs surveyed evaluated the track 
record, the operating competence, and the pre-investment communication (pitching 
efficiency) of CVC units at a significantly lower level than they did the same aspects of IVCs. 
Furthermore, CVC vehicles received fewer positive comments and more negative comments 
than IVCs. 
 
2.6.6 Implications for corporate mothers 
The literature highlights several ways in which established corporations benefit from 
external venture activities. Besides the creation of firm value and learning aspects, some 
authors take the benefits from the interaction of CVC and other external CV modes such as 
acquisitions or alliances into account. 
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2.6.6.1 Strategic learning 
Several articles focus on the concept of learning (e.g., Keil, 2004; Keil, Autio, & 
George, 2008) through CVC. For instance, Keil (2004) introduced a model showing that 
established corporations can initiate learning processes to establish CV capability. Hence, 
learning processes can be stimulated in two ways. Referring to Levitt and March (1988), the 
author argued that one part of this learning process takes place within the CVC triad in the 
form of learning-by-doing. Moreover, corporations are able to learn from their industry peers 
by filling vacant positions with experienced managers. Several authors point to the innovation 
output of a corporation as a potential outcome of learning processes. Dushnitsky and Lenox 
(2005a) found evidence that CVC investments could increase a firm’s innovation rate, 
especially when the IP protection in the target industry was weak; whereas Wadhwa and 
Kotha (2006) found that the relationship was only valid for corporate investors with a high 
level of involvement with their portfolio firms; otherwise, a higher number of CVC 
investments was associated with a decreasing innovation rate. In addition, two articles are 
discussing the relationship between the use of CVC and knowledge-related outcomes such as 
patents. While Schildt et al. (2005) found a positive linear relationship, Lee, Kim, & Jang 
(2015) showed that beyond a certain point the engagement in CVC can also diminish patent-
driven activities.  
 
Adopting a different point of view, Smith and Shah (2013), built a theoretical 
framework to explain how user knowledge could provide corporations with more useful and 
innovative insights than other sources of information. Subsequently, the relevant hypotheses 
were tested using CVC transactions within the medical device industry. It is apparent that the 
level of knowledge acquisition can vary and that established corporations can benefit most by 
accessing knowledge from innovative users.  
 
However, Basu and Wadhwa (2013) revealed a potential drawback of the above notion 
when investigating the ways in which the use of external venturing mechanisms could 
influence the strategic renewal tendencies of corporations. Relying on longitudinal data, the 
authors argued that CVC investments are mainly used to enable growth opportunities in 
existing and new businesses, but that such investments did not result in a withdrawal from a 
corporation’s core business. This negative relationship between strategic renewal and the use 
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of CVC is heightened for corporations operating in highly dynamic environments and with 
strong internal capabilities. 
2.6.6.2 Financial effects 
Some articles study the relationship between the use of CVC and corporations’ 
financial performance. By using Tobin’s Q as an indicator of a firm’s growth opportunities, 
strategic investors can benefit from the use of CVC (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). In another 
study, Zahra and Hayton (2008) investigated the relationship between a firm’s external 
venturing activities and its financial outcomes. Using primary and secondary data, the authors 
found evidence that investments made through CVC funds are positively associated with a 
corporation’s ROE and revenue growth. The finding underscores the absorptive capacity of an 
investor. In other words, the ability to exploit external information positively moderates the 
relationship between the use of CVC and financial performance. From a financial point of 
view, the short-term inefficiencies and costs of CVC initiatives can be compensated for, if 
corporations understand the use of CVC as a long-term instrument. 
2.6.6.3 CV mode interaction 
While most authors test their hypothesis in a comparative setting (e.g., Schildt et al., 
2005, Keil et al., 2008; Tong & Li, 2011; Van de Vrande et al., 2011), only few authors (e.g., 
Benson & Ziedonis, 2009, 2010; Dushnitsky & Lavie, 2010; Masulis & Nahata, 2011; Van de 
Vrande & Vanhaverbeke, 2013) consider the subsequent use of two external CV modes. 
While finance-related publications (such as Benson & Ziedonis, 2009, 2010) focus on the 
interplay of CVC and acquisitions, some articles provide information about the interaction 
between CVC and the formation of subsequent alliances.  
 
In terms of acquisitions, Benson and Ziedonis (2010) underline possible drawbacks 
involved in acquiring a venture which already received funding from a mother firm’s own 
CVC unit. The study argues that the acquisition of such entrepreneurial ventures can 
undermine the value of shareholders for the acquirer. A possible explanation for acquisition 
premiums could be the emotional attachment of corporate managers. Particularly managers 
with a strong technical background tend to become attached to a portfolio company’s projects 
and ideas and can be prone to overvalue a venture.  
 
41 
Analyzing 372 software firms in the 1990s, Dushnitsky and Lavie (2010) revealed an 
inverted U-shaped association between the use of CVC investments and alliance formation. 
Both external venturing modes are typically managed separately. For the first time, 
Dushnitsky and Lavie (2010) demonstrated that both modes cannot be considered 
independently. As a result, the number of CVC investments first increases and then decreases 
with the total number of alliances formed. Extending these findings, Van de Vrande and 
Vanhaverbeke (2013) investigated how prior CVC investments shape the odds of establishing 
a strategic alliance between the supported ventures and the corporate mother. The authors’ 
complementary log–log model included potential antecedents such as market uncertainty and 
technological proximity. The commitment of CVC in a prior financing round increased the 
probability of establishing a follow-on strategic alliance with the venture. This relationship 
was positively influenced by the technological proximity of both parties involved. The 
findings indicate that established companies are more likely to form an alliance with their 
portfolio company if there is a considerable overlap of technological competencies. 
 
2.7 Discussion 
In recent decades (see Figure 2), the academic discussion stressed the importance of 
CVC within the VC ecosystem. Accordingly, this paper contributes to this debate by 
structuring and analyzing 65 empirical articles from both a bibliographical and a content-
driven point of view. In addition, the analyzed articles reveal several issues and neglected 
research streams that merit future research (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Issues and neglected research streams extracted from the underlying sample 
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Cyclical nature. As Gompers and Lerner (2000) report, the use of CVC investments is 
strongly associated with the general state of economic development. Early research offers 
insights suggesting that early adopters of CV activities struggle to deal with insufficient 
commitment (Siegel, Siegel, & MacMillan, 1988), the absence of a well-defined mission 
(Rind, 1981), and an inadequate compensation scheme based on the corporate mothers’ 
guidelines (Block & Ornati, 1987; Sykes, 1990). Taking these considerations into account, 
there is a danger that firms tend to abandon their CVC activities at too early at a stage and fail 
to evaluate their future prospects correctly, especially in the face of upcoming external shocks 
(Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess, 2005). However, recent literature has increasingly turned to 
examining the antecedents of CVC unit withdrawal (e.g., Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Gaba & 
Bhattacharya, 2012; Gaba & Dokko, 2016). Only 11 of the 65 articles reviewed consider this 
fact when assessing the study’s observation period. Therefore, future scholars should 
carefully review and argue why a specific time period is chosen. 
 
Comparative country approaches. Similarly to other research streams (i.e., Bruton et 
al., 2010), 76.9% (n=50) of the articles in the sample focus their empirical analysis on single 
countries. Only seven articles (e.g., Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Zahra & Hayton, 2008; Teppo 
& Wüstenhagen, 2009) are based on data from at least two different geographical areas. 
Within the sample, the majority of articles (n=45; 70%) draw exclusively on data from the 
well-developed US-CVC market. Because cross-border CVC investments are viewed as 
important within the academic and practical discourse, and corporations from Europe and 
Asia are discovering the use of CVC to reinvigorate their innovation portfolio, single country 
studies are not well-suited to contribute to the understanding of how several aspects of the 
CVC phenomenon can be influenced by endogenous factors like cultural or institutional 
settings. Therefore, to broaden our understanding of the worldwide CVC market, future 
studies should not neglect cross–cultural aspects. It would be interesting to study the 
investment behavior of CVC units in light of the geographical distance from potential target 
ventures by building on the approach of Gaba and Meyer (2008). 
 
Databases and statistical methods. Owing to the constantly increasing data coverage 
and quality of widely used databases such as ThomsonOne (formerly known as VentureXpert 
or Venture Economics) and VentureSource (formerly known as VentureOne), only eight 
studies in the sample based their multivariate analysis on primary data. The work of Hill and 
Birkinshaw (2008, 2014) and Hill et al. (2009) and the publications of Maula et al. (2003, 
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2005, 2009) are based on the same data, thereby reducing the number of conducted surveys. 
Accordingly, future studies could benefit from using primary data to examine new research 
questions; although it must be acknowledged that the CVC unit population has proved 
reluctant to contribute to prior surveys (e.g., Maula et al., 2003; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Nevertheless, studies relying on secondary data have shown that the use of emerging 
databases can result in unique research questions that can foster CVC research. For instance, 
as mentioned above, Bengtsson and Wang (2010) accessed TheFunded to tap into 
entrepreneurs’ experiences of the VC industry. Databases such as Mattermark, Tracxn, 
Owler, PrivCo, Crunchbase, or Bison might also assist future research projects to fully grasp 
the CVC phenomenon. Not surprisingly, the sample is dominated by regression-based 
analysis. With the exception of the work of Hill and Birkinshaw (2014), and Maula et al. 
(2003, 2005, 2009), all quantitative articles were based on regression analysis. Accordingly, 
the use of OLS regressions (n=19), negative binomial regressions (n=14), and probit 
regressions (n=10) are the most common statistical methods for testing hypotheses in the 
CVC setting. 14  Owing to the fact that the CVC literature is strongly influenced by 
management-related journals (see Figure 4), further research could introduce emergent and 
management-related statistical methods into the field of CVC. In this vein, a survey 
conducted by Kuckertz and Prochotta (2018) identified several upcoming or neglected 
research methods such as multilevel modeling, data mining or qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) that could shed light on hitherto underrepresented CVC aspects. Owing to the 
fact that the CVC triad is notably hierarchical in nature, some authors address the issue 
through the use of hierarchical linear models (e.g., Röhm et al., 2018). Additionally, some 
authors use the combination of QCA and well-established methods such as OLS to emphasize 
how qualitative and quantitative methods could complement each other and therefore 
contribute to a multifaceted view on specific topics (e.g., Skaaning, 2007). 
 
Isomorphic tendencies. Alongside examining the cyclical nature of CVC investments, 
the isomorphic tendencies of a CVC unit provide an interesting starting point for further 
research. Primarily, Souitaris et al. (2012) observed how CVC units structure their 
organization within different institutional environments. The authors argue that based on 
prevailing norms, CVC units seek legitimacy either with their corporate parent 
(endoisomorphism) or with the IVC industry (exoisomorphism). Accordingly, CVC units 
                                                 
14 Please note, counts are not mutually exclusive due to the fact that articles could apply several statistical 
methods simultaneously. 
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usually not only operate within two different environments but also in different cultural 
regions. For instance, in addition to their US headquarters, Qualcomm Ventures operates 
offices in several geographical regions including Europe, India, Israel, China, and Korea. 
Therefore, future research could examine how those different cultural settings influence the 
process of isomorphism as such, and also address the question of whether varying tendencies 
can coexist simultaneously within a CVC unit. In addition, the isomorphic processes of CVC 
units could also restrict the selection of a syndication partner in a funding round. However, 
their relatively small sample meant Souitaris et al. (2012) could not relate the concept of 
isomorphism to performance. Therefore, future research could link the organizational 
structures of CVC vehicles to performance metrics such as the survival of a unit or to exit 
rates. 
 
Governance modes. To the best of the author’s knowledge there is almost no evidence 
regarding the interplay of the CVC governance modes and performance. As Dushnitsky 
(2006) already mentioned, the adoption of investment practices from IVCs can be organized 
in three ways. Besides self-managed and wholly-owned subsidiaries, some corporations tend 
to operate as an LP in pooled or dedicated funds, typically managed by IVCs. Those different 
organizational settings (i.e., the level of autonomy or the compensation of managers) could 
strengthen or weaken the potential benefits associated with the support of portfolio 
companies. Other scholars might address the question of which governmental mode is most 
suitable for corporations facing different circumstances.  
 
Raison d’être. Another major academic and practical issue arises from the cyclicality of 
CVC activities. If a corporation is already committed to CVC, further performance 
measurements and tools will be necessary to support managers trying to convey the value of a 
CVC unit, especially if the unit fails to deliver the anticipated financial gains. This question 
raised by Teppo and Wüstenhagen (2009) involves the way corporations develop suitable 
performance metrics to measure the benefits associated with CVC. With the exception of the 
work of Bassen et al. (2006), research examining this issue is nonexistent, although such new 
measurements could stimulate research by drawing a clearer picture of the successful 
contributions of CVC. 
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2.8 Limitations 
As with any research, the current study does have some technical limitations. While 
VOSviewer is particularly well-suited for visualizing larger networks (Van Eck & Waltman, 
2014) and its set of unique and valuable techniques is undoubtedly useful compared to other 
science mapping software tools (Cobo, López‐Herrera, Herrera‐Viedma, & Herrera, 2011), 
the interdisciplinary approach of this literature review and the resulting sample of 65 articles 
might have influenced the results provided by VOSviewer. First, owing to the underlying 
sample, journals with a relatively small number of CVC-related articles tend to be isolated 
(e.g., the International Journal of Technology Management) or be assigned to an 
inappropriate cluster; however, this is an issue affecting only one paper in the current 
analysis. The journal Administrative Science Quarterly is grouped with the finance-oriented 
literature but mainly addresses management-related topics. This is confirmed by only the 
article of Pahnke et al. (2015) being published in this journal. Second, this issue is 
strengthened by the fact that the prevailing literature is highly heterogeneous in terms of the 
articles’ dates of publication (ranging from 1992 to 2016) and the use of full counting, where 
each bibliographic coupling link has the same weight (for a similar approach see, Van Raan, 
2015). Consequently, to paint a holistic picture of the CVC literature, predefined VOSViewer 
thresholds regarding the total number of documents constituting a source and the number of 
bibliographic coupling links were set to the appropriate minimum levels.  
 
It should be mentioned that there is an ongoing discourse questioning the importance of 
received citations as a proxy for academic quality, creativity, and impact (Wang, 2014). Based 
on the “Matthew effect” a vast number of articles aim to investigate the antecedents of 
received citations in the academic landscape. For instance, there is evidence that research 
from prestigious universities (Crane, 1965; Medoff, 2006), papers published in highly-ranked 
journals (Judge, Cable, Colbert, & Rynes, 2007; Lariviere & Gingras, 2010), awards earned 
(Azoulay, Stuart, & Wang, 2013), and a well-development network (Gonzalez-Brambila, 
Veloso, & Krackhardt, 2013; Li, Liao, & Yen, 2013) can positively affect the citations of a 
paper, resulting in a cumulative advantage. However, Lariviere and Gingras (2010) argue that 
the intrinsic value of an article is only a weak signal of quality and particularly journals with a 
high impact factor could add a significant quality surplus that results in a greater probability 
of citation. Hence, it could be possible that the citation-based analysis such as is applied in 
this article (see Figure 4 and 5) could be skewed to favor highly-ranked journals and well-
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established members of the academic community. In this vein, it could be argued, that articles 
with a long reference list influence the presented results. It therefore seems obvious that 
articles submitted to higher-ranked journals (A+ and A) tend to have extended reference lists, 
since the theoretical grounding is more rigorous. That demand for rigor means papers in A+ 
or A journals average 90.47 citations (SD=36.207), while articles published in B journals or 
lower draw on an average of 78.37 sources (SD=33.022). However, a t-test showed that this 
difference is statistically not significant.  
 
To expand the findings of the literature review, subsequent studies might reduce the 
selection criteria applied here or adopt cut-off criteria based on impact factor, such as the 
Thomson Reuters Journal Citation Reports (JCR) or the SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 
provided by Scopus to ensure quality (Bouncken, Gast, Kraus, & Bogers, 2015).  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
To conclude, this review explored the prevailing literature within the CVC research 
stream from both a bibliographical and a content-driven perspective. The article uses a 
network analysis approach to emphasize the current structure within the CVC field by 
introducing bibliographic methods into this particular research area. Consequently, the 
bibliographic network analysis revealed that the extant work is mainly driven by two 
dominant logics, management and finance. Both streams try to capture particular facets of the 
CVC phenomenon from different perspectives. More precisely, because both logics tend to 
separate themselves from each other, this article thoroughly examined emerging research 
trends and issues from a sample of 65 articles. The review consequently outlines several paths 
for further work and research gaps that might stimulate the academic discussion in the CVC 
context. 
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3 A World of Difference? The Impact of Corporate Venture 
Capitalists’ Investment Motivation on Startup Valuation15 
 
Abstract 
CVC investors are regularly painted with the same brush, a fact underscored by the 
often observed belief in the extant literature that CVCs form a homogeneous group. In 
contrast to this simplifying perspective, this paper categorizes CVCs into subgroups by 
examining their levels of strategic and financial investment motivation using CATA and 
cluster analysis. To validate the resulting clusters, this paper studies the impact of CVC type 
on startup valuation from an intra-group perspective by applying HLM, thus illustrating 
which particular investment motivation might be preferable to others in the context of 
negotiating valuations. An empirical analysis of 52 CVC mission statements and 147 startup 
valuations between January 2009 and January 2016 revealed that first, CVCs with a strategic 
investment motivation assign lower startup valuations than CVCs with an analytic motivation 
that have moderate levels of the two scrutinized dimensions, suggesting that entrepreneurs 
trade off these CVCs’ value-adding contributions against a valuation discount; second, CVCs 
with an unfocused investment motivation pay significantly higher purchase prices, thus 
supporting the hypothesis that they have a so-called liability of vacillation; and third, the 
valuations of CVCs with a financial investment motive are not significantly different from 
those of their analytic peers. In sum, our results add to the knowledge of the continuum of 
corporate investors’ investment motivation by illustrating how startup valuations differ across 
CVC types. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
CVC, which comprises minority equity investments from incumbent enterprises in 
private startups, is on the increase and has now returned to the levels of its heyday in 2000, a 
fact that underscores the cyclical nature of CVC (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006; Caldbeck, 2015; NVCA, 2016). According to the MoneyTree Report published 
by the NVCA and PwC, CVCs participated in 905 transactions representing 21% of all US VC 
                                                 
15  This study is published under an open access license. The original publication Röhm et al. (2018) appeared in: 
Journal of Business Economics, Vol. 88, Issue 3-4, pp. 531-557, which can be found at the following address 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-017-0857-5. 
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deals in 2015 (NVCA, 2015, 2016). In light of this, it is scarcely surprising that researchers 
have increased their interest in the role of CVCs in startup valuations (Gompers & Lerner, 
2000; Hellmann, 2002; Masulis & Nahata, 2009; Heughebaert & Manigart, 2012). The 
empirical evidence, however, is mixed; for instance, Gompers and Lerner (2000) reported that 
CVCs pay higher purchase prices than IVCs, while Heughebaert and Manigart (2012) found 
no significant difference between the two investor types. Intriguingly, it is well established 
that CVCs differ in their motivation regarding the target of strategic goals, such as gaining a 
window on technology, and financial returns (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2006). It is therefore surprising that to date the impact of CVCs’ heterogeneity on startup 
valuations in terms of their strategic and financial investment motivation has not been 
explored further. To address this conundrum, we analyzed the variability of startup valuations 
with CVC involvement against the backdrop of CVCs’ underlying investment motivations. 
Therefore, in contrast to previous research that generally studies the inter-group comparison 
between the valuations of CVCs and IVCs, we deliberately shift the focus to an intra-group 
perspective to effectively scrutinize how CVCs’ startup valuations differ based on the 
evidence of their publicly stated investment motives. 
 
To discern a corporate investor’s levels of strategic and financial motivation, we 
analyzed the public statements from the websites of 52 CVCs using CATA (Short, Broberg, 
Cogliser, & Brigham, 2010; McKenny, Short, & Payne, 2013). Our exploratory cluster 
analysis identified four types of CVCs: CVCs with a (i) strategic, (ii) financial, (iii) analytic, 
and (iv) unfocused motivation. It should be noted that for the last two CVC motivations, we 
draw on the labeling and findings of the seminal work of Miles, Snow, Meyer, and Coleman 
(1978). To validate the identified clusters within the paper’s theory-testing section, we applied 
HLM to explore 147 startup valuations between January 2009 and January 2016 that 
characterized the first round of CVC involvement. 
 
Consequently, we contribute to multiple streams of research. Our first contribution is 
that we extend current research by classifying CVCs into more fine-grained subgroups. 
Specifically, by focusing on CVCs’ investment motivation our research differs from Gompers 
and Lerner (2000), who used CVCs’ parent firms’ annual reports to assess the strategic fit 
between a corporate parent’s business lines and the startup for each investment. By evaluating 
the type of investment in terms of its strategic fit, the approach of Gompers and Lerner (2000) 
implies that multiple investment categories can be assigned to a single CVC, thereby 
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disregarding the implications of a CVC’s holistic investment motivation for the valuation of a 
startup. Thus, we deliberately analyze a CVC’s overall investment motivation and hence 
extend the black and white approach of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006), classifying CVCs’ 
investment motivation as either strategic or financial, and go beyond that to address its 
limitations stemming from the drawbacks of human coding (Neuendorf, 2002; Short et al., 
2010). We do this by introducing CATA and cluster analysis to measure CVCs’ degree of 
strategic and financial motivation. A second contribution of the current study lies in adding to 
the studies of Basu et al. (2011), Cumming and Dai (2011) and Heughebaert and Manigart 
(2012) by examining how the heterogeneous characteristics of CVCs affect the valuation of 
startups. The findings of the current research also contribute to the prevailing literature stream 
by providing evidence that CVCs with a high strategic motivation pay lower purchase prices. 
This, in turn, suggests that entrepreneurs trade off highly strategically motivated CVCs’ 
value-adding contributions against a valuation discount. 
 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the current 
literature addressing distinctive CVC investment motives, and reflects the paper’s underlying 
motivation. Section 3.3, the paper’s explorative part, describes the data to construct the 
study’s underlying sample and describes its approach of clustering CVCs into mutually 
exclusive subgroups. Section 3.4, the theory-testing part, borrows from the extant VC and 
CVC literature to develop hypotheses about the impact of the identified types of CVC 
motivation on startup valuations while also describing the paper’s methodological approach 
and outlining the main empirical findings. Section 3.5 discusses the results and Section 3.6 
draws a conclusion. 
 
3.2 Literature review and motivation 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) were the first to find empirical evidence that CVCs 
assigned significantly higher startup valuations than IVCs, indicating that CVCs pay a 
strategic premium. The study further subdivided CVC investments into two classes by 
analyzing the parent companies’ annual reports to search for connections between the parents’ 
business lines and the startup investments they sanctioned. The first class included CVC 
investments where CVC parent companies had direct strategic relations with a venture, while 
the second class encompassed investments for which the authors did not find such a relation. 
Interestingly, the authors reported that the average pre-money valuation paid for CVC 
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investments with a strategic fit was lower than that reported by their peers, even though one 
might intuitively expect higher prices for such investments. Building on this, Masulis and 
Nahata (2009) found empirical evidence that complementary CVCs, which invest in startups 
with products that complement those of the CVCs’ parent companies (as opposed to 
competitive CVCs, which favor startups with products that compete with those of their parent 
firms) pay lower purchase prices. Moreover, among others, Chesbrough (2002), Dushnitsky 
and Lenox (2006) and Ivanov and Xie (2010) draw a line between strategic and financial or 
non-strategic CVCs. 
 
The distinction between strategic and financial CVCs seems to be well established. The 
critical issue, however, is how to determine and measure the degree of a CVC’s strategic and 
financial motivation. While most scholars, like Masulis and Nahata (2009) and Ivanov and 
Xie (2010), present financial CVCs as merely the opposite of their strategic counterparts, we 
believe that this approach does not capture a more moderate motivation of CVCs. 
Interestingly enough, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) were unable to classify 116 of their total 
171 CVCs as having either a strategic or a financial investment motivation. For this reason—
and also because Heughebaert and Manigart (2012) establish that the type of VC investor 
influences the valuations assigned to startups—studying the different investor types of the VC 
landscape is important. The prevailing simplistic black and white approach dominating the 
academic discourse in the CVC literature highlights the absence of empirical work 
scrutinizing the continuum of CVCs’ investment motivation. 
 
Identifying the varying types of CVCs’ investment motivation will thus help to shed 
light on the interactions of CVCs and entrepreneurs and, in turn, the variability of CVCs’ 
startup valuations. The following example illustrates the topic’s relevance: A startup 
entrepreneur looking for funding receives offers from both a financially and a strategically 
motivated CVC. While the financially motivated CVC only invests for financial reasons, the 
strategically motivated CVC, owing to its intrinsic investment motivation, will commit to 
providing the startup with access to its resource base. That resource base can benefit the 
startup, for instance, by attracting new foreign and domestic customers, or by helping the 
startup’s technologies to evolve, implying a higher value-add potential. Hence, based on the 
well-established reasoning within the literature that entrepreneurs trade off higher value-add 
potential against a lower valuation (Hsu, 2004), it must be concluded that the strategically 
motivated CVC should be able to negotiate a lower valuation. Nevertheless, despite the 
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evident importance of CVCs’ investment motivation to startup valuations, the extant literature 
has not comprehensively studied its impact. To fill this research gap, the current study intends 
to expand the prevailing black and white approach to CVCs’ investment motivation and then 
to validate the cogency of the explored CVC types against the assigned startup valuations. 
 
3.3 Exploring CVCs’ investment motivation 
The explorative part of this paper investigates the different types of CVC investment 
motivation. To overcome the limitations of the current literature, our explorative research 
strategy is based on a rigorous combination of CATA and cluster analysis because that 
approach permits us to objectively identify the whole continuum of CVCs’ investment 
motivation. Furthermore, we followed the approach of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) in 
relying on CVCs’ publicly disclosed statements as this makes it possible to parse a CVC’s 
investment motivation in a front-stage setting. 
 
3.3.1 Data and sample design 
To construct a sample of CVCs unbiased by cross-country differences, like the 
institutional or cultural environment (Wright, Pruthi, & Lockett, 2005), we searched Dow 
Jones VentureSource database, which is commonly used in the VC literature (Korteweg & 
Sorensen, 2010), for accessing details of domestic startup investments by US-based CVCs. To 
account for the cyclical nature of CVC, we considered the time period between January 2009 
and January 2016 because CVCs have played an increasingly important role in startup 
investments since the economic crisis in 2008, and because it is apparently the most recent 
CVC wave (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; Roof, 2015).16 We further limited our search to 
transactions stating the startups’ post-money valuation (i.e., the valuation after a financing 
round, including the amount invested) and excluded deals which only reported the estimated 
post-money valuation provided by VentureSource. By excluding estimated valuations, we 
avoided the risk that the underlying assumptions of the estimation algorithm would bias our 
analysis. Indeed, the algorithm from VentureSource in partnership with Sand Hill 
Econometrics does not even incorporate different types of VC firms as predictor variables 
(Blosser & Woodward, 2014). Thus, we considered it unlikely that the reported estimations 
                                                 
16 In January 2015 Michael Yang, managing director at Comcast Ventures, stated: “Corporate venture capital has 
been on the rise since the bowels of 2008” (Roof, 2015). 
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could capture potential valuation impacts in light of CVCs’ investment motivation. As this, 
however, is the center of our empirical analysis, we decided to exclude estimated valuations 
from our sample. 
 
In general, we focus on financing rounds where CVCs invest in a startup for the first 
time rather than on follow-on rounds, as the initial investment round is when the impact of 
CVC investment motivation might be expected to be most pronounced (see also Zhang, 
Wong, & Ho, 2016). In cases where multiple CVCs initially invested in the same investment 
round, we followed Masulis and Nahata (2009) and treated each CVC-startup dyad separately. 
This process yielded an initial sample of 58 CVCs with 161 distinctive CVC-startup pairs. 
Finally, we reviewed the identified CVCs and included only those that complied with the 
definition and governance of CVCs proposed by Dushnitsky and Lavie (2010), focusing on 
legally separate CVC arms and established companies with external corporate business 
development units. Hence, we excluded the direct startup investments of JumpStart Inc., 
Facebook Inc., Citrix Systems Inc., MasterCard Inc., Second Century Ventures LLC and 
Peacock Equity, resulting in a final sample of 52 CVCs with 147 unique investments, which 
compares favorably to the sample sizes of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) and Wadhwa and 
Basu (2013). The size of the final sample is driven by our focus on deals with both first time 
CVC involvement and a stated post-money valuation, which is sensitive information and 
accordingly less-frequently revealed (Kaplan et al., 2002). 
 
Having compiled a sample of CVCs, we next—based on the aforementioned front-
stage approach of Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006)—gathered the relevant information available 
from each CVC’s mission statement from its website. The approach ensures the closest 
possible fit between our research question and the type of documents used, as recommended 
by Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer (2007). Accordingly, the following website information sources 
were included: Message from the CEO, About Us, Who We Are, Our Approach, Our Mission 
or alternatively a CVC unit’s description of itself found in press releases. Hence, all 
organizationally produced texts offer a clear view of the underlying mission statements (e.g., 
Cochran & David, 1986; Pearce & Fred, 1987; Mullane, 2002). It should be remarked that 
when a CVC’s website was not active as of January 2016 due to a merger, spin-out, 
acquisition, or abandonment, we retrospectively accessed the required information using the 
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine (Hackett, Parmanto, & Zeng, 2004); a technique that 
has been applied previously (e.g., Youtie, Hicks, Shapira, & Horsley, 2012). 
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3.3.2 Capturing investment motivation through CATA 
We relied on CATA to capture CVCs’ levels of strategic and financial investment 
motivation from their public mission statements. The underlying idea of CATA is to classify 
communication while simultaneously allowing for contextual inferences (Weber, 1990; 
Krippendorff, 2004), which offer researchers deep insights into the perceptions and beliefs 
behind an organization’s narrative (D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). Previous articles used 
CATA to derive theoretically based but otherwise difficult to measure constructs from 
organizational narratives such as an IPO prospectus (Payne, Moore, Bell, & Zachary, 2013), a 
shutdown message (Mandl, Berger, & Kuckertz, 2016), a corporate website (Zachary, 
McKenny, Short, Davis, & Wu, 2011) or an annual report (Moss, Payne, & Moore, 2014). In 
contrast to human coding, where experts and trained coders evaluate the underlying text 
corpus, CATA improves the reliability and speed of the considered measurements 
substantially (Rosenberg, Schnurr, & Oxman, 1990; Morris, 1994; Krippendorff, 2004). 
Furthermore, we chose CATA because this method focuses solely on publicly accessible 
information, overcoming the issue of insufficient response rates when conducting survey 
studies (Zachary, McKenny, Short, & Payne, 2011). Especially in entrepreneurial and VC 
related articles, the population of LPs (e.g., Kuckertz, Kollmann, Röhm, & Middelberg, 
2015), IVCs (e.g., Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998) and corporate investment vehicles has 
proved reluctant to respond to prior surveys (Maula, Autio, & Murray, 2003; Maula et al., 
2005; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014; Proksch, Röhr, Ernst, Pinkwart, & Schefczyk, 2017). In 
general, the gathered mission statements comprise between 42 and 8,136 words, resulting in a 
mean word count of 428 and a standard deviation (SD) of 1,098. On average, a sentence 
comprises 24 words (SD = 6). 
 
To enhance the construct validity, we utilized the procedures introduced by Short et al. 
(2010) to develop mutually exclusive word lists capturing the whole continuum of CVCs’ 
investment motivation. To capture all facets of the underlying theoretical construct and 
increase its validation simultaneously, Short et al. (2010) recommend the use of both 
deductively and inductively derived word lists. As a starting point, we developed a 
deductively derived word list building on prior theory (Potter & Levine‐Donnerstein, 1999). 
Therefore, we created a working definition for each investment motive based on the findings 
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of Winters and Murfin (1988), Chesbrough (2002), Ernst et al. (2005), Weber and Weber 
(2005), and Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006). 
 
Word representatives and synonyms were generated in turn for each construct (i.e., 
financial and strategic), using Rodale’s (1978) The Synonym Finder, integrated dictionaries 
(money and quantitative) of LIWC2015 and the already established profitability word list by 
Zachary, McKenny, Short, and Payne (2011). Although initially written in 1978, The 
Synonym Finder remains deeply rooted and widely accepted within the academic landscape 
(e.g., Moss, Short, Payne, & Lumpkin, 2011; Zachary et al., 2011; McKenny et al., 2013; 
Brigham, Lumpkin, Payne, & Zachary, 2014; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2016; 
Vracheva, Judge, & Madden, 2016). Owing to this impressive coverage, we decided to apply 
The Synonym Finder over other comparable and more recent dictionaries. The resulting word 
lists were then supplemented by a systematic analysis of all publications within the CVC 
research branch using the WordStat text analysis program from Provalis Research to extract 
knowledge and trends from an underlying text corpus. Consequently, a total of 300 additional 
words and 1,344 phrases (e.g., window on technology, promote entrepreneurship, assets under 
management, and return on investment) which appeared at least 25 times were analyzed and 
allocated. In a last step, the construct validity of the word lists was assessed by two 
independent experts. Based on Holsti (1969) interrater reliabilities of .89 (strategic 
dimension) and .90 (financial dimension) were determined, indicating substantial agreement 
between the two raters (Short et al., 2010). Following this, we applied an inductive analysis 
supplementing the deductive lists with additional words and phrases directly stemming from 
the extracted mission statements. The combination of inductively and deductively derived 
word lists is commonly used in the field of organizational studies (Duriau et al., 2007; 
Zachary et al., 2011; Moss et al., 2014; Wolfe & Shepherd, 2015) and helps to forge links 
between theoretically driven research branches and more practically oriented ones (Van De 
Ven & Johnson, 2006; Short et al., 2010). Table 4 reports the full lists of all deductively and 
inductively derived words. 
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Table 4: Applied word lists to operationalize a CVC’s investment motivation 
Variable Word lists† 
Strategic deductive 
(68 words) 
alliance, blueprint, boost demand, complement*, continuity, core, create new, development process, emerg*, enabling, entrepreneurial 
culture, entrepreneurial spirit, exploit*, explor*, external growth, fit, future, generalship, goal, opportun*, improve corporate image, 
increase demand, innovat*, instrumentality, Intellectual Property, internal efficiency, IP, key, knowledge, learning, long term, long-
term, monitor*, new markets, new technologies, objective*, partner*, patent*, path, pioneer*, pivot*, plan*, position, program*, 
project, promote entrepreneurship, R&D, raise demand, renewal, research & development, research and development, shift*, social 
interaction, sourcing mode, spinoff*, spin-off*, stimulating demand, substi*, sustainable, synergi*, tactic*, talent, technological 
development, transfer*, venturing, vision, window on technology  
Strategic inductive 
(23 words) 
absorb*, access*, adapt*, capabilit*, capacit*, catalys*, collaborat*, commerciali*, flexibility, foster*, hiring, incubat*, integrat*, path, 
problem*, radar, recruit*, scout*, solution*, spinout*, trend*, strategic*, spin-out* 
Financial deductive 
(79 words) 
acqui*, assets under management, AUM, bottom line, buy back, buyback, buyout, buy-out, capital commitment, capital efficien*, capital 
expenditures, capital under management, cash flow, cash on cash, CoC, cash*, cost effective*, cost effic*, cost*, DEBT, distributed to 
paid in, DPI, dividend*, earn*, EBIT, EBITDA, economic, emolument, equity, exit, finance*, fiscal, gain*, hurdle rate, income*, initial 
public offering, investment, IPO, IRR, liquidity, loan, lucrative, lucre, M&A, market to book, market-to-book, merger, mezzanine, 
monetary, money*, paid off, pay off, pay*, pecuniary, performance, profit*, quartile, recompense, remunerat*, return*, revenue*, 
reward*, risk, ROI, sale*, scalability, secondary purchase, share*, stake, surplus, takeover, term sheet, track record, TVPI, valu*, well-
paying, winnings, wins, yield* 
Financial inductive 
(7 words) 
capitalis*, discount*, maximi*, metric, odds, price, streamline* 
† A wildcard (*) indicates that the root and different variants of a word were used. In addition, all abbreviations were also  considered in their full forms. 
This table presents the resulting word lists based on the deductive and inductive approaches. The first row contains the deductively derived words for the strategic dimension 
and the second row the respective inductively compiled words. In sum, 91 words on the strategic side were taken as basis for CATA. The third and fourth row report the 
deductively and inductively derived words for the financial dimension, resulting in a total of 86 words. 
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After merging the deductively and inductively derived word lists, we subsequently 
relied on LIWC2015, a powerful computerized text analysis tool introduced by Tausczik and 
Pennebaker (2010), to extract the variables of interest. In addition, we followed Jegadeesh and 
Wu (2013) and omitted words that are accompanied by a negator (i.e., not, no, and never) 
within the space of three words. By standardizing all measures as a percentage of overall 
words, LIWC2015 controls for the variance that could arise from the total word count of an 
underlying text corpus by default. Because longer mission statements increase the likelihood 
of there being strategic and financial related content, LIWC2015 provides standardized output 
variables to compare the investment motivation of all 52 corporate investment vehicles in our 
dataset. Hence, we calculated the strategic and financial investment motivation for every 
CVC. Across all CVC mission statements, we found an average word count of 4.61% (SD = 
1.89, max. 10.75) representing a strategic investment motive respectively 2.57% (SD = 1.73, 
max. 8.16) for the financial dimension. To control for potential volatility in CVCs’ investment 
motivation, we have conducted an extensive test to validate the conformity of the long-term 
nature of CVCs’ underlying investment motive. Briefly, using the Wayback Machine (Hackett 
et al., 2004), we gathered the historic mission statements of all retrospectively accessible 
CVC websites. To observe the longevity of CVCs’ investment motivation, we then chose the 
very first participation of a particular corporate investor within our sample as a reference 
point for the data collection. Furthermore, we draw on the Directory of Venture Capital and 
Private Equity Firms (Gottlieb, 2008) and historical press releases to identify variances of 
URL addresses. For instance, Comcast Ventures was initially incorporated under the name of 
Comcast Interactive Capital. Unfortunately, not all CVC websites could be restored. Hence, 
this procedure resulted in a total subsample of 44 clearly identified CVCs. In a final step, we 
analyzed the narrowed subsample by correlating the historic and current investment motives, 
indicating strong support for CVCs’ stable investment motivation. In detail, we found a high 
correlation between both points in time for the financial (r = .921; p ≤ .01) and strategic 
dimension (r = .651; p ≤ .01). 
 
3.3.3 Clustering CVCs based on their investment motivation 
To classify the different levels of CVCs’ strategic and financial investment motivation, 
we employed cluster analysis to identify mutually exclusive segments of CVCs with a 
comparable investment motivation (Chiu, Fang, Chen, Wang, & Jeris, 2001). The clustering 
method used is based on a two-step procedure, where subclusters are initially defined and 
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subsequently merged until an optimal number of clusters is reached. We chose this method 
because within the second step, a standard agglomerative clustering algorithm estimates 
myriad solutions that are reduced to an optimal number of clusters. To do this, we applied 
Schwarz’s (1978) Bayesian inference criterion (BIC) that features less subjectivity than other 
clustering methods (see Ketchen & Shook, 1996 for an overview of alternative clustering 
methods and criteria). Based on the BIC, we then clustered the 52 CVCs into four mutually 
exclusive subgroups. 
 
Figure 7: Results of the two-step cluster analysis approach 
 
This figure depicts the resulting box plots of the cluster analysis. While the box plots represent the distribution of 
the overall sample, the within cluster distribution is shown as whiskers. Thus, the depicted cluster symbols 
represent the corresponding median values. The x-axis states the calculated ratio of all words that match our 
predefined word lists and the total word count of the underlying text document, thereby controlling for size 
effects. CVCs with a strategic motivation score very high on the strategic dimension, while their counterparts 
with a financial motivation do so on the financial side. Their counterparts with an analytic motivation show 
moderate levels of both dimensions, whereas CVCs with an unfocused motivation lack a clear investment 
motivation, considerably underperforming their peers on the strategic dimension. 
 
Figure 7 depicts the results of the cluster analysis. Overall, the box plots of our cluster 
analysis reveal that CVCs in general are more strategically motivated (see also Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006). Nonetheless, the box plots also point to significant intra-group differences. 
Thus, to better grasp the varying investment motivation and to clarify the following empirical 
discussion, we assigned each CVC cluster a label encapsulating its specific characteristics. 
The labeling process was based on the argument that CVCs’ strategic and financial 
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investment motivations are two ends of a continuum, while an analytic motivation shows 
moderate levels of the two. Accordingly, CVCs with a strategic motivation (15 CVCs) score 
very highly on our strategic dimension, meaning that these CVCs have an exceptionally 
strong focus on achieving strategic benefits. In contrast, their counterparts with a financial 
motivation (13 CVCs) are characterized by a strong financial focus in their investment 
motivation. CVCs with an analytic motivation (15 CVCs), on the other hand, exhibit more 
moderate levels of the two criteria with a greater tendency toward the strategic dimension. 
CVCs with an unfocused motivation (9 CVCs) are ranked in the moderate bracket of our 
financial criteria, but substantially underperform their counterparts on the strategic side, and 
are moreover comparable to the residual strategy type called reactors by Miles et al. (1978). 
 
To further verify our resulting clusters, we followed Ketchen and Shook (1996) and 
sought expert opinion on them from two anonymous executives with relevant experience in 
the field of corporate investments. Their feedback was that our findings aligned with their 
perception of the actual CVC landscape. Illustrative text excerpts are used to exemplify the 
types of CVC investment motivation identified (see Table 5). 
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Table 5: Illustrative text excerpts of the identified clusters 
 Strategic motivation Financial motivation Analytic motivation Unfocused motivation 
Illustrative text excerpts We work with our investment 
candidates and portfolio 
companies to ensure that any 
synergies are explored and 
developed. 
 
(…) focuses on emerging (…) 
technology companies that have 
the potential to provide long-term 
strategic growth options (…). 
(…) attractive financial return 
potential commensurate to the 
risk profile of the investment. 
 
We invest for financial return 
(…). 
Our approach reflects our 
understanding of the limitations of 
both traditional corporate and 
financial venture capital models. 
 
We offer entrepreneurs all the 
strengths of a strategic investor 
(…). But, like a traditional or 
independent fund, we measure our 
success by the returns of our 
portfolio companies (…). 
(…) provides seed, venture, and 
growth-stage funding to the best 
companies not strategic 
investments (…). 
 
We started (…) with a mission to 
help entrepreneurs make the world 
better. 
Number of CVCs 15 13 15 9 
This table shows illustrative text excerpts from the mission statements of each CVC type. It also states the total number of the respective cluster. 
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3.4 Validating the identified clusters: CVCs’ investment motivation and 
startup valuation 
To empirically test the cogency of clusters, Ketchen and Shook (1996) strongly 
recommend applying multivariate analysis using external variables that were not considered 
in the cluster analysis itself, but that have a theoretical connection with the resulting clusters. 
In our case, relying on the work of Heughebaert and Manigart (2012), the valuation of the 
CVC-backed startups provides such an external benchmark variable. Accordingly, the theory-
testing section of this paper draws from the extant literature to hypothesize how the identified 
CVC types might affect startup valuations. Regarding the hypotheses development, it should 
be noted that we use the CVC cluster with an analytic motivation as reference group since this 
allows us to derive more accessible intra-group suppositions relating to the other CVC types 
with either a strategic and financial or an unfocused motivation. 
 
3.5 Theoretical development and hypotheses 
From a strategic point of view, CVC investments, in contrast to IVC investments, are 
typically marked by dual reciprocity and thus represent a triad between CVC unit, startup, and 
the CVC’s parent company (Chesbrough, 2002; Weber & Weber, 2011).  
 
The literature distinguishes between the absorptive capacity entailed by the use of CVC 
as well as CVCs’ value-added services supplied to startups (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a, 
2005b; Maula et al., 2005; Zu Knyphausen-Aufsess, 2005; Ivanov & Xie, 2010). Absorptive 
capacity means that CVCs’ parent organizations exploit knowledge through their venture 
investments, primarily to gain a window on innovative technology but also to explore new 
products and industry trends (Winters & Murfin, 1988; Keil, 2000; Maula, 2007). In fact, 
there is some empirical evidence reporting higher CVC investment activity is associated with 
an increase in CVCs’ parent firms’ levels of patenting (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). 
Similarly, Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005b) found that CVCs’ parent companies capitalize on 
the knowledge base of startups to complement their own innovativeness. 
 
The majority of papers, however, analyze the opposite value transfer within the CVC 
triad, namely the value-adding services CVCs’ parent organizations provide to startups (e.g., 
McNally, 1995). In this regard, the findings of Maula et al. (2005) highlight that CVCs’ 
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value-adding contributions differ from those of IVCs, suggesting that there are probably 
circumstances when entrepreneurs consciously accept the involvement of CVCs. Specifically, 
startups have been found to be able to capitalize on an incumbent’s brand name to establish 
their trustworthiness by gaining access to a corporation’s network of cooperation partners (Zu 
Knyphausen-Aufsess, 2005). Additionally, Maula et al. (2005) found evidence that corporates 
are particularly valuable for startups due to their capability to offer technological support and 
attract foreign customers, which allows the startups to scale their business internationally 
more rapidly. Moreover, Park and Steensma (2013), Chemmanur et al., (2014), and Alvarez-
Garrido and Dushnitsky (2016) showed that after CVC involvement, ventures’ innovativeness 
rates measured in terms of numbers of patents were higher than those of their counterparts 
backed by IVCs. In this regard, Ivanov and Xie (2010) found that CVCs only add value to 
startups that have a strategic fit with their parent organizations. Interestingly, from a CVC 
intra-group perspective, Gompers and Lerner (2000) reported that startup investments with a 
strategic fit with CVCs’ parent firms, on average received a lower valuation than startup 
investments lacking such a relationship. Therefore, we suggest that CVCs with a strategic 
motivation should have and provide more value-added support capabilities than their analytic 
peers. In sum, all this implies that there are reasonable grounds to assume that (just as with 
more reputable IVCs who are expected to provide more value-adding services) there could be 
circumstances when entrepreneurs tolerate lower valuations. This in turn implies that 
entrepreneurs are willing to accept valuation discounts in exchange for more comprehensive 
value-adding contributions through highly strategically motivated CVCs (Hsu, 2004). 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Everything else being equal, CVCs with a strategic motivation assign lower 
valuations to startups than CVCs with an analytic motivation do. 
 
Our cluster analysis confirmed current research revealing that there are CVCs who 
invest in startups primarily for financial reasons (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Masulis & 
Nahata, 2009). This means that financially motivated CVCs stand in direct competition with 
IVCs (Heughebaert & Manigart, 2012). However, IVCs are financial professionals who look 
for attractive risk-return profiles when investing in startups and, among other things, add 
value through their networks within the financial services community (Maula et al., 2005). 
Financially motivated CVCs in contrast, might lack such broad connections within the 
financial services community as they generally have less experience of startup investments. 
62 
This, in turn, could put these CVCs in an adverse position in terms of both value-add potential 
and credibility (Maula et al., 2005; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). Accordingly, financially 
motivated CVCs might lack the capabilities to select the startups that are most attractive from 
a pure risk-return perspective, and furthermore might lack the necessary valuation expertise. It 
follows that financially motivated CVCs, as opposed to strategically motivated ones, could, at 
least in part, fail to have a comparative advantage and a well-defined position within the VC 
industry and thus, potentially only offer a second-best solution for entrepreneurs seeking a 
financial investor. Therefore, we predict that CVCs with a financial motivation pay higher 
purchase prices than CVCs with an analytic motivation. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Everything else being equal CVCs with a financial motivation assign higher 
valuations to startups than CVCs with an analytic motivation do. 
 
Our CATA and cluster analysis identified a CVC cluster with an unfocused 
motivation, something we consider particularly interesting. CVCs with an unfocused 
motivation lack a focus on a specific investment motive. This type of CVC investor lacks the 
commitment to seek out strategic investments. One reason for this weak strategic motivation 
could be that these CVCs do not receive sufficient backing from their corporate parents, 
which could negatively influence the CVC-startup relationship. Close relationships between 
CVCs and entrepreneurs and a mutual understanding of the investment motivation is an 
important factor in CVC investments (Hardymon, DeNino, & Salter, 1983; Sykes, 1990). 
However, in the case of CVCs with an unfocused motivation, a lack of a clearly defined 
investment motive might cause entrepreneurs to be wary of agency problems stemming from 
a potential lack of alignment on goals between themselves and the CVCs. Consequently, that 
potential goal incongruence could cause entrepreneurs severe moral hazard concerns, because 
rather unfocused CVCs could lack the effort and serious intentions necessary to support their 
portfolio firms (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Maula, 2001). Hellmann (2002) and Masulis and Nahata 
(2009) have pointed out that entrepreneurs facing severe moral hazard issues extract higher 
valuations from CVCs. In other words, this is in line with standard bargaining theory 
implying that entrepreneurs demand a valuation premium in anticipation of potential moral 
hazard problems. From a CVC perspective, this valuation premium, in turn, could point to a 
liability of vacillation as these CVCs lack a consistent and tangible investment motivation. 
Consequently, we hypothesize that CVCs with an unfocused motivation in comparison to 
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their analytic counterparts, who are likely to have a substantially more tactile investment 
motivation, pay higher purchase prices for startups. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Everything else being equal, CVCs with an unfocused motivation assign higher 
valuations to startups than CVCs with an analytic motivation do. 
 
3.6 Measures and descriptive statistics 
We obtained the data underlying the analysis from the sample described in Section 3.3.1 
and supplemented it with additional information on startups’ and CVCs’ parent firms’ SIC 
code classifications from the Thomson One database. We further followed Bernerth and 
Aguinis (2016) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) in limiting our predictor variables to those 
we considered most relevant. Table 6 provides an overview of the underlying variables and 
their respective definitions.  
 
The outcome variable of our multilevel analysis is a startup’s post-money valuation 
(i.e., the valuation after a financing round, including the amount invested); a variable 
regularly used in the VC literature (e.g., Yang et al., 2009; Block, De Vries, Schumann, & 
Sandner, 2014). We included with level 1 (startups), startup characteristics related to 
financing round, startup age at CVC investment, industry and location as predictor variables 
(e.g., Heughebaert & Manigart, 2012). In view of CVCs’ fears of supporting a future 
competitor, we controlled for a startup’s financing round. In addition, future payoffs of 
startups are more stable in their later than in their early stages leading to an increasing 
valuation as they age. Moreover, considering the fact that fast growing industries attract more 
solvent and reputable investors, we controlled for a startup’s industry. In so doing, we relied 
on a dummy variable to determine whether a startup operates in a high-technology industry 
(see also Antonczyk, Breuer, & Mark, 2007), by using the SIC code classifications of Bhojraj 
and Lee (2002) and the extended version of Klobucnik and Sievers (2013).17 
                                                 
17 We therefore considered startups and CVCs’ parent companies with the following SIC codes to operate in 
high-technology industries: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computers, computer 
programming, data process (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674) and 
telecommunication (SIC codes 4810-4841). 
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Table 6: List of variables and their definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable  
Startup valuation Natural logarithm of a startup’s post-money valuation, i.e. the valuation after a financing round including the amount invested 
Independent variables  
Level 1: Startup level  
Startup financing round Financing round in which a startup raised money from a CVC investor 
Startup industry Dummy variable indicating the affiliation of a startup to a high-technology industry 
Startup location Dummy variable referring to the geographical affiliation of a startup’s headquarters to the predominating VC ecosystems of California 
(Silicon Valley), Massachusetts (Route 128) and New York 
Startup age Startup age in years at the year of CVC funding 
Level 2: CVC level  
CVC reputation Aggregated number of a CVC’s performed IPOs 
CVC industry Dummy variable indicating the affiliation of a CVC’s corporate parent to a high-technology industry 
Strategic motivation Dummy variable representing CVCs with a strategic investment motivation 
Unfocused motivation Dummy variable representing CVCs with an unfocused investment motivation 
Analytic motivation  Dummy variable representing CVCs with an analytic investment motivation 
Financial motivation Dummy variable representing CVCs with a financial investment motivation 
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We included the geographical location dummy variable because startups 
headquartered within the three main US VC clusters, California (Silicon Valley), 
Massachusetts (Route 128) and New York, might benefit from better access to VC funding 
(Inderst & Müller, 2004; Gaba & Meyer, 2008; Zheng, Liu, & George, 2010) and a higher 
level of interorganizational knowledge spillover (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson 1993). At 
level 2 (CVCs), we considered CVC reputation, the industry of a CVC’s parent firm and the 
identified CVC clusters as predictor variables. As a proxy for CVC reputation, we took a 
CVC’s aggregated number of startups that went public up until January 2016 (e.g., Masulis & 
Nahata, 2009). This predictor variable allowed us to take into consideration startup 
entrepreneurs preferring the offers of more reputable investors at lower prices (Hsu, 2004). 
Additionally, and analogous to level 1, we coded a dummy variable to distinguish whether a 
CVC’s parent organization operates in a high-technology sector. Moreover, as the identified 
CVC subgroups form the key interest of our analysis, we operationalized three dummy 
variables: strategic motivation, financial motivation, and unfocused motivation to account for 
a CVC’s cluster membership. A fourth dummy variable, analytic motivation, was chosen as 
the reference category. 
Table 7 summarizes the means, SDs, and intercorrelations of all variables used in this 
study. Given the fact that CVCs tend to be later-stage investors (Masulis & Nahata, 2009), our 
sample’s average CVC investment takes place between the third and fourth financing round 
with a mean post-money valuation of USD 263.67 million (median = USD 65.00 million, SD 
= USD 663.40 million). At the time of the first CVC investment, the startups were at most 16 
years old and on average were four years old. Unsurprisingly, 76% of our sample’s CVC 
investments were related to startups headquartered in either California, Massachusetts, or 
New York. Notably in our sample, CVC programs are equally divided among parent 
companies from high-technology industries and parent firms from sectors other than high-
technology. The CVCs in our sample prefer to invest in startups from high-technology sectors 
(mean = .72, SD = .45). With respect to the intercorrelation matrix, on level 1 we found 
evidence that the financing round (r = .44, p ≤ .001), as well as startup age (r = .34, p ≤ .001) 
are positively related to the post-money valuation. Obviously, this coherence is driven by the 
fact that, over time, a startup’s payoffs typically reach a less volatile level, with the 
consequence that the observed valuations increase substantially. Moreover, on level 2, only 
investment vehicles with corporate parents operating in high-technology industries (r = .23, p 
≤ .05) and CVCs with an unfocused motivation (r = .30, p ≤ .05) are related to the total 
number of IPOs initiated. 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations 
Variable Max Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Level 1: Startup level 
         
 1. Startup valuation [m] 4,500 263.67 663.40 - / - 
     
 2. Startup financing round 16.00 3.62 2.46 .44*** - / - 
    
 3. Startup industry 1.00 .72 .45 -.13 -.18* - / - 
   
 4. Startup location  1.00 .76 .43 .03 -.14† .04 - / - 
  
 5. Startup age 16.00 4.39 3.37 .34*** .62*** -.07 -.11 - / - 
 
Level 2: CVC level 
         
 1. CVC reputation 125.00 7.77 18.81 - / - 
     
 2. CVC industry 1.00 .50 .51 .23* - / - 
    
 3. Strategic motivation 1.00 .29 .46 -.09 .21 - / - 
   
 4. Unfocused motivation 1.00 .17 .38 .30* -.05 n.a. - / - 
  
 5. Analytic motivation 1.00 .29 .46 -.12 .04 n.a. n.a. - / - 
 
 6. Financial motivation 1.00 .25 .44 -.05 -.22 n.a. n.a. n.a. - / - 
*** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .1. n.a. = not applicable. 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for a sample of 147 startups and 52 CVCs. Startup valuation is the valuation after a financing round including 
the amount invested. Startup financing round reflects the financing round in which a startup raised money from a CVC investor. Startup industry reports whether a startup 
operates in a high-technology industry. As mentioned in footnote 17, the following SIC codes were considered high-technology industries: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836 
and 8731-8734), computers, computer programming, data process (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-7379), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674) and telecommunication (SIC 
codes 4810-4841). Startup location indicates whether a startup is headquartered in one of the predominating US VC clusters, that is, California (Silicon Valley), Massachusetts 
(Route 128), and New York. Startup age is calculated as the startup’s age in years in the year it received CVC funding. CVC reputation serves as a proxy for a CVC’s 
reputation, measured as a CVC’s aggregated number of performed IPOs. CVC industry states whether a CVC’s corporate parent operates in a high-technology industry, and is 
determined analogously to Startup industry. Strategic motivation is a dummy variable for CVCs with a highly strategically motivated investment motive. Unfocused motivation 
is a dummy variable for CVCs lacking a consistent and tangible investment motivation. Analytic motivation is a dummy variable representing CVCs with moderate levels on 
the strategic and financial dimensions. Financial motivation is a dummy variable standing for CVCs with a high financial investment motivation. 
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3.6.1 Method of analysis 
To analyze the underlying data, we used HLM, a statistical method that allows researchers to 
explain the variance of the dependent variable with predictor variables from two or more 
different levels, that is, the individual level (startups) and the contextual level (CVCs). 
Accordingly, HLM surpasses the feasibility of standard OLS regressions (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). In general, nested data structures, where the objects of investigations are 
hierarchically separated, are frequently observed in the fields of management (e.g., Van Der 
Vegt, Van De Vliert, & Huang, 2005; Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, & Lepine, 2006) and 
finance (e.g., Engelen & van Essen, 2010; Kayo & Kimura, 2011). In light of the fact that our 
research design assessed the impact of investor related predictors on startup related ones, we 
consequently applied a two-level HLM approach (see Figure 8). We consider it appropriate to 
assume that startups receiving funding from a particular CVC are generally more readily 
comparable than portfolio companies from another corporate investor. This means that a CVC 
following a particular investment motivation also targets startups that are more similar to each 
other, indicating a natural hierarchical nesting. Usually, studies within the VC context ignore 
the hierarchical nature of such investor-investee relationships, thereby alleging that the 
estimated effects between two variables are constant across the whole data sample. 
 
Thus, the problems associated with standard OLS methods dealing with nested data in 
the VC context are twofold: First, by disaggregating all investor related variables to the 
startup level, the assumption of independence between the observations is violated, 
contradicting the prerequisites of the OLS regression. Subsequently, by ignoring the 
differences between the investor related variables on level 2, OLS regressions tend to 
underestimate the standard errors which, in turn, are positively associated with more 
statistically significant coherences. Second, by aggregating the startup related variables to the 
less specific investor level, researchers are unable to observe the within-group variation 
because all startups are implicitly treated as homogeneous entities (Osborne, 2000).  
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Figure 8: Underlying conceptual model 
 
The figure visualizes the paper’s HLM approach, summarizing the predictor variables of the contextual level of 
the CVCs (level 2) as well as predictor variables together with the dependent variable, i.e. startup valuation, on 
the individual level of the startup (level 1). The arrows depict the influence of both the level 2 and level 1 
predictor variables on a startup’s post-money valuation. 
 
In this regard, Roberts (2004) found evidence that the presence of nested structures 
can affect the findings of an empirical analysis dramatically. Hence, to avoid such a bias in 
our results, we formally accounted for the presence of nested structures employing an 
unconditional model to determine the amount of variance of the dependent variable that exists 
within and between the groups of CVCs. The analysis used HLM7, a software package by SSI 
that applies a sequential procedure. In a first step, for each level 2 entity (CVCs) the effects of 
all level 1 (startups) predictors are estimated separately, producing intercepts and slopes that 
directly link the predictors to the dependent variable. Within the second step, those randomly 
varying intercepts and slopes are used as outcome variables themselves and are predicted with 
level 2 variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
 
Following Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), an iterative process was conducted to 
calculate all HLM models (see Table 8). First, as mentioned above, we estimated a 
conditional null model that revealed a significant intercept component (γ00 = 17.941, p < .001) 
and, in turn, a significant intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of .102, underscoring that 
the application of multilevel analysis is suitable and required for our data structure (Hofmann, 
1997; Ozkaya, Dabas, Kolev, Hult, Dahlquist, & Manjeshwar, 2013). After that, we estimated 
Level 2: CVC
Level 1: Startup
Startup related variables:
 Startup financing round
 Startup industry
 Startup location 
 Startup age
CVC related variables:
 CVC reputation
 CVC industry
 Strategic motivation
 Unfocused motivation
 Analytic motivation
 Financial motivation
Startup valuation
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a random coefficient model addressing only level 1 variables and an intercept-as-outcome 
model including all level 1 and level 2 variables. The following equations illustrate the 
intercept-as-outcome model that we applied to test Hypothesis 1 to 3 and that accounts for 
both fixed (γ) and random effects (r, u): 
 
Level 1 Model: 
Startup valuationij = β0j + β1j (Startup financing round) + β2j (Startup industry) 
       + β3j (Startup location) + β4j (Startup age) + rij 
 
Level 2 Model: 
    β0j = γ00 + γ01 (CVC reputation) + γ02 (Strategic motivation) + γ03 (Unfocused motivation)  
         + γ04 (Financial motivation) + γ05 (CVC industry) + u0j 
    β1j = γ10 + u1j    β2j = γ20 + u2j    β3j = γ30 + u3j    β4j = γ40 + u4j 
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3.6.2 Results 
The findings of the HLM framework are presented in Table 8. Of key interest was the 
relationship between the post-money valuation of startups (level 1 outcome variable) and the 
CVC subgroups (level 2 predictor variables) identified in the course of the CATA and cluster 
analysis. To assess the overall goodness of fit, we estimated our models using the full 
maximum likelihood approach (Luo & Azen, 2013). The calculated deviance as well as the 
pseudo R2 statistics for level 1 (Snijders & Bosker, 1999) and level 2 (Kreft & De Leeuw, 
1998; Singer, 1998) indicate a satisfactory model (see Table 8). Consequently, our final 
model explains 65% of the within-CVC variance and 50% of the between-CVC variance. 
 
The control variables of the intercept-as-outcomes model (Model III) show the 
expected signs and except for Startup industry and Startup location are statistically significant 
at the startup level. At level 1 (startups), in line with Heughebaert and Manigart (2012), the 
high-technology industry dummy, however, is negative and not statistically significant (γ20 = -
.246, p = .278). Additionally, we find that consistent with prior research, CVCs assign higher 
valuations to startups headquartered in California, Massachusetts, or New York, albeit the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant (γ30 = .202, p = .381). Furthermore, both the financing 
round and the age of a startup at the point of CVC investment are positively and significantly 
related to post-money valuations (γ10 = .317, p < .001; γ40 = .117, p = .045). At level 2 
(CVCs), corporate investors with a stronger reputation in terms of companies taken public pay 
significantly lower purchase prices (γ01 = -.008, p = .023). Interestingly, CVCs whose parent 
companies operate in high-technology industries assign significantly higher valuations to 
startups (γ05 = .759, p = .002). One possible explanation of this finding could be that parent 
companies operating in high-technology sectors are under more pressure to implement 
strategic renewal due to the rapidly changing industry environment, and are therefore willing 
to pay higher purchase prices for startups to avoid disruption sparked by incumbents and new 
competitors (Keil, 2002). 
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Table 8 Hierarchical linear models and estimated results 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
 
Null model 
 
Random coefficient model 
 
Intercept-as-outcome model 
 
γ SE 
 
γ SE 
 
γ SE 
Fixed effects 
        
Level 1: Startup level 
        
Intercept, γ
00
 17.941*** .149 
 
16.371*** .305 
 
16.170*** .338 
Startup financing round, γ
10
 
   
.291*** .073 
 
.317*** .073 
Startup industry, γ
20
 
   
-.072 .226 
 
-.246 .224 
Startup location, γ
30
 
   
.250 .231 
 
.202 .228 
Startup age, γ
40
 
   
.080 .060 
 
.117* .057 
Level 2: CVC level 
        
CVC reputation, γ
01
 
      
-.008* .003 
CVC industry, γ
05
 
      
.759** .228 
Strategic motivation, γ
02
 
      
-.820** .281 
Unfocused motivation, γ
03
 
      
.600* .268 
Financial motivation, γ
04
 
      
-.256 .286 
         Variance components (random effects) 
        
Level 1 residual variance, σ
2
 2.098 
  
.734 
  
.706 
 
Level 2 residual variance, τ
2
 .237* 
  
.216* 
  
.118** 
 
Level 1 slope variance for Startup financing round, u
1
 
   
.037 
  
.047 
 
Level 1 slope variance for Startup industry, u
2
 
   
.301** 
  
.228** 
 
Level 1 slope variance for Startup location, u
3
 
   
.367* 
  
.366* 
 
Level 1 slope variance for Startup age, u
4
 
   
.046* 
  
.040* 
 
      
Model fit 
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ICC = τ
2 
/ (τ
2 
+ σ
2
)  .102     
R
2
Level 1
 
  
.593 
 
.647 
R
2
Level 2
 
  
.089 
 
.502 
Deviance 522.855 
 
438.192 
 
424.852 
*** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .1. 
 
This table reports the results of the fixed and random effects HLM model of the level 1 and level 2 predictor variables on a startup’s post-money valuation for a sample of 147 
startups and 52 CVCs. An iterative process was performed. Model I represents the null model and was used to test if the HLM model is generally appropriable to the 
underlying data. This model reveals a significant intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of .102, therefore the application of HLM is suitable. Model II is a random 
coefficient model only considering level 1 predictor variables. Model III, the intercept-as-outcome model, considers all level 1 and level 2 predictor variables. Overall, the 
pseudo R² statistics for level 1 with 65% and level 2 with 50% show a satisfying model fit. 
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Overall, our hypotheses regarding the impact of CVCs’ investment motivation on 
startup valuations receive substantial support. CVCs with a strategic motivation are associated 
with significantly lower valuations than those with an analytic motivation (γ02 = -.820, p = 
.005) supporting Hypothesis 1. Consequently, in line with the findings of Hsu (2004) for 
IVCs, from a CVC intra-group perspective, we found evidence for CVCs having a value-
adding role, indicating that startup entrepreneurs also appear to accept valuation discounts 
from CVCs with a strategic motivation in anticipation of more value-adding contributions. In 
other words, entrepreneurs seem to trade off the higher value-add potential of these CVCs 
against a lower valuation. As for CVCs with a financial motivation our results do not provide 
a statistically significant coefficient (γ04 = -.256, p = .376). Consequently, Hypothesis 2 is not 
supported, which suggests there is no significant difference between the assigned startup 
valuations of CVCs with an analytic motivation and their peers with a financial motivation. In 
accordance with Hypothesis 3, our results indicate that CVCs with an unfocused motivation 
pay significantly higher purchase prices for startups (γ03 = .600, p = .030) than their peers 
with an analytic motivation. This confirms our supposition that CVCs with an unfocused 
motivation are faced with a liability of vacillation as they might lack a tangible investment 
motive. Thus, entrepreneurs apparently demand a valuation premium in expectation of 
eventual moral hazard problems. 
 
To confirm our findings, we conducted further analyses by additionally controlling for 
a startup’s business model, that is, whether a startup operates a B2B business model, as well 
as a CVC’s fund size and its age at funding. Owing to the limited data coverage, we created a 
subsample where we were able to access the above mentioned data, resulting in a narrowed 
sample of 23 CVCs and their responding 87 startup investments. As expected, the effects of 
CVCs’ investment motivation also hold for our subsample, and therefore confirm the results 
of our full model. 
 
Overall, our findings show that the different forms of investment motivation among 
CVCs are important factors in explaining the valuations of startups. We therefore extend the 
findings of Heughebaert and Manigart (2012) highlighting that research should not only 
differentiate between VC types like IVCs, CVCs, and governmental VCs, but also between 
the different subgroups of CVCs. 
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3.7 Discussion 
3.7.1 Theoretical and practical implications 
Extant research overlooks the possible impact of the divergent degrees of CVCs’ 
investment motivation on the startup valuations they assign. Accordingly, the goal of this 
study was to explore this effect and it is to the best of the authors’ knowledge the first paper 
addressing this potential interplay in detail. To achieve the above research goal, the current 
study analyzes 52 CVC mission statements and 147 startup valuations between January 2009 
and January 2016, applying CATA and cluster analysis to identify different types of CVCs 
according to their degree of strategic and financial motivation. We then applied HLM to 
examine the effects of CVC type on startup valuation. Overall, our findings emphasize that 
CVCs’ characteristics in terms of their investment motivation appear to play a decisive role in 
explaining startup valuations. Specifically, we found empirical evidence that when all other 
factors are equal, CVCs with a strategic motivation pay significantly lower purchase prices 
for startups than their counterparts with an analytic motivation, supporting our hypothesis 
about the value-adding role of highly strategically motivated CVCs. For CVCs with a 
financial motivation, on the other hand, we did not find a significant valuation impact. 
However, we illustrated that entrepreneurs extract higher valuations from CVCs with an 
unfocused motivation, underscoring our notion that these CVCs have a liability of vacillation 
owing to their potential lack of a tangible investment motivation and entrepreneurs’ moral 
hazard concerns. 
 
In light of these results, our paper makes multiple contributions to the VC and CVC 
literature. First, we extend previous work by adding to the continuum of CVCs’ investment 
motivation, thereby demonstrating that they form a heterogeneous group (e.g., Dushnitsky 
and Lenox 2006; Wadhwa and Basu 2013). More specifically, we introduced CATA together 
with a clustering technique as objectifiable means to measure the divergent levels of CVCs’ 
strategic and financial investment motive. This, in turn, allowed us to overcome the black and 
white approach of current research, which has so far only differentiated between strategic and 
financial CVCs. Consequently, we propose a more fine-grained classification of CVCs. 
Furthermore, in contrast to previous articles that studied the valuation impact of CVCs as 
opposed to IVCs from an inter-group perspective (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 2000; 
Heughebaert & Manigart, 2012), we deliberately shifted the focus to an intra-group 
perspective, which enabled us to effectively scrutinize the valuation effects of different CVC 
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types in a unique empirical setting. We therefore add to the studies of Cumming and Dai 
(2011) and Heughebaert and Manigart (2012) by explicitly considering CVCs’ characteristics 
in terms of their underlying investment motivation as determinants of the purchase prices they 
pay. In doing so, our work addresses the current research gap regarding the variability of 
CVCs’ startup valuations. In addition to this, our results are interesting, precisely because 
they might initially appear counterintuitive. Specifically, we found that the involvement of 
CVCs with a strategic motivation leads to a lower valuation than when their CVC 
counterparts with an analytic motivation are involved. Accordingly, the presence of CVCs 
with an unfocused motivation contradicts the initial idea of corporate investment practice 
regarding their non-sufficient-strategic investment motive. Dealing with a liability of 
vacillation those CVCs seem to lack a clear investment motivation which could be a signal for 
the absence of comprehensive corporate backing. Nonetheless, when startups actively seek 
CVC funding, they evaluate the potential value-added contributions resulting from a 
corporates’ unique resource base (Ernst et al., 2005; Maula et al., 2005). Hence, due to the 
dearth of strategic investment motivation, those CVCs might need to increase their general 
attractiveness through offering higher purchase prices. Alternatively, CVCs with a strategic 
motivation are expected to provide a broader basis of complementary assets for startups, 
thereby enabling their portfolio firms to scale their business more rapidly. In this regard, the 
entrepreneurs behind such startups apparently tend to accept valuation discounts in exchange 
for more substantial value-add activities from those CVCs than the investment offerings from 
CVCs with an analytic motivation. 
 
Moreover, this study should also be of significant value for entrepreneurs in outlining 
clusters of CVCs that reflect a specific investment motivation. Our cluster approach, in turn, 
could help entrepreneurs to segment CVCs and to align their investor choice with their 
business and exit strategy. Having a CVC with an unfocused motivation in the early stage to 
push for a higher valuation might be helpful in terms of signaling when planning to exit via an 
IPO in the long run, whereas entrepreneurs seeking value-adding contributions might be 
interested in maintaining a close relationship with CVCs with a strategic motivation. 
 
3.7.2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
Several limitations of this study illuminate promising avenues for future research. In 
particular, four limitations seem worthy of consideration. First, we applied CATA to measure 
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CVCs’ levels of strategic and financial motivation. However, it might be that this approach 
does not fully capture CVCs’ real investment behavior, an inherent drawback of applying 
CATA (e.g., Moss et al., 2014). More importantly, CVCs’ front-stage investment statements 
might differ from their actual back-stage actions (Fiol, 1995). We would therefore encourage 
future research to benchmark our front-stage findings against CVCs’ back-stage statements on 
their investment motivation by analyzing, for instance, internal memos or meeting transcripts 
(Zachary et al., 2011). Second, we differentiated between CVCs’ strategic and financial 
investment motivations. Nevertheless, we are well aware of the fact that there are other 
differentiating characteristics among CVCs, such as their exploitative and explorative 
investment motives (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2014). Therefore, we propose that future research 
should study the effects of these other CVC characteristics on startup valuation. Third, we 
deliberately focused our study on the US CVC market, implying that our findings are 
geographically limited; however, for a first analysis of the valuation impact of CVCs’ 
heterogeneous investment motivation, the mature and very active US VC market, with its 
ample data coverage, provides a perfect empirical setting (Da Rin, Hellmann, & Puri, 2013). 
Nonetheless, this also implies that we consciously scrutinized a common set of institutional 
and cultural factors. In view of this, we consider it an important second step for scholars to 
analyze the transferability of our findings to other VC markets with a range of institutional 
and cultural settings (Wright et al., 2005). Additionally, we focused on CVC investments 
between January 2009 and January 2016. However, as already outlined above, CVC activity 
is very cyclical in nature and we thus leave it up to future work to externally validate our 
findings for different time periods (McNally, 1995; Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006). Fourth, even though our study sheds light on CVCs’ heterogeneous investment 
motivation, it could not address which particular startup characteristics the identified CVC 
types consider when making an investment decision. We would therefore encourage future 
research scrutinizing the matching characteristics between the differing CVC and startup 
types (e.g., Maula et al., 2009). It would be interesting for instance to understand why startups 
accept the offers of CVCs with an unfocused motivation who seem unable to demonstrate a 
concrete investment motive. Similarly, as the underlying data cannot answer these questions, 
future work should address how the identified types of CVCs’ investment motivation relate to 
their particular business practices, such as their holding periods or their proportions of equity 
stake taken in startups. This, in turn, will help to further validate the paper’s findings and to 
expand the literature on CVC heterogeneity. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
A rigorous combination of explorative and theory-testing approaches meant we were able 
to illustrate that the investment motivation of CVCs goes beyond the simplistic assumptions 
currently dominating the academic discourse. In general, these motivations not only shape 
how CVCs behave in the market for startup investments, they also determine the startup 
valuations those CVCs assign. For our research design, we constructed a unique sample of 52 
CVCs and their corresponding 147 startup valuations for the time period between January 
2009 and January 2016. Owing to the natural hierarchical structure within the CVC-startup 
reciprocity, we also instituted an HLM regression method. The underlying data identified four 
differing types of CVC motivation and showed that they affect the startup valuations CVCs 
assign. The current study challenges the prevailing black and white approach to CVC 
investment motives, demonstrating that there is a continuum of CVC investment motivation, 
and thus implying that CVCs form a heterogeneous group, and which explains the variability 
of their startup valuations. 
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4 From Investment to Acquisition: The Impact of Exploration 
and Exploitation on CVC Acquisition 
 
Abstract 
This study applies the framework of exploration and exploitation to scrutinize the 
interplay of corporate venture capital investments and subsequent startup acquisitions. We 
analyze 901 unique CVC triads comprising a corporate mother, CVC unit, and startup 
covering the period 1996–2016. A total of 124 transactions of our sample mark a CVC 
acquisition, that is, a corporate mother acquires a portfolio startup of its CVC unit. Our 
findings show that a corporate mother’s explorative and exploitative orientation has 
significant effects on the likelihood of a CVC acquisition, albeit moderated by the product 
market relatedness between corporate mother and startup. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In 2016, U.S. corporations conducted 317 domestic venture capital-backed startup 
acquisitions, according to data from the Dow Jones VentureSource. Among the most active 
acquirers are companies like Google, Intel, Salesforce.com, and Verizon that operate their 
own corporate venture capital units. Those corporations use their CVC units to take minority 
equity stakes in startups to extend and improve their own knowledge base (Hill & 
Birkinshaw, 2008). It is particularly intriguing that a salient motive for CVC investments is to 
seek out promising acquisition targets (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010). Consequently, CVC 
investments can play a vital role in the identification of acquisition targets, above all in light 
of the fact that corporations often find it challenging to spot new knowledge from external 
sources in terms of product, services, and technologies (Benson & Ziedonis, 2009). The 
rationale of a CVC unit is precisely to alleviate this issue (Keil, 2004; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2005a). There is a growing body of literature examining ECV activities in a comparative 
setting, and this research seeks to answer the question of which external venturing mode, i.e. 
alliances, joint ventures, or CVC investments is preferred in specific circumstances (e.g., Keil 
et al., 2008; Tong & Li, 2011; Titus, House, & Covin, 2017). However, this research does not 
investigate the inherent option of making CVC investments to ultimately acquire a startup. 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the phenomenon of CVC acquisitions, which means that a 
79 
corporate mother acquires a startup which was funded through its CVC unit (Benson & 
Ziedonis, 2010). Remarkably, despite its practical and theoretical relevance, there is scant 
research on startup acquisitions in general (Andersson & Xiao, 2016), and virtually no work 
on the phenomenon of CVC acquisitions in particular. In the latter context, Benson and 
Ziedonis (2010) explore the effect of CVC acquisitions on the shareholder value, while 
Dimitrova (2015) scrutinizes the determinants leading to a CVC acquisition, but the research 
lacks a clear theoretical anchor. However, as suggested by March (1991), organizational 
learning can be driven by two fundamental patterns of behavior, that is, exploration and 
exploitation (E/E). While exploitative behavior is strongly associated with the utilization of a 
corporation’s existing knowledge base, exploration requires a clear shift toward new skills 
and capabilities to leverage the existing knowledge base (Lavie et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
continuum of these patterns can influence the risk-taking behavior of corporations (March, 
1991). Accordingly, the goal of this study is to fill this gap by linking the phenomenon of 
CVC acquisitions to the explorative and exploitative orientation of a corporate mother, and 
thus to answer the research question: What is the effect of a corporate mother’s degree of 
explorative and exploitative orientation on CVC acquisition? The theory of exploration and 
exploitation has received attention in the mergers and acquisition literature (e.g., Phene et al., 
2012) as well as the CVC research stream (e.g., Schildt et al., 2005; Hill & Birkinshaw, 
2008). It is in turn a logical and necessary step to link the theory of E/E to CVC acquisitions. 
 
To address the paper’s research question, we applied a logistic regression by using a 
carefully compiled sample of 901 unique U.S. CVC triads. We employed CATA to discern a 
corporate mother’s degree of explorative and exploitative orientation from the firm’s 
shareholder letters. Furthermore, we followed Benson and Ziedonis (2010) in distinguishing 
between CVC and non-CVC acquisitions, and similar to that study find that 14% of the 
acquired startups had previous equity relationships with the CVC units of their acquirers. In 
sum, the current research makes three main contributions. First, it contributes to the CV 
literature by going beyond the prevailing separate view on the external venturing modes of 
CVC investments and startup acquisitions. Instead of analyzing external venturing modes in a 
comparative setting, the article shifts the focus on to the specific interplay of CVC 
investments and startup acquisitions. Second, it contributes to the under-researched topic of 
startup acquisition in general, and specifically extends the extant literature on the 
phenomenon of CVC acquisitions by directly linking it to the theoretical framework of E/E. 
The results indicate that corporate mothers with a greater degree of explorative orientation are 
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more likely to acquire startups funded through their CVC units, whereas we find the opposite 
effect for corporate mothers with a greater degree of exploitative orientation, and thereby also 
confirm the findings of previous research on E/E. Additionally, we provide evidence that the 
effect of exploitation on CVC acquisition is increased when corporate mothers and startups 
operate in related product markets. Third, we contribute to the current academic discourse 
within the syndication literature on the effects of CVC investments from an acquisition 
perspective by providing empirical evidence that the number of different CVC investors in a 
startup affects the likelihood of a CVC acquisition. 
 
4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Corporate venture capital 
Research on CVC—that are direct minority equity investments in startups by large and 
established corporations through a corporate investment vehicle (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006)—is usually grounded in the CV or corporate entrepreneurship 
literature (Narayanan et al., 2009). Ellis and Taylor (1987, p. 528) define CV as the adoption 
of the “structure of an independent unit […] to involve a process of assembling and 
configuring novel resources”. Particularly CVC practices can help corporations to overcome 
their internal R&D limitations (Brockhoff, 1998) by fostering innovation, technological 
development, and business practices across organizational boundaries (Winters & Murfin, 
1988; Keil, 2000; Keil, 2004; Maula, 2007; Narayanan et al., 2009). How those CVC 
activities are structured depends on the underlying motivation of the corporate mother, a topic 
that has received wide-spread attention in the CVC literature (Winters & Murfin, 1988; 
Chesbrough, 2002; Ernst et al., 2005; Weber & Weber, 2005; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; 
Röhm et al., 2018). Generally, CVC units are organized in one of two ways; either the 
corporate investment vehicle provides startups with equity through a self-managed and 
wholly-owned subsidiary, or the CVC unit acts as a LP in pooled and dedicated funds, 
typically managed by a third party such as an independent venture capitalist (McNally, 1995; 
Keil, 2000). The remainder of this study envisages the former organizational structure of a 
CVC unit, similar to the work of Ernst et al. (2005), because its aim is to investigate CVC 
acquisitions against the backdrop of a corporate mother’s explorative or exploitative 
orientation. We believe that within the setting of CVC acquisitions the direct relationship 
between corporation and startup is paramount, which is evident in the amount of equity 
directly invested into the startup. 
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In view of the fact that corporations tend to explore and exploit through several 
external venturing modes such as alliances, joint ventures, or acquisitions (Narayanan et al., 
2009), the case of CVC acquisitions provides a unique context. This is because CVC 
acquisitions allow us to scrutinize how pre-existing startup relationships in terms of CVC 
investments can ultimately result in an acquisition. Interestingly, prior research only reveals 
how corporations deal with both external venturing modes in comparative settings. For 
instance, based on real options logic, Tong and Li (2011) examine the choice between CVC 
investments and acquisitions as alternative venturing modes. The authors find that a 
corporation’s propensity for CVC will increase if an investment is surrounded by an elevated 
level of market uncertainty. This finding is based on the fact that CVC investments can be 
staged, and therefore offer greater flexibility than acquisitions, which require a strong and 
irreversible financial commitment. Drawing on the same argumentation, Schildt et al. (2005) 
provide evidence that external venturing modes such as CVC, alliances, and joint ventures are 
preferable to acquisitions. Moreover, the literature highlights several ways in which 
established corporations benefit from CVC investments. In general, the use of CVC is 
positively related to a corporate mother’s return on equity and revenue growth (Zahra & 
Hayton, 2008), the creation of firm value (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006) and the growth a 
corporate mother’s innovation rate (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a). However, acquisitions are 
also commonly said to be used to realize tax benefits (Hayn, 1989), create economic value 
(Chatterjee, 1986), or to gain access to customers, markets, and technologies (Salter & 
Weinhold, 1978). 
 
Astonishingly, only a few articles shift the independent view of the external venturing 
modes to a sequential one, where CVC vehicles are used as a strategic instrument to 
materialize startup investments into an acquisition by the corporate mother at a later point in 
time (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010; Dimitrova, 2015). While Dushnitsky and Lavie (2010) study 
the interrelationship between CVC investments and alliance formation—finding an inverted 
U-shaped association between the two—relatively little is known about the interplay of CVC 
investments and acquisitions. Two studies are particularly worth mentioning in this context: 
Dimitrova (2015) shows that corporate mothers tend to acquire startups that received prior 
funding through the mother’s CVC vehicle when the startup outperforms the corporate mother 
in terms of innovativeness. Further, Benson and Ziedonis (2010) illustrate that CVC 
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acquisitions are associated with negative stock price reactions and a reduction in abnormal 
returns. 
 
4.2.2 Exploration and exploitation in the context of CVC acquisition 
This paper, in contrast to the comparative setting of previous work, focuses on the 
interplay of CVC investments and acquisitions. We argue that, depending on a corporate 
mother’s degree of explorative and exploitative orientation, previous CVC investments in 
startups can influence the likelihood of an ultimate startup acquisition. In fact, a corporation 
acquiring startups from its own CVC portfolio can substitute for internal shortcomings and 
contribute to its external knowledge capabilities (Dimitrova, 2015). Therefore, we argue that a 
prior CVC investment can be interpreted as a clear signal of commitment (e.g., Wadhwa & 
Basu, 2013; Titus et al., 2017) which can spur the possibility of a CVC acquisition by the 
corporate mother. 
 
Figure 9: Underlying conceptual model 
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Since the introduction of March’s (1991) framework of explorative and exploitative 
organizational behavior, a wide range of studies has applied that framework to shed light on 
various phenomena (Lavie et al., 2010). Following previous research (e.g., Lubatkin, Simsek, 
Ling, & Veiga, 2006; Sirén, Kohtamäki, & Kuckertz, 2012; Titus et al., 2017), we consider 
both orientations as distinct, meaning that they can occur simultaneously (see Figure 9 for our 
conceptual model). In turn, exploration pertains to entrepreneurial actions to overcome 
internal R&D limitations by investing in external relationships (Phene et al., 2012) to gain 
insights into innovative technologies, products, services, and processes (Sirén et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, explorative orientation is strongly related to innovation, variation, and risk 
taking (March, 1991), thereby leveraging a firm’s financial performance (Auh & Menguc, 
2005; Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). Hence, several publications link the degree of 
explorative orientation to external corporate venturing modes in a comparative setting (e.g., 
Schildt et al., 2005; Wadhwa & Basu, 2013; Titus et al., 2017). Moreover, as summarized by 
Phene et al. (2012) a large part of the literature relates acquisitions to an acquirer’s inclination 
toward exploration, arguing that a corporate mother’s absorptive capacity, that is, the ability 
to extract specific knowledge from ventures (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a), expands its 
underlying knowledge base. In that sense, Wadhwa and Basu (2013) show that CVC funds 
with a stronger explorative orientation tend to strengthen the resource commitment between 
startup and corporate mother more than CVC units with a stronger exploitative orientation. 
Against the backdrop of our research question, this resource commitment could stimulate the 
use of CVC acquisitions to expand a firm’s knowledge base. Therefore, and due to the fact 
that acquisitions are also associated with a greater willingness to take risk (Pablo, Sitkin, & 
Jemison, 1996), which March (1991) ascribes to exploration, we suppose that corporate 
mothers exhibiting a greater degree of explorative orientation are also more acquisitive with 
regards to the portfolio companies of their CVC units. 
 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, a corporate mother’s degree of explorative orientation is 
positively related to CVC acquisition. 
 
Exploitative orientation involves strengthening a firm’s existing knowledge base 
(Lubatkin et al., 2006; Lavie et al., 2010) and among other things entails investing in internal 
R&D (Phene et al., 2012). Since corporate mothers with a greater degree of exploitative 
orientation seek to improve their existing knowledge base, they can capitalize on their CVC 
investments without necessarily acquiring a startup. They might therefore be less prepared to 
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risk an acquisition and might absorb knowledge from portfolio startups, for example, through 
the due diligence process accompanying CVC investments (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Keil 
et al., 2008; Souitaris & Zerbinati, 2014), or through the presence of a CVC investment 
manager on a startup’s board (Anokhin et al., 2011). Consequently, as corporate mothers with 
a greater degree of exploitative orientation are more inclined to improve their existing 
resource base through internal resources (Phene et al., 2012), we also expect them to be less 
involved in CVC acquisitions as we suppose that they use CVC investments as a means to 
transfer the knowledge from the startup without ultimately acquiring it. Accordingly, CVC 
investments can be beneficial for them, even without the acquisition of a focal startup. We 
therefore suggest that corporate mothers with a greater degree of exploitative orientation are 
less likely to be involved in CVC acquisitions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, a corporate mother’s degree of exploitative orientation is 
negatively related to CVC acquisition. 
 
4.2.3 The moderating role of product market relatedness 
The product market relatedness between acquirer and target has received significant 
attention in the literature (see Stellner (2015) for an overview). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
find that the absorptive capacity of an acquirer is enhanced when it operates in a similar 
industry as its target. This finding rests on the rationale that when the knowledge base and 
business conduct of both acquirer and target are aligned, it is easier for the acquirer to 
successfully integrate and exploit the knowledge of the target. A stronger product market 
relatedness means that the acquirer is endued with a greater market knowledge regarding 
products, services, customers, and suppliers (Wadhwa & Basu, 2013). In turn, Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010) studying the impact of product market relatedness in the formation of mergers 
and acquisitions, find that product market relatedness between acquirer and target increases 
the likelihood of a transaction. The authors argue that a higher level of product market 
relatedness facilitates the realization of product market synergies. Likewise, for the realm of 
CVC acquisitions, Dimitrova (2015) finds that industry similarity increases the likelihood of 
an acquisition. We hence hypothesize that CVC acquisitions are in general also more likely 
when corporate mother and startup operate in more closely-related product markets. 
 
Hypothesis 3: All else being equal, the product market relatedness between startup and 
corporate mother is positively related to CVC acquisition. 
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Product market relatedness can play a decisive role in the linkage between E/E and 
CVC acquisition. Katila (2002) outlines how corporations with a greater tendency toward 
exploration are more inclined to generate knowledge distant from their existing resource base, 
seeking to explore products and services that are not related to their core industry. Because 
exploration involves risk taking and experimentation (March, 1991), it is regarded as the 
“pursuit of new knowledge” (Levinthal & March, 1993, p. 105). Therefore, acquirers with a 
greater degree of explorative orientation are likely to look for acquisition targets that operate 
in industries distant from their core competencies to broaden and extend their existing 
resource base (Phene et al., 2012). Drawing on these arguments, we suggest that the impact of 
exploration on CVC acquisition decreases when corporate mothers and startups operate in 
related industries. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: All else being equal, the product market relatedness between startup and 
corporate mother negatively moderates the effect of exploration on CVC acquisition. 
 
Levinthal and March (1993, p. 105) describe exploitation as “the use and development 
of things already known”. Phene et al. (2012) outline that although most literature suggests 
that acquisitions are undertaken to aid exploration, acquisitions of targets from related 
industries can help the acquirer to improve its own knowledge base, for instance, through the 
amelioration of economies of scales in R&D. Accordingly, corporate mothers with a greater 
degree of exploitative orientation are likely to be more engaged in acquiring the portfolio 
startups of their CVC units when the startups can help them to build on their existing 
knowledge base, that is, to operate in closely-related product markets. In this case, corporate 
mothers might ultimately acquire those startups from their CVC unit’s portfolio that help 
them to exploit their existing resource base. Consequently, we expect that a greater product–
market relatedness between acquirer and startup positively moderates the effect of 
exploitation on CVC acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: All else being equal, the product market relatedness between startup and 
corporate mother positively moderates the effect of exploitation on CVC acquisition.  
86 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample and data 
We constructed a unique data sample relying on Dow Jones VentureSource, a database 
commonly used in the CVC (e.g., Röhm et al., 2018) and venture capital (e.g., Gompers, 
Kovner, & Lerner, 2009) contexts. We chose VentureSource because the database provides 
valid data for more than 30,000 venture-backed startups with a strong focus on the U.S. 
venture capital market. The first step involved compiling all data available on startups that 
received at least one investment from a corporation or CVC vehicle, and that were acquired 
on or before 17 November 2016. Additionally, only startups headquartered in the U.S. were 
considered, thus excluding satellite and branch offices. In a second step, we cleaned the data 
obtained by dropping investment vehicles lacking a corporate background, such as hedge 
funds, investment banks, venture capitalists, real estate investors, angel groups, accelerators, 
public sector organizations, or diversified private equity investors. In line with the work of 
Alvarez-Garrido and Dushnitsky (2016) and other authors (e.g., Basu et al., 2011; Gaba & 
Dokko, 2016) we only retained corporations and CVC vehicles headquartered in the U.S., 
thus suppressing potential macroeconomic (e.g., Jeng & Wells, 2000) and cultural (e.g., Li & 
Zahra, 2012) influence factors. Owing to the predefined distinction in VentureSource between 
corporate investors and CVC being rather vague and not fitting the article’s underlying 
definition of CVC, an additional data cleaning process was undertaken. To clearly distinguish 
between those two investment types, we drew on data from S&P’s Capital IQ database, 
applying two classification criteria, consequently excluding those investors that did not 
comply with the following criteria: (i) investors must be listed as a subsidiary of a larger 
mother corporation, and (ii) corporate investment vehicles must not act as GPs for external 
investors, as this better suits the underlying motivation of CVC units to promote explorative 
and exploitative learning relevant for this study. Following this approach, 17 corporations that 
were initially not listed as CVCs by VentureSource were reclassified as CVCs. That group 
included Tribune Ventures, TTC Ventures, and the corporate investment arm of Knight 
Ridder. The above-mentioned approach also identified 40 corporations and 11 other investor 
types (mainly VCs, advisory corporations, and investment banks) erroneously listed on 
VentureSource as CVC vehicles, and we therefore dropped them from the sample. The 
excluded group contained direct startup investments from Facebook Inc. and The Graham 
Holdings Corp. Due to missing data in the S&P Capital IQ database, we could not classify 59 
investors. We thus cross-checked these cases with Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. 
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However, we encountered similar data issues and thus had to remove these 59 investors from 
the sample. The final sample comprises 901 unique CVC triads (Weber & Weber, 2011), each 
composed of a CVC vehicle, a corporate mother, and a startup. 
 
Table 9 reports the distribution of the sample’s CVC investments and the number of 
startups that were acquired by a corporate mother, which received at least one CVC 
investment through the mother’s investment vehicle. We identified 124 CVC acquisitions, 
representing 14% of our overall sample, in the period 1996–2016. This percentage of CVC 
acquisitions compares favorably to that of Benson and Ziedonis (2010). 
 
Table 9: Sample distribution of CVC investments and CVC acquisitions 
Acquisition year Acquisitions with CVC investment 
 
CVC acquisitions 
# % 
 
# % 
1996 4 .44% 
 
1 .81% 
1997 3 .33% 
 
3 2.42% 
1998 16 1.78% 
 
3 2.42% 
1999 23 2.55% 
 
8 6.45% 
2000 36 4.00% 
 
3 2.42% 
2001 43 4.77% 
 
8 6.45% 
2002 31 3.44% 
 
4 3.23% 
2003 38 4.22% 
 
6 4.84% 
2004 52 5.77% 
 
8 6.45% 
2005 70 7.77% 
 
14 11.29% 
2006 64 7.10% 
 
11 8.87% 
2007 71 7.88% 
 
11 8.87% 
2008 53 5.88% 
 
14 11.29% 
2009 46 5.11% 
 
6 4.84% 
2010 64 7.10% 
 
8 6.45% 
2011 50 5.55% 
 
5 4.03% 
2012 50 5.55% 
 
2 1.61% 
2013 40 4.44% 
 
2 1.61% 
2014 60 6.66% 
 
4 3.23% 
2015 44 4.88% 
 
1 .81% 
2016 43 4.77% 
 
2 1.61% 
Total 901 100% 
 
124 100% 
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4.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. Owing to the current study’s focus on CVC acquisitions, we 
followed Benson and Ziedonis (2009, 2010) and Dimitrova (2015) and applied a dummy 
variable to capture if a CVC investment materialized into an acquisition by the corporate 
mother. The dependent variable is therefore dichotomous and indicates if a startup that has 
received prior funding through the mother’s CVC vehicle has ultimately been acquired by the 
corporate mother or not (see Table 10 for an overview of the variables employed and their 
underlying definitions).  
 
Independent variables. The first independent variable is a proxy for product market 
relatedness as suggested by several previous publications (e.g., Farjoun, 1998; Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009; Wadhwa & Basu, 2013). Based on the primary SIC codes derived from 
Compustat and Thomson One, we calculate the product market relatedness between corporate 
mothers and startups. The variable takes the value of 1 if all four digits of the primary SIC 
codes are identical, indicating the highest possible product market overlap. Following this 
procedure, the variable takes the value of .75 if the first three digits match, .50 if the first two 
digits match, .25 if only the first digit is identical and 0 if all four digits are completely 
different (e.g., Schildt et al., 2005). It should be mentioned that based on the SIC codes 67% 
of the startups within our sample operate in service-related industries, while the majority of 
the corporate mothers (47%) are related to the manufacturing industry, including high-
technology firms like, Intel, General Electric, Cisco, Advanced Micro Device or Chevron.  
 
To operationalize the explorative and exploitative orientation of corporate mothers, we 
draw on the work of Moss et al. (2014). We rely on CATA (Short et al., 2010; McKenny et 
al., 2013) to capture the degree of a corporate mother’s explorative and exploitative 
orientation in the fiscal year prior to the CVC acquisition. In comparison to other established 
measures of E/E (e.g., Auh & Menguc, 2005; Schildt et al., 2005; Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Phene et al., 2012; Sirén et al., 2012), the advantages using predefined word lists in 
conjunction with CATA are threefold. 
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Table 10: List of applied variables and their definitions 
Variable  Definition  Data sources  
Dependent variable    
CVC acquisition  Dummy variable indicating if a corporate mother has acquired a startup that has received prior funding through 
the mother’s CVC vehicle  
Dow Jones VentureSource  
Independent variables    
Product market relatedness  Equals 1 if all four digits of the primary SIC codes of corporate mother and startup match; .75 if the first three 
digits match; .50 if the first two digits match; .25 if only the first digit matches, and 0 if all four digits are 
completely different  
Compustat, Thomson One 
Exploration  The degree of a corporate mother’s explorative orientation of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition based on the 
word list of Moss et al. (2014)  
Shareholder letter  
Exploitation  The degree of a corporate mother’s exploitative orientation of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition based on 
the word list of Moss et al. (2014) 
Shareholder letter  
Control variables    
Acquisition year  Year in which a CVC-backed startup was acquired  Dow Jones VentureSource  
Mother total assets  Natural logarithm of the book value of a corporate mother’s total assets of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition  Compustat, Bloomberg  
Mother R&D intensity  Ratio of the corporate mother’s R&D expenses to its revenues of the fiscal year prior to the acquisition Compustat, Bloomberg 
CVC acquisitions 3 years  Number of CVC acquisitions of the corporate mother in the three years preceding the respective acquisition  Dow Jones VentureSource 
Startup age  Acquisition year minus founding year of the respective startup  Dow Jones VentureSource, 
Thomson One 
# CVCs invested  Number of CVCs invested in a startup prior to the acquisition  Dow Jones VentureSource 
[·] stage  Series of dummy variables referring to the development stage of the respective startup in the last financing 
round prior to the acquisition  
Dow Jones VentureSource 
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First, this method allows us to draw on publicly accessible reports that are available 
for a wide range of companies, operating in profoundly different industries covering a long 
period of time. Second, CATA allows us to derive theoretically based but difficult to measure 
constructs from organizational text excerpts, accounting for a broad scope of corporate 
mothers’ actions (Uotila et al., 2009). Third, analyzing excerpts of texts produced by an 
organization using CATA is deeply rooted and widely accepted within the management (e.g., 
Uotila et al., 2009; Zachary et al., 2011) and finance research landscape (e.g., Bukh, Nielsen, 
Gormsen, & Mouritsen, 2005; Li, 2010). To construct the measures of E/E, we gathered 
shareholder letters to extract the corporate mother’s explorative and exploitative orientation. 
This is because shareholder letters are very important (Short et al., 2010) and the most often 
read organizational narrative (Courtis, 1982) as they serve to communicate the corporation’s 
underlying strategic orientation, among other things (Moss et al., 2014). We used multiple 
data sources including Morningstar, LexisNexis, Bloomberg, annualreports.com, 
annualreportowl.com and corporate websites to collect the shareholder letters. In a final step, 
we used the software package LIWC2015 to determine the ratio of all words that match the 
E/E word lists to the total word count of the underlying text corpus, thereby automatically 
controlling for size effects (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). On average, the shareholder 
letters examined comprise 1,821.95 words (SD = 1,110.05, max = 7,646) with a total mean of 
22.51 words per sentence (SD = 3.48, max = 33.64). 
 
Controls. We further added an extensive number of control variables to our analysis that 
might influence the probability of acquiring a startup that received prior funding through the 
mother’s CVC vehicle. Since both CVC (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 
2006) and merger and acquisition activities (Harford, 2005; Bauer & Matzler, 2014) are 
cyclical in nature, we control for the year in which a CVC-backed startup was acquired. Given 
that prior research found positive correlations between firm size and a corporation’s 
innovation behavior (e.g., Phene & Almeida, 2008), we control for size effects of the 
corporate mother, a measure commonly used in the CVC grounded literature (e.g., Dushnitsky 
& Lenox, 2005a; Benson & Ziedonis, 2009; Chemmanur et al., 2014). Therefore, we include 
the natural logarithm of the book value of a corporate mother’s total assets of the fiscal year 
prior to the acquisition. Furthermore, by employing the ratio of the corporate mother’s R&D 
expenses to its revenues in the fiscal year prior to the acquisition, we control for the 
possibility that R&D-intense acquirers have a greater tendency to be explorative (Phene & 
Almeida, 2008; Phene et al., 2012). For six percent of our sample, we could not find the 
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respective R&D expenditures in the databases. In these cases, we used the average R&D 
expenditures of the corresponding industry (based on the four-digit primary SIC codes) as a 
proxy. Furthermore, prior research from Benson and Ziedonis (2010) shows that corporate 
mothers tend to over-evaluate possible synergy effects when acquiring a startup from their 
portfolios, resulting in an escalation of commitment. On the other hand, corporate mothers 
that have previously undertaken CVC acquisitions might also be more likely to do so in 
general. To control for this, we include the total number of CVC acquisitions of the corporate 
mothers in the three years preceding the respective acquisition. We also account for the 
development stage of a startup by including a series of dummy variables and a startup’s age at 
the acquisition (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010). Finally, in line with Dimitrova (2015) we take 
potential acquisition competitors into consideration by counting the number of different 
CVCs invested prior to the acquisition. 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables employed in 
the analysis. In line with Benson and Ziedonis (2010), within our sample, 14% of the acquired 
startups had previous equity relations in terms of receiving CVC investment through a 
corporate mother’s CVC vehicle. At the time of acquisition, the startups were on average 7.84 
years old and received funding from 1.23 CVCs. Moreover, in the three years prior to an 
acquisition the mother companies acquired an average of 2.75 portfolio startups of their CVC 
units. Notably, the maximum of 30 CVC acquisitions in the three years preceding an 
acquisition shows that some corporate mothers are very active in acquiring portfolio 
companies identified by their CVC vehicles. While previous CVC acquisitions correlate 
positively with the dependent variable (r = .44, p ≤ .001), the number of CVCs invested is 
negatively related to CVC acquisition (r = -.08, p ≤ .05). Moreover, startup age has a 
significant and negative relation with the dependent variable (r = -.10, p ≤ .01). As suggested, 
product market relatedness shows a significant and positive correlation with CVC acquisition 
(r = .07, p ≤ .05). The degree of the exploitative orientation of a corporate mother in the fiscal 
year prior to the acquisition is negatively associated with CVC acquisition (r = -.11, p ≤ .001), 
whereas its degree of explorative orientation is positively, but non-significantly correlated 
with CVC acquisition (r = .03, n.s.). On top of this, we accounted for multicollinearity by 
examining the variance inflation factors (VIFs). All VIFs are far less than the suggested 
threshold of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue (e.g., O’Brien, 2007). 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable  Max  Mean  SD  1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  
01. CVC acquisition  1.00  .14  .35  - / -                 
02. Product market relatedness  1.00  .17  .32  .07*  - / -                
03. Exploration  2.05  .64  .36  .03 .16***  - / -               
04. Exploitation  2.36  .67  .41  -.11***  -.02  -.26***  - / -              
05. Acquisition year 2016  2007.67  4.97  -.16***  .10**  .41***  -.08*  - / -             
06. Mother total assets 14.17  10.02  8.31  .05 -.13***  -.04 .08*  .10**  - / -            
07. Mother R&D intensity  .43  .09  .14  -.02  -.03  .01 .22***  .15***  .80***  - / -           
08. CVC acquisitions 3 years  30.00  2.75  5.15  .44***  -.09**  -.11***  -.01  -.32***  .07*  .03 - / -          
09. Startup age  37.00  7.84  6.22  -.10**  -.09*  .02 .01  .25***  -.06†  -.01  -.04 - / -         
10. # CVCs invested  4.00  1.23  .52  -.08*  -.05  .01  -.03  .08*  .02  -.04  -.07*  .03  - / -        
11. Product development stage  1.00  .25  .43  -.07†  .16***  .04  -.06†  .01  .05  .10**  -.07*  -.11***  -.02  - / -       
12. Beta testing stage  1.00  .06  .23  -.02  .10**  .04  -.01  .02  .02  .04  -.03  -.03  .06†  -.14***  - / -      
13. Profitable stage  1.00  .05  .22  .15***  -.06†  .01  .01  .10**  .04  .02  .09**  .20***  -.07*  -.13***  -.06†  - / -     
14. Restart stage  1.00  .00  .03  -.01  -.02  .01  -.02  -.03  .00  .01  .01  .02  -.02  -.02  -.01  -.01  - / -    
15. Startup stage  1.00  .02  .14  .04  .10**  .08*  -.04  .08*  .02  .04  -.04  -.17***  -.00  -.08*  -.04  -.03  -.01  - / -   
16. Revenue stage  1.00  .62  .49  -.01  -.19***  -.08*  .07*  -.08*  -.08*  -.13***  .04  .07*  .02  -.74***  -.32***  -.30***  -.04  -.18***  - / -  
n = 901. *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .1.            
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As our dependent variable is binary in nature, we applied a logistic regression to test 
our hypotheses. The results of the regression are shown in Table 12. In our baseline model, 
we only include the control variables and then successively add the key independent variables 
of interest. Analogously, we add the interaction terms discussed in Hypotheses 4a and 4b in a 
successive manner to Model IV, meaning that Model VII represents our full model. The 
pseudo R² statistic in Model VII exhibits a decent model fit explaining 37.5% of the variance 
(Nagelkerke, 1991) and shows a strong increase when compared to the pseudo R² of 29.8% in 
the baseline model. The control variables in both the baseline model and Model VII, with the 
exception of the corporate mother’s total assets and the number of CVC acquisitions, are 
negative and statistically significant. This means that, for instance, R&D intensity (β = -3.41, 
p = .078) and the number of CVCs invested (β = -.63, p = .050) reduces the likelihood of a 
CVC acquisition. The number of previous CVC acquisitions (β = .17, p = .000) exhibits a 
significantly positive coefficient. The total assets of a corporate mother (β = .21, p = .116) 
have a positive, but insignificant effect. Model I includes the control variables and the product 
market relatedness between the acquirer and the respective startup, which in line with 
expectations is positive and significant (β = 1.79, p = .000). In Model II together with the 
control variables, the degree of the explorative orientation of a corporate mother in the fiscal 
year prior to an acquisition is introduced, and has the expected significant and positive 
coefficient (β = 1.02, p = .003). In Model III analogous to Model II, the degree of a corporate 
mother’s exploitative orientation is added to the control variables, showing the predicted 
significant negative coefficient (β = -1.03, p = .002). Model V presents the interaction term of 
exploration and product market relatedness and is as suggested negative (β = -2.11, p = .018). 
Analogously, Model VI includes the interaction term of exploitation and product market 
relatedness and shows a positive coefficient (β = 1.83, p = .013). Model VII represents the full 
model. For the direct effects, we find a significantly positive effect of product market 
relatedness on CVC acquisition (β = 1.79, p = .053), thus supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Furthermore, Hypothesis 1 suggested that a greater degree of explorative orientation on the 
part of a corporate mother increases the likelihood of a CVC acquisition. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, exploration is positive and significant (β = 1.33, p = .005). And Hypothesis 2, on 
the other hand, predicted that the degree of exploitative orientation of a corporate mother will 
decrease the likelihood of a CVC acquisition. Our results thus support Hypothesis 2, 
indicating that corporate mothers with a greater degree of exploitative orientation are 
significantly less likely to acquire a startup that has received previous funding from the 
mother’s CVC unit (β = -1.45, p = .002). 
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Table 12: Results of the logistic regression examining the effects on CVC acquisition 
Independent variables  Baseline Model Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
 
β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) β (SE) Exp(β) 
Product market relatedness 
  
1.79*** (.35) 5.98 
    
1.74*** (.36) 5.69 3.07*** (.67) 21.45 .52 (.61) 1.68 1.79† (.93) 6.00 
Exploration  
    
1.02** (.35) 2.78 
  
.69† (.38) 2.00 1.38** (.46) 3.98 .80* (.39) 2.22 1.33** (.47) 3.77 
Exploitation  
      
-1.03** (.34) .36 -.78* (.33) .46 -.92** (.34) .40 -1.49** (.47) .23 -1.45** (.46) .23 
Exploration ×  
Product market relatedness            
-2.11* (.89) .12 
  
-1.65† (.91) .19 
Exploitation ×  
Product market relatedness              
1.83* (.74) 6.25 1.51* (.77) 4.52 
Controls  
                
Acquisition year  -.05† (.03) .95 -.07* (.03) .93 -.08** (.03) .92 -.06* (.03) .95 -.10** (.03) .91 -.10** (.03) .91 -.10** (.03) .90 -.10*** (.03) .90 
Mother total assets  .16 (.13) 1.18 .23† (.13) 1.26 .13 (.12) 1.14 .14 (.13) 1.16 .18 (.13) 1.19 .18 (.13) 1.20 .21 (.13) 1.24 .21 (.13) 1.23 
Mother R&D intensity  -3.60* (1.67) .03 -5.54** (1.81) .00 -3.53* (1.68) .03 -1.72 (1.80) .18 -4.19* (1.92) .02 -3.60† (1.91) .03 -3.65† (1.96) .03 -3.41† (1.94) .03 
CVC acquisitions 3 years  .16*** (.02) 1.17 .17*** (.02) 1.18 .17*** (.02) 1.18 .16*** (.02) 1.18 .17*** (.02) 1.19 .17*** (.02) 1.19 .17*** (.02) 1.19 .17*** (.02) 1.19 
Startup age  -.04* (.02) .96 -.04† (.02) .96 -.04† (.02) .97 -.04* (.02) .96 -.04† (.02) .97 -.04* (.02) .96 -.03† (.02) .97 -.04† (.02) .96 
# CVCs invested  -.61* (.30) .55 -.58† (.31) .56 -.61* (.31) .55 -.60* (.30) .55 -.57† (.31) .57 -.62† (.32) .54 -.59† (.32) .55 -.63* (.32) .53 
Product development stage  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Beta testing stage  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Profitable stage  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Restart stage  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Startup stage  Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Model fit  
-2 LL = 560.22 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .298 
-2 LL = 535.50 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .339 
-2 LL = 551.98 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .312 
-2 LL = 549.67 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .316 
-2 LL = 522.92 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .360 
-2 LL = 517.16 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .369 
-2 LL = 516.75 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .369 
-2 LL = 513.40 
Nagelkerke’s R2 = .375 
n = 901. *** p ≤ .001; ** p ≤ .01; * p ≤ .05; † p ≤ .1. 
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Regarding the interaction effects, Hypothesis 4a postulated that the product market 
relatedness negatively moderates the effect of exploration on CVC acquisition. The 
interaction term of exploration and product market relatedness is negative, thus generally 
indicating support for Hypothesis 4a (β = -1.65, p = .071). Finally, with regards to Hypothesis 
4b, the results show a positive coefficient for the interaction term of exploitation and product 
market relatedness (β = 1.51, p = .049). To allow for a statistically valid interpretation of the 
interaction effects (Hypothesis 4a and 4b), we used the well-established (e.g., Kuckertz et al., 
2015) simulation-based approach introduced by Zelner (2009). Following King, Tomz, & 
Wittenberg (2000) and Hoetker (2007) the results for the full model are also graphically 
depicted in Figure 10 and Figure 11.  
 
Figure 10: Interaction analysis of exploration and product market relatedness 
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As outlined by Ai and Norton (2003), not considering the marginal effect of the 
interactions in non-linear models could lead to biases in the interpretation of their magnitude, 
direction and significance. Thus, we run 1,000 simulations to examine the effect of the 
changes of our key independent variables on the differences in predicted probabilities of the 
dependent variable, while holding all other variables at their corresponding means. Figure 10 
shows that product market relatedness moderates the influence of exploration on the 
probability of a CVC acquisition negatively, for moderate to high values of exploration. 
However, this result is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval, therewith 
not lending support to Hypothesis 4a. Figure 11 strongly supports Hypothesis 4b showing that 
product market relatedness positively and significantly moderates the relationship between 
exploitation and CVC acquisition for all levels of exploitation. 
 
Figure 11: Interaction analysis of exploitation and product market relatedness 
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In addition to the above, we conducted additional robustness checks taking into account, for 
instance, the travel and direct distance between the corporate mothers and the respective 
startups, using STATA’s geodist (Picard, 2010) and georoute command (Weber & Peclat, 
2016), and found robust results. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
There is an increasing amount of research that relates E/E to either CV and CVC or 
acquisitions, thereby ignoring the effect of E/E on the potential interplay between both 
external venturing modes. This study sought to fill that void by examining the 
interrelationship between CVC and startup acquisitions by focusing on the underlying 
explorative and exploitative orientation of a corporate mother. Consequently, this study is the 
first to empirically test this potential interplay. We test our hypotheses by applying a logistic 
regression analysis and further interaction analysis based on Zelner (2009) to scrutinize 901 
unique CVC triads that consist of corporate mother, CVC unit, and startup. Of these 901 
transactions 124 characterized CVC acquisitions, meaning that corporate mothers acquired 
startups funded through their own CVC unit. Furthermore, to extract a corporate mother’s 
degree of explorative and exploitative orientation, we relied on CATA because this allowed 
us to draw on publicly available shareholder letters. The advantage of this measure of E/E is 
that we can use the organizational narrative that directly relates to the potential acquirer 
(Uotila et al., 2009), that is, the corporate mother, and which provides insights into the 
mother’s business activities and its underlying self-conception (Leuthesser & Kohli, 1997). 
Taken together, our results untangle the interplay between CVC investments and acquisitions. 
In that sense, our findings indicate that the influence of a corporate mother’s explorative and 
exploitative orientation is directly linked to the possibility of a CVC acquisition. Our results 
highlight that a corporate mother’s explorative orientation raises the likelihood of a CVC 
acquisition, and vice versa for more exploitative oriented corporate mothers. However, our 
results also show that the product market relatedness between corporate mother and startup 
negatively (positively) moderates the effect of exploration (exploitation) on CVC acquisition, 
albeit our additional interaction analysis showed that the moderating effect is only statistically 
meaningful for exploitation.  
 
In drawing on the framework of E/E, our results relating to the interplay of CVC 
investments and acquisitions offer interesting and novel insights into corporate mothers’ 
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acquisition behavior. The findings therefore contribute to the under-researched topic of 
startup acquisitions in general (Andersson & Xiao, 2016), and specifically to the phenomenon 
of CVC acquisitions (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010; Dimitrova, 2015). We do this in particular by 
holistically taking into account all three parties involved in the CVC triad. Thus, our results 
help us to explain that CVC investments facilitate startup acquisitions when the corporate 
mother is more inclined to take risks and to learn about new opportunities, underscoring that it 
is more explorative in nature. We thus find strong support for the position that external 
venturing modes of CVC investment and acquisitions should not be considered separately but 
as complementary modes. Hence, our work adds to the small, but increasingly important 
research stream studying the interplay of external venturing modes (e.g., Dushnitsky & Lavie, 
2010; Dimitrova, 2015). In light of this, we introduce the concept of E/E to the phenomenon 
of CVC acquisition, which enables us to explicitly examine and include the strategic 
orientation of a corporate mother. Doing so allows us to simultaneously study the interaction 
of their explorative and exploitative orientation in relation to their product market relatedness 
with the focal startup; an interaction we could not have explored without adopting this 
theoretical angle. Hence, this made it possible for us to shed light on the fact that corporate 
mothers with a more exploitative orientation tend to acquire startups with a high product 
market overlap. Our study, in turn, confirms the concept of E/E by also highlighting that 
corporate mothers with a greater degree of exploitative orientation capitalize on their CVC 
investments to acquire startups from related industries that enable them to strengthen their 
own knowledge base seeking to sustain a competitive advantage (Garrett, Covin, & Slevin, 
2009; Sirén et al., 2012). Another important aspect of our study is that we draw on the CATA-
based measure of E/E, thereby putting into perspective that exploration and exploitation are 
not two contradicting ends of a continuum (Gupta et al., 2006), but that corporate mothers 
simultaneously follow both orientations to different degrees. Our findings thus provide strong 
validation of the CATA-based measure of E/E introduced by Uotila et al. (2009) and extended 
by Moss et al. (2014). Finally, our findings indicate that a higher number of CVCs invested in 
a startup decreases the likelihood of the startup being acquired by an associated corporate 
mother. This means that corporate mothers shy away from an acquisition when other 
corporations had access to the same startup’s knowledge, suggesting that they do not want to 
risk acquiring knowledge already accessed and shared with a potential competitor; an 
important aspect that, except in Dimitrova (2015), has not been investigated in the academic 
discourse. Intriguingly, in contrast to Dimitrova (2015) who discussed this aspect but could 
not find empirical evidence, our results support this notion. 
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4.5.1 Limitations and paths for future research 
This paper has four noteworthy limitations that pave the way for future research. First, 
our study examined CVC acquisitions in the U.S. context, meaning that startups, corporate 
mothers, and CVC vehicles were all headquartered in the U.S. However, the explorative and 
exploitative orientation of a corporate mother might differ across different countries and 
cultures (Cui, Walsh, & Zou, 2014) and might also have a varying effect when startups are 
acquired worldwide (Petruzzelli, 2014). Consequently, we encourage future research to 
extend our work by studying the effect of E/E on CVC acquisition by similarly taking into 
account worldwide CVC acquisitions. In this vein, geographical distance might also play a 
more significant role. Second, we put careful thought into our measures of E/E to guarantee 
that these fit the context of the CVC triad underlying our research question. Nevertheless, as 
discussed above, there are many other well-established measures of E/E employed in the 
literature (e.g., Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Sirén et al., 2012). In addition, we measured the 
product market relatedness between corporate mothers and startups based on the overlap of 
their primary SIC codes. We acknowledge the criticism of this measure (Montgomery, 1982), 
but followed the argumentation of previous research that the SIC code is more applicable and 
generalizable than other measures. We thus challenge future studies to test the robustness of 
our findings by applying alternative measures of E/E and product market relatedness. Third, 
our study focused on startup acquisitions by corporate mothers that received funding through 
the mother’s CVC unit. Indeed, since CVC investments are the most arms-length external 
venturing mode (Schildt et al., 2005) characterized by a strong resource commitment 
(Wadhwa & Basu, 2013), CVC investments are probably the most likely external venturing 
mode ultimately resulting in a startup acquisition. That notwithstanding, there are also other 
external venturing modes with pre-existing startup relationships, such as alliances (e.g., 
Schildt et al., 2005), that might result in the acquisition of a startup. In this regard, future 
research should extend our work linking E/E and startup acquisitions by simultaneously 
taking into account other external venturing modes alongside CVC investments. Likewise, it 
would constitute a fruitful avenue to examine if startups with pre-existing relationships with 
corporations, particularly in terms of receiving CVC investments, are more likely to be 
acquired by these companies as compared to startups that lack such a pre-existing 
relationship. Fourth, the current research has drawn on E/E theory to shed light on the 
determinants ultimately driving the acquisition of startups with pre-existing CVC equity 
relationships, and therefore has not addressed the impact of E/E on successful and 
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unsuccessful CVC acquisitions from a post-acquisition perspective. Interestingly, Benson and 
Ziedonis (2010) found that CVC acquisitions are associated with shareholder value 
destruction. To address this conundrum, future research should therefore include the 
explorative and exploitative orientation of a corporate mother so as to study the impact on the 
success of CVC acquisitions; particularly in light of the fact that prior research found that E/E 
impacts a corporation’s financial performance (Uotila et al., 2009; Sirén et al., 2012). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Despite its theoretical and practical relevance there is virtually no research available on 
the phenomenon of CVC acquisition, that is, corporate mothers acquiring a startup that 
received funding through its CVC unit. Thus, the goal of this study was to examine the 
phenomenon of CVC acquisition by linking it to the explorative and exploitative orientation 
of corporate mothers. In doing so, the study applied a logistic regression by capitalizing on a 
diligently constructed sample of 901 unique CVC triads (reflecting 124 CVC acquisitions) 
comprising startups, CVC units and corporate mothers in the period 1996–2016. Our results 
show that corporate mothers with a greater degree of explorative orientation have a greater 
likelihood of acquiring startups that have been funded through their own CVC vehicles, while 
the opposite holds true for acquirers with a greater degree of exploitative orientation. In 
addition, our findings also reveal that the product market relatedness between corporate 
mother and startup negatively (positively) moderates the effect of exploration (exploitation) 
on the likelihood of a CVC acquisition. As shown by the supplemental simulation-based 
interaction analysis the interaction effect, however, is only statistically significant for 
exploitation. As a whole, our results emphasize the important link between E/E and CVC 
acquisition and thereby illuminate promising paths for future work. 
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5 Identifying Corporate Venture Capital Investors – A Data-
Cleaning Procedure 
 
Abstract 
The majority of research on corporate venture capital relies on data retrieved from 
secondary databases. As a result, on most occasions CVC researchers accept the definitions 
that are integral to those databases. Because the definitions vary, results of empirical CVC 
research are often not comparable, and replicability across databases becomes impossible, 
thus hampering the progress of this research stream. To address this issue, we examine the 
scope and consistency of the two most popular databases among CVC researchers: Eikon 
from Thomson Reuters and Dow Jones VentureSource. In doing so, we develop a replicable 
data-cleaning procedure based on an appropriate CVC definition, thus providing a common 
ground for the future discourse on the CVC phenomenon. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
CVC is increasingly becoming a means through which established firms gain an edge in 
today’s business. According to the NVCA (NVCA, 2018), CVC deals worth a record amount 
of over $37 billion were funded in the United States in 2017. The CVC concept is fairly 
straightforward. Investment funds, so called CVC units, are usually established within a 
parent company (Dushnitsky, 2006). The funds target nascent firms with high-potential 
technologies that are usually strategically aligned with the mother firm (Ernst et al., 2005). 
CVC investments provide start-ups with capital and industry knowledge (e.g., Park & 
Steensma, 2013; Chemmanur et al., 2014; Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016), and in turn, 
the parent companies get access to potentially disruptive technologies and emerging markets 
(e.g., Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). The increased CVC activity has 
stimulated academic interest in the topic, resulting in a rapidly growing body of research (see 
Röhm forthcoming for an overview). However, empirical research into its workings and 
impact has been hindered by data limitations and the lack of a common definition of CVC, 
and that lack of a common definition makes it particularly difficult to gauge the progress 
being made in CVC research. 
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Although there have been some attempts to propose a common theoretically-grounded 
CVC definition for future empirical work (e.g., Bengtsson & Wang, 2010; Dimov & 
Gedajlovic, 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2014; Pahnke et al., 2015), the majority of empirical 
studies ground their definition of CVC on presets from the corresponding data providers. The 
problem is that each database has its own CVC definition. VentureSource, for example, 
classifies investors as a CVC if they invest in ventures through a dedicated fund to 
simultaneously achieve financial and strategic objectives (personal communication, 
September 10, 2017). In contrast Eikon treats corporate subsidiaries as CVCs if they are 
actively involved in PE related investments (personal communication, September 21 to 
October 30, 2017). Even for the same database, it is hard to replicate empirical results because 
the understanding of CVC activities varies among researchers (see e.g., Dushnitsky, 2006 for 
an overview) and most studies give no detailed information on the applied search settings 
within the commercial databases. 
 
Additionally, researchers have reported inconsistencies among databases. The 
comparison of VC related databases has only rarely been addressed in the literature (e.g., 
Lerner, 1994; Lerner, 1995; Kaplan, Strömberg, & Sensoy, 2002; Maats, Metrick, Yasuda, 
Hinkes, & Vershovski, 2011). In fact, we are unaware of any detailed comparison of CVC 
data. The lack of a precise CVC definition and a common data-cleaning process makes it hard 
to discern commonalities among previous studies. Building on the theoretical literature, we 
characterize CVC units as wholly-owned subsidiaries of nonfinancial corporations that invest 
in start-ups on behalf of their corporate parent (e.g., Souitaris et al., 2012; Chemmanaur et al., 
2014) and propose a replicable data-cleaning procedure for this definition for the two 
databases most popular among CVC researchers: Eikon from Thomson Reuters and Dow 
Jones VentureSource. We thereby help to put future CVC research on a common footing, 
which would facilitate academic discussion and promote coherence across future research. 
Additionally, we contribute to the literature on the consistency and reliability of VC related 
databases (e.g., Lerner, 1994, 1995; Kaplan et al., 2002; Maats et al., 2011) by shedding light 
on the scope of CVC data in the two most extensively used databases. 
 
5.2 Relevant databases for CVC research 
To identify the most prominent databases for CVC research, we conducted an extensive 
literature review based on Elsevier’s Scopus database. In this vein, we searched Scopus for 
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occurrences of the search strings “venture capital” or “corporate venture capital” in either the 
title, abstract, or keywords. Additionally, we limit the results to academic papers published in 
journals up until March 2018 and written in English. In total, we were able to download 2,128 
unique articles. To extract information about the underlying databases used by the articles, we 
applied LIWC2015 from Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, and Blackburn (2015), and controlled for 
inconsistencies in spelling.18 With 551 appearances Eikon (also known as Thomson One, 
VentureXpert, or Venture Economics and collecting data since 1961) is used most extensively, 
followed by VentureSource (also known as VentureOne and collecting data since 1994) with 
95 appearances. Other databases such as Crunchbase (26 appearances), Preqin (31 
appearances), Pitchbook (9 appearances) and CB Insights (9 appearances) only play a minor 
role.19 These results compare favorably to those of Da Rin et al. (2013), who claimed the two 
primary commercial databases that have been used in venture capital research are Thomson 
Reuters’ Eikon and VentureSource from Dow Jones.20 Hence, we will focus on those two 
databases in the remainder of this paper. 
 
VentureSource provides information for 36,000 VC investors and offers data points for 
about 101,000 PE- and VC-backed companies. In cooperation with Sand Hill Economics, a 
rich collection of post-money valuations can be accessed (VentureSource, 2018). In 
comparison, the “private equity screener” of Eikon comprises information on about 22,000 
investors with 51,000 funds and a total number of 133,000 PE- and VC-backed companies. 
Moreover, the database makes it possible to utilize the “Cambridge associates benchmark 
calculator” to acquire a strong understanding of performance related issues for PE 
investments (Thomson Reuters, 2018). The frequency of updates for both databases is 
comparable. To gather information from the rapidly evolving VC industry both databases use 
a similar procedure including the use of extensive quarterly surveys in which investors in the 
VC industry participate. This step in the data collection is particularly suited to gaining access 
to sensitive information that is not presented in official deal statements. In addition, 
VentureSource uses its Factiva database and a web crawler to identify information on an 
investor’s homepage or from its press releases (personal communication, September 10, 
2017). Likewise, Eikon draws on government fillings, public news releases, and on PE 
newsmakers including the European Venture Capital and Private Equity Journal and the 
                                                 
18 For instance, we used VentureSource and Venture Source as alternative forms of spelling. 
19 Because some articles discuss several databases simultaneously, the counts cannot be interpreted as mutually 
exclusive. 
20 See Da Rin (2013) for a detailed overview of other data sources. 
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Private Equity Week (personal communication, September 21 to October 30, 2017; Thomson, 
2008; Thomson, 2010). 
 
5.3 Data sample 
To develop a common data-cleaning process for the given CVC definition, we rely on 
the two primary databases: Thomson Reuters’ Eikon and Dow Jones VentureSource. For each 
database we construct two samples, one for US-based CVCs and one for CVC vehicles 
headquartered in Europe.21 In order to cover most of the recurring CVC waves (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2000; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006), we draw on an extensive dataset ranging from 
January 2000 to December 2015. In addition, we do not restrict the country of origin for the 
investees considered, thus allowing for cross-country investments. 
In both databases, the search criteria were set to an appropriate minimum, reducing the risk of 
omitting a CVC unit due to incorrect classification in the databases. Accordingly, besides the 
geographical settings, we predefine “Corporate Venture Capital” as an investor type in 
VentureSource and “Corporate PE/Venture” as a firm type in Eikon. For the predefined period 
of sixteen years we found 629 investors, 9,602 investees and a total of 19,077 investment 
rounds (Europe: 282 investors, 2,737 investees, 4,540 investment rounds) for the US-based 
Eikon sample. For VentureSource our initial data set comprised 235 investors, 4,532 investees 
and a total number of 7,719 investment rounds (Europe: 171 investors, 2,026 investees, 3,283 
investment rounds). The previously specified samples serve as a starting point for the 
subsequent data-cleaning process. 
 
5.4 Data-cleaning process 
The proposed data-cleaning procedure comprises seven steps resulting in the given 
definition of CVC units. The underlying methodology of the data-cleaning procedure is 
shown in Figure 12. In the following section, we introduce each step of the procedure 
separately and discuss how the underlying samples from both databases are affected. Table 13 
offers an overview to outline the number of excluded investors, investees, and investment 
rounds for both data providers and for each continent separately, based on the criteria applied. 
 
                                                 
21 Note that Europe also includes the non-EU countries Iceland, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey. 
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Undisclosed investors. Building on the initial step of retrieving the raw data from the 
databases, in the second step, we drop all investors that were categorized as undisclosed 
investors. In those cases, we had information about the investee but not on the corresponding 
investors even though they were grouped as “Corporate PE/Venture” firms. This was only the 
case in the Eikon database. For the European sample of Eikon, we consequently omitted 
investors that were categorized as “Undisclosed Firm” or “Other UK Investor(s)” which 
removed five investees and seven investment rounds from the sample. In the US-based data 
we also dropped “Undisclosed Investors” which resulted in a massive reduction of 32 percent 
of the overall investees or respectively 33 percent of the covered investment rounds. 
 
Unknown investors. Third, we merge all investor specific information with data from 
the Capital IQ platform of Standard & Poor’s. This allows us to draw on an extensive data 
pool of more than 4 million private and listed companies covering nearly 100 percent of the 
world’s market capitalization (S&P Global, 2018). Capital IQ provides information on the 
investors’ business descriptions and information related to the company affiliation. We 
exclude all investors where we could not find a fitting investor profile in the Capital IQ 
database. In doing so, we ensure data consistency and simultaneously provide a solid and 
reliable foundation for the subsequent steps. For instance, we could not find the investors Alps 
Investment Research and Lauder Investments. This step led to the exclusion of 44 US-based 
investors appearing in the Eikon sample (25 in Europe) and 11 appearing in the 
VentureSource sample (7 in Europe). 
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Figure 12: Underlying methodology of the proposed data-cleaning procedure 
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Table 13: Results from the database queries for US and European-based CVCs 
  Thomson Reuters Eikon 
 
Dow Jones VentureSource 
US Europe 
 
US Europe 
Step 1: Full sample 
Initial investors 629 282 
 
235 171 
Initial investees 9,602 2,737 
 
4,532 2,026 
Initial rounds 19,077 4,540 
 
7,719 3,283 
Step 2: Undisclosed investors 
Excluded investors 1 (0%) 2 (1%) 
 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Excluded investees 3,101 (32%) 5 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Excluded rounds 6,332 (33%) 8 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Step 3: Unknown investors 
Excluded investors 44 (7%) 25 (9%) 
 
11 (5%) 7 (4%) 
Excluded investees 92 (1%) 157 (6%) 
 
24 (1%) 14 (1%) 
Excluded rounds 199 (2%) 213 (5%) 
 
43 (1%) 16 (0%) 
Step 4: Geographical overlap 
Excluded investors 80 (14%) 7 (3%) 
 
50 (22%) 4 (2%) 
Excluded investees 731 (11%) 55 (2%) 
 
571 (13%) 12 (1%) 
Excluded rounds 1,885 (15%) 69 (2%) 
 
1,161 (15%) 19 (1%) 
Step 5: Alternative investors 
Excluded investors 63 (13%) 61 (25%) 
 
15 (9%) 13 (8%) 
Excluded investees 507 (9%) 636 (25%) 
 
86 (2%) 250 (13%) 
Excluded rounds 901 (8%) 1,089 (26%) 
 
207 (3%) 510 (16%) 
Step 6: CVC governance 
Excluded investors 240 (54%) 31 (17%) 
 
33 (21%) 21 (14%) 
Excluded investees 843 (16%) 123 (7%) 
 
276 (7%) 69 (4%) 
Excluded rounds 1,828 (19%) 155 (5%) 
 
419 (7%) 91 (3%) 
Step 7: Outside LPs 
Excluded investors 22 (11%) 17 (11%) 
 
10 (8%) 11 (9%) 
Excluded investees 1,313 (30%) 434 (25%) 
 
1,231 (34%) 362 (22%) 
Excluded rounds 2,604 (33%) 732 (24%) 
 
2,168 (37%) 660 (25%) 
CVC definition 
Remained investors 179 139 
 
116 115 
Remained investees 3,015 1,327 
 
2,344 1,319 
Remained rounds 5,328 2,274 
 
3,721 1,987 
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Geographical overlap. The fourth step includes the analysis of the investors’ position 
within an existing corporate network. For each investor in our samples, we draw on the 
Capital IQ database to identify potential corporate mothers and thus clarify the ownership 
status. Accordingly, we use the business descriptions as well as the corporate tree function of 
Capital IQ to clearly match the investor to a corporate mother. To cope with dynamic 
processes, we also consider historical names and also merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activities. We were then able to gather information about the corporate mother and to classify 
investors where we could not find an obvious parent company. Where a corporate mother was 
present, we collected various data relating to the industry, the general status (public vs. 
private), and geographical information. Although we excluded non-US and non-European 
investors respectively from our sample, we could still identify a great number of investors 
with a corporate mother from the excluded geographical regions. For instance, German-based 
companies such as BMW and Bertelsmann operate investment vehicles in the USA. Both 
databases classify these CVC units as US-based, although the corporate mother is from 
Europe. As knowledge typically flows from the investor to the corresponding corporate 
mother (e.g., Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000), the corporate mother determines the geographical 
affiliation. Accordingly, we omit all CVC units with a corporate mother from a different 
region. This procedure resulted in the exclusion of 80 investors from the US-sample of Eikon 
(7 in Europe) and 50 from VentureSource (4 in Europe). 
 
Alternative investors. Based on the business description, we omit associations (e.g., 
Massachusetts Technology Collaborative), NGOs or universities (e.g., Rhode Island College), 
regional development vehicles (e.g., SCRA Technology Ventures), advisory firms (e.g., 
Limestone Capital Advisors), independent VCs (e.g., Ulu Ventures) and several other 
investment vehicles such as hedge funds, PE investors, business angel associations, 
incubators, and family offices. Those investor types were initially declared as CVC units in 
the databases but do not meet the definition owing to missing corporate parents or their self-
conception in the S&P Capital IQ business descriptions, and thereby carry the risk of skewing 
the empirical analysis. Accordingly, in the fifth step between eight and twenty-five percent of 
the remaining investors were removed. 
 
CVC governance. The sixth step includes the deep analysis of the remaining corporate 
investment vehicles. Following Dushnitsky (2006), corporations can structure their venturing 
activities in three ways: First, they can act as a LP in already existing funds of IVCs. Second, 
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the investments can be organized through an operating business unit that is in charge of the 
venturing strategy (also called direct investments). In practice, as mentioned by Bertoni et al. 
(2013), it is mainly R&D or business development units that are responsible for those 
transactions. Third, CVC units can also be organized as wholly-owned subsidiaries within the 
corporate boundaries. The problem, however, is that investments made through IVCs cannot 
be assigned to a specific corporate LP and therefore are not observable in the databases. There 
are also challenges involved in clearly matching direct CVC investments, because commercial 
databases only provide information about the existing corporate entities but not on the 
business unit level. Consequently, only wholly-owned subsidiaries were considered in the 
further analysis using the corporate trees in Capital IQ. Following Dushnitsky and Lenox 
(2005), we also exclude corporate pension trusts, retirement trusts, pension plans, employee 
share schemes, and asset management arms. This step led to the exclusion of 54 percent of the 
investment vehicles in the US-based sample of Eikon (17 percent in Europe) and 21 percent 
of the VentureSource investors (14 percent in Europe). 
 
Outside LPs. In contrast to the proper sense of CVC, some corporate venture units act 
as a general partner (GP) for external investors. In this case, LPs such as insurance firms, 
IVCs, and other corporate arms can invest in a fund organized and run by a CVC and benefit 
from the market knowledge of the GP. In a manner similar to the approach in Step 4, we 
argue in the seventh step that the use of this investment practice is accompanied by a risk of 
sharing knowledge with actual or potential competitors through a knowledge outflow. 
Therefore, we excluded CVC vehicles with external LPs. In this step, we excluded 22 
investors from the US-sample of Eikon, among them prestigious CVCs such as Intel Capital 
or TI Ventures, the corporate investment vehicle of Texas Instruments. For instance, Intel 
provide access to their investment fund for external investors such as Dell, Boeing, General 
Electric, and Morgan Stanley. Looking at the samples of VentureSource we excluded 
investors of similar magnitude (US 8 percent; Europe 9 percent). 
 
CVC definition. The process deployed above yields the specified CVC vehicles. Of 
629 (282), we consider 179 as CVCs in the Eikon sample (Europe 139). In VentureSource, we 
identify out of 235 (171) listed CVCs, 116 (115) for the USA (Europe). All other firms cannot 
be considered a CVC because they are funded by financial companies, partnerships, or 
multiple corporate parents, or have a foreign or unknown parent (Chemmanur et al., 2014). 
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Following Maats et al. (2011), we present the resulting CVCs based on the underlying 
geographical sample (Figure 13) in a Venn diagram. 
 
Figure 13: Coverage of CVC investors within the underlying data samples 
 
 
In the US (European) sample, we identify 75 (65) shared CVC investors. Overall, it 
appears that Eikon offers a higher availability of CVC investors. However, a closer look 
reveals that this is mainly driven by past data points. More recently, VentureSource has 
caught up, offering similar numbers of CVC investors (see Table 14). When looking at the 
industry groups of the unique investors it appears that Eikon is especially suited for US-based 
CVCs from the transportation and utilities industries (designated by SIC codes starting with 
4). In comparison, VentureSource has a higher availability of European CVCs from 
manufacturing industry (designated by SIC codes starting with 2 or 3) and US-based CVCs 
from the service industry (designated by SIC codes starting with 7 or 8). Regarding the 
covered investment rounds, Eikon systematically offers a higher data coverage with one 
exception: VentureSource covers more investment rounds in the European sample between 
the years of 2011 and 2012. Moreover, we found that the underlying definition of CVC is 
superior in VentureSource compared with the definition provided in this article. 
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Table 14: Unique CVCs and investment rounds covering the period from 2000 to 2015 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Unique CVCs 
US sample 
VentureSource 31 29 24 28 26 29 25 26 35 33 33 34 30 31 36 43 
Eikon 63 58 36 44 37 43 38 38 45 34 35 42 36 38 43 45 
Investment rounds 
US sample 
VentureSource 288 180 117 109 107 136 147 147 147 136 176 203 217 252 313 381 
Eikon 716 321 166 134 150 161 214 227 234 159 210 244 246 263 284 354 
Unique CVCs 
European sample 
VentureSource 23 24 26 25 21 21 22 23 27 24 27 23 24 31 36 38 
Eikon 26 25 23 19 20 21 14 21 29 19 23 22 29 27 31 38 
Investment rounds 
European sample 
VentureSource 78 103 79 94 80 81 78 103 104 77 78 110 173 85 110 122 
Eikon 113 98 64 81 94 83 77 98 112 82 85 82 102 107 129 138 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In analyzing the recent empirical literature on CVC, this article seeks to address how 
CVC activity is measured and in which ways the commonly used databases, namely Eikon 
from Thomson Reuters and Dow Jones VentureSource can be used to reach a theoretically 
defined dataset of CVCs. Most published studies provide researchers with insufficient 
information about the technical definition of CVC or base their empirical work on the 
definition of the commercial data providers. We propose a data-cleaning procedure to 
promote future coherence in research. Due to the results presented in this paper, we contribute 
to the ongoing discussion of CVC in several ways. By providing a data-cleaning process, we 
encourage researchers to pay far more attention than is typical to the criteria applied in their 
definition of CVC. Moreover, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the data coverage in 
the commonly used databases of Eikon and VentureSource to help researchers with decisions 
connected to the data provider or the sampling period used. 
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6 The Devil Inside? Organizational Voids Within Corporate 
Venture Capital Dyads 
 
Abstract  
Acting as an intermediary, corporate venture capital (CVC) units need to balance two 
different institutional settings—the rigid corporate world and the advancing startup 
ecosystem. As a result, CVC units are faced with multiple voids that influence their 
organizational orientation toward one environment. Currently however, the academic 
literature only considers those processes from a theoretical angle. This section in contrast 
employs text analysis and a unique sample of 22 CVC dyads to introduce a novel empirical 
way of measuring isomorphic variations. Following a mix method approach, it presents the 
results of interviews to shed light on potential drivers of isomorphism. The findings 
demonstrate that the degree of isomorphism is not only determined by initial decisions made 
during the initial phase of a CVC unit, but also from mimetic processes that occur within the 
lifespan of such investment vehicles. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
To overcome financial constraints, innovative startups often draw on external investors 
such as IVCs, business angels, or PEs depending on the startup’s development stage (Sudek, 
2006; Kollmann & Kuckertz, 2010). Since the mid-1960s, established corporations have 
discovered the advantages of backing such startups (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; CB Insights, 
2018b). In an ideal world, CVC is associated with a wide range of benefits for all parties 
concerned. Acting as a broker, the CVC unit supports promising startups with money 
provided by the corporate mother22; this represents the so-called CVC triad (Weber & Weber, 
2011). Prior research showed that corporate mothers’ can leverage their innovation rate (e.g., 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005a; Schildt et al., 2005; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006) and financial 
performance (e.g., Zahra & Hayton, 2008) through the use of CVC investments. Likewise, 
startups also profit from CVC in terms of improved innovation behavior (e.g., Park & 
                                                 
22 In some cases, CVC units also raise money (Kollmann, Kuckertz, & Middelberg, 2014; Kuckertz et al., 2015) 
from outside investors. 
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Steensma, 2012; Alvarez-Garrido & Dushnitsky, 2016) and better financial performance 
(Ivanov & Xie, 2010; Wang & Wan, 2013). 
However, there is also a potential downside of the CVC phenomenon. Gompers and 
Lerner (2000) pointed out that CVC vehicles have a shorter lifespan than their independent 
counterparts. Hence, it is not surprising that data provided by Dow Jones VentureSource, one 
of the two most frequently used databases in the VC field, shows that 13.5% of all its 
recorded CVC units have ceased operations.23 Some researchers blame a lack of commitment 
(Siegel et al., 1988; Bannock Consulting, 2001), unattractive compensation schemes 
(Bannock Consulting, 2001), staffing decisions (Siegel et al., 1988), or unsuitable 
performance measurement (Teppo & Wüstenhagen, 2009). 
 
In addition, the high failure rates of CVC units could also be explained by CVC units 
acting in two competing environments simultaneously: the corporate world and the startup 
world. Under the label of isomorphism, Souitaris et al. (2012) showed that CVC units are 
caught in a continuum between two contradictions, that is, the corporate world with its rigid 
structures and the startup ecosystem characterized by high levels of autonomy and risk-taking 
behavior. Consequently, CVC units are forced to either align with the corporate mother’s 
norms (endoisomorphism) or with the norms of the startup ecosystem (exoisomorphism). 
CVCs with endoisomorphic tendencies tend to develop mechanistic structures with command-
like communication, concentrated decision making, fixed and written procedures, and a clear 
division of labor into specific tasks. Conversely, CVCs closely aligned with the startup sphere 
tend to develop more organic structures in terms of overlapping responsibilities, distributed 
decision making, flexible and unwritten procedures, and consultative communication (Burns 
& Stalker, 1961; Souitaris et al., 2012). 
 
Although the seminal work of Souitaris et al. (2012) has the potential to shed light on 
various open questions regarding the organizational settings of CVC units, the concept of 
isomorphism has not been further addressed in the academic discourse. This might be 
grounded in the fact that observing and measuring such tendencies is an arduous task. 
Therefore, this section proposes a new measure of isomorphism in the CVC context. This 
measure considers the overlap of two organizational written mission statements, that is, from 
the corporate mother and its corresponding CVC unit. In doing so, we are able to extract 
                                                 
23 Please note, that the search considered all recorded CVC units recorded in VentureSource, and was not limited 
to a specific time frame or country. 
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organizational tendencies to favor one of the environments by shifting the focus from 
subjective assessments to a more impartial approach. A significant benefit of this measure is 
the fact that it makes it possible to track the isomorphic tendencies over time. In the second 
part of the section, we go beyond the quantitative observation by qualitatively identifying 
drivers of isomorphism that could influence a CVC’s decision. 
 
6.2 Literature review 
The concept of isomorphism is grounded in the question of why organizations tend to 
be homogeneous (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Isomorphic tendencies in the CVC context 
have surprisingly only rarely been discussed in the finance and management-related literature 
(Röhm, forthcoming). In their seminal work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) observed three 
mechanisms of isomorphism and the factors that potentially influence them. The study 
describes coercive isomorphism as resulting from formal and informal pressure on an 
organization that stems from an interdependence with other organizations and social 
expectations. As a result, organizations respond to legislative changes or new regulations 
resulting in a homogenization of organizational structures. Second, when organizations face 
an uncertain environment they try to imitate structures from organizations which have already 
shown the ability to resist those circumstances, also known as mimetic isomorphism. Finally, 
an increasing standardization of occupational groups can influence the homogenization of 
organizations. Flowing from a high level of specialization in terms of professional training 
and education, standards can easily be spread through networks and can change existing 
procedures. 
 
Souitaris and colleagues (2012) observed and documented isomorphic tendencies with 
regards to CVC units. The authors conducted six extensive case studies with newly founded 
CVC units from prestigious established corporations. The selected CVCs all share the idea of 
simultaneously leveraging strategic goals and delivering strong financial returns. Souitaris et 
al. (2012) draw on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Burns and Stalker (1961) to 
show that CVCs either seek legitimacy with the corporate world or with the VC ecosystem. 
Accordingly, CVCs that align with the norms and rules of the corporate mother (i.e., they 
demonstrate endoisomorphism) tend to develop organizational structures comparable to the 
structure of the corporate mothers in terms of a formalization of tasks, centralized decision-
making processes, being relatively stable and having control over tasks, and employing 
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command-style communication methods. CVCs that are closely aligned with the VC 
ecosystem (i.e., they demonstrate exoisomorphism), tend to decentralize their decisions with a 
low degree of specialization, and employ a consultative communication style and unwritten 
procedures. The existing academic discourse on CVC has focused only on some aspects of the 
organizational structure; for instance, Dushnitsky (2006) identifies three types of 
organizational settings: First, established corporations can manage their investments in 
technology-oriented startups through internal business units; termed a direct investment 
setting. Second, CVC units can also act independently by operating a fund sponsored by the 
corporate mother; typically organized as wholly-owned subsidiaries. This setting has proved 
to be a good role model owing to the greater degree of autonomy it confers. Third, established 
corporations can invest in open or dedicated funds run by independent VCs. In this way 
corporations can benefit from the IVCs network and experience without the need to build 
their own capabilities. With this in mind, Siegel et al. (1988) asked 52 actors from the CVC 
community how they organized their activities to maximize success. The paper provides 
useful insights into several aspects of CVCs’ organizational structures such as staffing 
decisions, compensation aspects, and autonomy. The study’s findings suggest only one in ten 
CVCs acts completely independently without requiring some form of approval from the 
corporate management. A more recent paper published by Asel, Park, and Velamuri (2015) 
focuses on the differences between internally and externally managed CVC programs. The 
study takes the underlying strategy, staffing decisions, compensation schemes, and exit 
considerations into account to highlight where both program structures overlap and differ. 
 
From a human resource point of view, some articles investigate the influence of the 
individual experience of managers on the adoption of IVC practices (Dokko & Gaba, 2012) 
and on the longevity of CVC units (Gaba & Dokko, 2016). Results indicate that managers 
with IVC experience tend to leverage financial goals and therefore contribute positively to the 
lifespan of their CVC unit. Beyond those staffing discussions, there are also some articles 
(e.g., Dushnitsky & Shapira, 2010; Yang, 2012) that observe the influence of different 
remuneration schemes on the performance of the CVC unit. However, to date the literature 
has not presented a holistic picture. Nevertheless, the isomorphic tendencies explored by 
Souitaris et al. (2012) provide a unique framework that can support placing the published 
insights in a broader theoretical context. 
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6.3 Isomorphic tendencies and the call for a mixed-method approach 
The relative scarcity of organizational research on VC and CVC might be expected to 
prompt researchers to adopt a qualitative design to illuminate a rather opaque phenomenon 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Röhm, forthcoming). However, this 
section opts for a mixed-methods approach to present a more complete picture (Creswell, 
2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). Generally speaking, mixed-method designs involve the 
combination of “elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches […] for the 
broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration” (Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 123). There have been occasional calls for intensified 
research following this paradigm in entrepreneurship research (e.g., Davidsson, 2004; Röhm, 
forthcoming); applications have, however, remained scarce until now (see Hohenthal, 2006 or 
Bryant, 2009 for noteworthy exceptions). Such mixed-methods designs can be differentiated 
in terms of the respective dominant paradigm within a given study, that is, they can be 
classified along the continuum from a purely quantitative focus to a purely qualitative one 
(Johnson et al., 2007). Mixed-method designs can also be distinguished according to the 
particular point within the research process at which a certain paradigm dominates (Morse, 
2003). This method is suggested for researchers testing a theoretical model from the literature, 
especially if some of the components are not quantifiable. Specifically, the present study 
utilizes two distinct samples: first, it quantitatively explores isomorphic tendencies from a 
CVC headquartered in the USA to establish if those tendencies vary over time. Against the 
backdrop of those results, we subsequently qualitatively identify and propose several drivers 
of isomorphic tendencies extracted from four in-depth case studies with experienced investors 
from the CVC industry in Germany. The next paragraph introduces our novel way to measure 
isomorphic tendencies based on excerpts from organizational texts. 
 
6.4 Making isomorphic tendencies measurable 
Owing to the absence of constructs to measure the isomorphism tendencies of CVC 
units, this article proposes a first approach by drawing on text analysis, a method widely used 
in the management (for an overview see Duriau et al., 2007) and finance research 
communities (e.g., Jegadeesh & Wu, 2013; Röhm et al., 2018). The history of analyzing 
mission statements is grounded in the idea that an organization’s written text is more than the 
sum of its words and consequently text analysis reveals the mission statement’s underlying 
118 
philosophy, perceptions, and beliefs (D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). Considering that the 
methodology used and the chosen text sources need to fit the question of interest (Short et al., 
2010), text analysis has a broad range of applications. In addition to website content (Zachary 
et al., 2011), IPO prospectuses (Bukh et al., 2005), annual reports (Titus et al., 2017), 
shutdown messages (Mandl et al., 2016), CEO speeches (Bannier, Pauls, & Walter, 2017) 
even internal data sources (McKenny et al., 2013) can be analyzed. This particular method 
offers a variety of advantages when measuring isomorphic tendencies over time (Duriau et al., 
2007; Moss et al., 2014): (1) by drawing on organizational narratives the isomorphic 
tendencies can be directly derived from publicly available information, overcoming the 
typical limitations of personal surveys or interviews, (2) narratives such as annual reports or 
websites are often available for lengthy periods of time, thus enabling longitudinal analysis, 
(3) outcomes can be quantified and serve as a valid starting point for further statistical 
analysis. 
 
To fully grasp the phenomenon of isomorphism over time, we merge data from multiple 
sources. To extract CVC-backed transactions in the USA that occurred from 2000 to 2010, we 
draw on Dow Jones VentureSource. This database is commonly used to investigate the VC 
and CVC ecosystem (e.g., Benson & Ziedonis, 2010) as it provides access to more than 
130,000 private companies and 40,000 investors worldwide (VentureSource, 2018). To ensure 
a rigorous theoretical anchoring related to CVC units, we adapted the data cleaning process 
suggested by Röhm, Merz, Kuckertz (2018). In short, by merging the extracted VC data with 
information provided by S&P Capital IQ, we penetrated beyond the rather vague CVC 
definition often used by data providers. The cleansing process produced a set of 72 unique 
CVC investors. To access those investors’ isomorphic tendencies and to examine how they 
vary over time, we subsequently collected written excerpts from the remaining 72 CVC dyads 
(i.e., the CVC unit and its associated corporate mother). Accordingly, we adopted two 
different search strategies: First, we collected all public available annual reports from the 
corporate mothers using the corporate websites, Bloomberg, annualreports.com, and 
annualreportowl.com. We chose annual reports because they should communicate the 
relevant corporate mission statement. Because annual reports address a hybrid group of 
stakeholders, the relevant information must be distilled down and critically reviewed by 
communication experts, and the resulting information therefore offers a valid starting point 
for our research (Stanton & Stanton, 2002). Second, examining the public websites of each 
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CVC unit offered an opportunity to scrutinize even more concise mission statements than 
those available on corporate websites (Zachary et al., 2011; Röhm et al., 2018). 
 
To access historic mission statements from the CVC websites, we made use of the 
Internet Wayback Machine (Hackett et al., 2004). To ensure data quality, we drew on the 
Directory of Venture Capital and Private Equity Firms, Domestic and International (Gottlieb, 
2008) and historical press releases to identify variances in URL addresses (on this approach 
see Röhm et al., 2018). Not surprisingly, we could find mission statements, contained for 
example in the Message from the CEO, About us or Our Approach, for only 22 CVC units. To 
analyze and compare the mission statements gathered from CVCs and their corresponding 
corporate mothers’ we combined several text-based software packages (Short, McKenny, & 
Reid, 2018). To measure endoisomorphism, that is, the alignment of a CVC unit with the 
norms of the corporate mother, we used NVivo software to extract every single word of a 
CVC mission statement and compare it with the corresponding text excerpts from its 
corporate mother in a given year using the Jaccard similarity coefficient. The Jaccard 
coefficient measures the similarity and/or diversity of two underlying text excerpts by 
comparing the number of shared words in relation to the total number of words (Huang, 2008; 
Al-Anazi, AlMahmoud, & Al-Turaiki, 2016; Gabriel, Kuo, McAuley, & Hsu, 2018), ranging 
from 0 (completely dissimilar) to 1 (completely similar). We argue that this measure of 
document similarity provides a reliable proxy for the isomorphic tendencies over time 
(Souitaris et al., 2012). High values represent a greater overlap between the CVC and 
corporate mission statements indicating that CVCs seek alignment with the corporate world 
(endoisomorphism), while lower values represent a weaker degree of endoisomorphism, that 
is a higher level of exoisomorphism. The analysis identified several development paths for 
isomorphism over time. At first sight, and as depictured in Figures 14 and 15, the mean values 
of all 22 CVC dyads indicate that isomorphism appears to be static rather than dynamic. 
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Figure 14: Endoisomorphism tendencies (CVC aligning with the corporate’s policies) 
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Figure 15: Exoisomorphism tendencies (CVC aligning with the startup ecosystem) 
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However, a detailed analysis of single cases conveys a different picture. The exemplary 
development paths of the CVC dyads Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon in particular 
support the argument of isomorphic tendencies varying over time. While we found a tendency 
to lean toward the corporate mother in the cases of Alpha, Beta and Gamma (Figure 14), other 
CVC units tend to seek legitimacy away from the corporate mother, for example, from the 
startup ecosystem (Delta and Epsilon; Figure 15). Overall, we extend the work of Souitaris et 
al. (2012) by showing that isomorphic tendencies are not static but over a period of time 
depend on both external circumstances and internal decisions. To shed further light on those 
processes the next section deals with factors that can stimulate or diminish the tendency 
toward a given environment. 
 
6.5 Disentangling potential driver of isomorphism 
To paint a holistic picture of isomorphic tendencies over time, we next used a 
qualitative method in our mixed-method design to identify drivers that push a CVC unit 
toward a specific organizational environment. Like Souitaris et al. (2012), we primarily drew 
on semi-structured interviews, relying on the process proposed by Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton 
(2013). That process is based on viewing organizations as social constructs made up of 
individuals that can serve as informants or knowledge agents (Gioia et al., 2013). 
Consequently, the thoughts, intentions, and actions of those individual informants are at the 
core of the research method (Gioia et al., 2013). 
 
The authors used the work of Burns and Stalker (1961), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
and Souitaris et al. (2012) to compile a semi-structured interview guide. In a subsequent step, 
as recommended by Silvermann (2006) and Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) we carefully 
constructed a theoretical sample of appropriate and diverse CVCs. To support 
generalizability, we did not restrict the pool of potential interview partners through criteria 
relating to the existing governance structure (for an overview see Dushnitsky, 2006), the 
industry of the corporate mother, the maturity stage, or the investment round preferences. The 
interviews took place in November 2017 and were transcribed. In summary, the transcribed 
interviews offer between 1354 and 3494 words (mean 2605 words) with a mean value of 
14.81 words per sentence. Similar to Souitaris et al. (2012), we were able to speak with 
leading representatives of the CVC units, such as Vice Presidents and Managing Directors. 
Reflecting a typical characteristic of the German CVC setting, only one participant had 
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previously worked for an independent VC (for 3.5 years), while no one had acquired 
entrepreneurial experience as a founder or co-founder of a startup, but instead based their 
qualification for their position on extensive experience with the corporate mother (for a mean 
of 10.25 years). As outlined above, we drew on the work of Gioia et al. (2013) to ensure 
academic rigor in extracting information regarding the isomorphic tendencies from the 
interview data. Prior research suggests a three-stage process to identify patterns in the raw 
data (e.g., Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The first step involved setting up a wide range of first-
order categories intended to capture all possible drivers of isomorphism in the CVC context. 
This step is also known as open coding. The second step employed axial coding to categorize 
second-order themes by their similarities and dissimilarities in relation to the first-order 
categories resulting from the first step. In a final step, the second-order themes were distilled 
down to provide more abstract and theoretically-anchored dimensions. We conducted the 
entire coding process utilizing the MAXQDA software package. The final data structure is 
presented in Figure 16.  
 
To date, there have been no empirical attempts to statistically validate isomorphism 
tendencies in the CVC context (see Röhm, forthcoming; Souitaris et al. 2012). Although, this 
section aims to make those tendencies measurable, an empirical validation exceeds the 
underlying scope of our research design. Consequently, below we present various 
propositions directly derived from the first-order categories and second-order themes in 
Figure 16. The aim is to stimulate the academic discourse on isomorphic tendencies in the 
field of CVCs. When they establish a CVC unit, corporations need to balance the initial setup 
carefully, paying particular attention to the alignment of the underlying objective and the 
structural organization (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). Those initial decisions were discussed by 
Dushnitsky (2006) and the recommended form was later adopted by Asel et al. (2015). 
However, the interview data gathered for this research show that some decisions are not 
retractable or are only partly retractable. Among those decisions the governmental structure, 
the assigned name of the CVC unit, and the planned program duration can determine the level 
and direction of isomorphism from the outset. This might lead to a situation where CVC units 
prefer to preserve the status quo instead of developing a more exoisomorphic profile because 
of the issue of path dependency. 
 
Proposition 1: The existence (absence) of path dependency is positively related with 
endoisomorphic (exoisomorphic) tendencies.  
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Figure 16: Data structure, extracted from the conducted interviews 
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Corporate mothers incorporate CVC vehicles for reasons well documented by several 
authors (e.g., Winters & Murfin, 1988; Chesbrough, 2002; EY, 2002; Ernst et al., 2005; 
Weber & Weber, 2005; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). Two articles with a sole focus on the 
German CVC market found that besides purely strategically driven and purely financial 
driven CVCs, 76 percent (Ernst et al., 2005) and 37 percent respectively (Weber & Weber, 
2005) of the observed CVCs were trying to achieve both objectives. By grouping CVCs’ 
reasons for investment, Röhm et al. (2018) also empirically tested the impact of a CVC’s 
investment motivation on a startup’s valuation. However, in addition to the investment 
motivation of the CVC the general innovation strategy of the corporate mother can also 
influence the unit’s isomorphic tendencies. For instance, Titus et al. (2017) investigated the 
effect of exploration on a corporate mother’s venturing activities and, drawing on Dokko and 
Gaba (2012) and Gaba and Dokko (2016), found the strategy to be correlated with staffing 
decisions. While internal hires tend to pursue a strategic investment approach, investment 
managers with prior IVC experience tend to leverage financial goals by implementing IVC-
like structures and decision-making processes. However, our interview data also indicate that 
as a unit matures it tends to align more closely with the startup environment. Some of the 
managing directors interviewed said that the novelty of the CVC concept led them to focus on 
communicating the strategic benefits of their CVC units. After that introductory stage, 
financial objectives became more relevant. 
 
Proposition 2: The existence of strategic goals (financial goals) is positively related to 
endoisomorphic (exoisomorphic) tendencies. 
 
Investments through CVC units have traditionally been associated with the concept of 
learning, and many articles have been published relating to that context (e.g., Keil, 2004; Keil, 
Autio, & George, 2008). However, there is also evidence that mimetic processes can effect a 
CVC’s behavior. In general, touching points with other investment vehicles can stimulate the 
deal flow (Souitaris & Zerbinati, 2014), but there are also other mechanisms that could 
stimulate mimetic processes. For instance, Noyes et al. (2014) presented results from a 
network perspective, indicating that interlocking boards can stimulate the diffusion of 
management practices. In addition, Gaba and Meyer (2008) emphasize the importance of a 
corporate mother’s peer group through the adoption of CVC practices. In addition, the 
syndication of investments with other CVCs or IVCs (e.g., Keil et al., 2010) can bring crucial 
advantages for the CVC. Based on a network perspective, Anokhin et al. (2011) noted the 
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importance of the network position for CVCs in highly concentrated industries. Accordingly, 
learning from competitors, IVCs, or other investment vehicles can help CVCs to overcome 
their liability of newness and the absence of a track record (Anokhin et al., 2011), and 
therefore can increase the chances of establishing more IVC-like structures. Our interviewees 
confirmed that the communication with IVCs was especially useful. One managing director 
noted that before the establishment of the firm’s CVC unit, all key decision makers presented 
the concept to successful and established players in the IVC industry. However, the object of 
comparison is crucial to the adoption of isomorphic tendencies. While mimetic processes 
within the startup ecosystem can push a CVC unit toward an exoisomorphic profile, the 
learning from other corporate units (i.e., the M&A function) will contribute to enhancing an 
endoisomorphism profile. 
 
Proposition 3: The existence (absence) of mimetic processes is positively related to 
exoisomorphic (endoisomorphic) tendencies. 
 
Besides formal barriers such as regulations or written operating procedures (Burns & 
Stalker, 1961) there are also informal barriers or drivers that influence the isomorphic 
tendencies of CVCs. Teppo and Wüstenhagen (2009) already discussed the importance of an 
entrepreneurial spirit within the corporate mothers’ culture for the success of corporate 
venturing programs. In this regard, most published literature draws on the five dimensions of 
the entrepreneurial orientation construct. This construct was also linked to the general 
performance in large- (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011) and medium-sized companies 
(Soininen, Martikainen, Puumalainen, & Kyläheiko, 2012). This study’s qualitative data, 
especially that on “not-invented-here syndrome” hinders fruitful cooperation between CVCs 
and corporate business units. By following their everyday business, employees of the 
corporate mother primarily need to be “infected” with the startup virus following a change of 
mindset. All participants in our case studies confirm that the isomorphic tendencies and the 
general success of the CVC program is associated with the cultural mindset of the corporate 
mother’s staff. 
 
Proposition 4: The existence (absence) of informal influences is positively related with 
endoisomorphic (exoisomorphic) tendencies. 
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Being located within the corporate mother’s boundaries plays an important role in the 
isomorphic tendencies of CVCs. Souitaris et al. (2012) note that the presence or absence of 
formal guidelines and structures influence a CVC’s isomorphic profile. Formal structures are 
a multifaceted topic in the CVC discourse; for instance, the corporate mother’s guidelines on 
remuneration can directly influence the performance of CVCs. Dushnitsky and Shapira (2010) 
showed that a CVC’s compensation scheme is directly related to the performance of its funds. 
Providing an IVC-like incentive scheme prompts performance improvement and also 
stimulates IVC-like behavior among the investment managers. Providing an incentive scheme 
based on the corporate mother’s regulations is risky for CVCs as such regulations might 
incorporate fixed salary scales, leading to the CVC recruiting a high ratio of internal staff, 
who might favor corporate standards over the IVC working model (Dokko & Gaba, 2012). 
Another aspect concerns the general influence of the corporate mother through the 
implemented investment committee. As Teppo and Wüstenhagen (2009) and Souitaris and 
Zerbinati (2014) note, the investment committee and the compensation scheme play important 
roles. Investment committees with a high proportion of corporate managers may risk 
endoisomorphic tendencies due to a lack of experience with the startup ecosystem. The 
importance of the investment committee was also confirmed by our interviewees. Moreover, 
some managing directors also struggle with the corporate guidelines on the financial 
remuneration of hired managers, because for them, the salary is crucial to establish an IVC-
like working environment. Accordingly, stringent restrictions hinder the CVC moving toward 
the startup ecosystem. However, within our sample there was also one CVC providing a 
carried interest system, which can be interpreted as an exoisomorphic signal. 
 
Proposition 5: The existence (absences) of formal structures is positively related to 
endoisomorphic (exoisomorphic) tendencies. 
 
6.6 Discussion 
This section adopts a mixed-method approach to shed light on the isomorphic 
tendencies of CVCs. In a first step, we proposed and developed a unique method of 
measurement that takes organizational written excerpts into account. As mentioned above, a 
text analysis offers several advantages when investigating constructs that are difficult to 
measure (Short et al., 2010). By creating a unique sample of US-based CVCs we were able to 
track the isomorphic tendencies of 22 investment vehicles over 11 years of operation (2000–
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2010). Based on the Jaccard index which measures the overlap between the organizational 
written mission statements of the corporate mother and the corresponding CVC unit, we were 
able to identify three groups of isomorphic profiles. One group, depicted in Figure 14, showed 
a clear tendency to follow the corporate mother (i.e., endoisomorphism), whereas the second 
group (examples presented in Figure 15) seeks legitimacy through the startup ecosystem (i.e., 
exoisomorphism). Beyond that, we also found CVC units with a relatively stable profile of 
isomorphism over time. Interestingly (and as can be observed from the plots in Figure 14 and 
Figure 15), the group converging toward the corporate mother achieves high levels of 
endoisomorphism by adjusting the positioning at one point in time, whereas CVCs with an 
exoisomorphic profile seem to separate themselves from the corporate mother in small 
incremental steps. This could point to endoisomorphic tendencies that might be due to a top-
down decision by a corporate mother adjusting its strategy for its CVC unit, and 
exoisomorphism tendencies that might result from a CVC unit that continuously strives for 
independence from the corporate mother, but which is reluctant to flag those endeavors and 
therefore opts for an incremental approach to achieving its goal. It should be noted, that we 
draw on the work of Souitaris et al. (2012) in developing the measurement of isomorphic 
tendencies. In doing so, we assume that endoisomorphic and exoisomorphic tendencies are 
two poles of a continuum. Accordingly, a high level of endoisomorphism (exoisomorphism) 
is associated with a low level of exoisomorphism (endoisomorphism). We do acknowledge, 
however, that presenting the relationship as such might be to oversimplify the concept of 
isomorphism, and that a CVC unit’s organizational DNA can be more complex, owing to a 
multifaceted isomorphic profile. 
 
To explore the driving forces of isomorphism over time, we interviewed experts from 
the German CVC market and found that isomorphic tendencies are mainly based on mimetic 
processes. All interviewees pointed out that learning from other CVCs, startups, and IVCs 
plays a crucial role in their everyday business. One managing director particularly highlighted 
the value of making comparisons with IVCs and defunct CVC funds as sources of information 
to influence structuring the activities of the CVC unit. However, as mentioned above, the 
third group of CVCs with no clear tendencies toward a particular environment indicates that 
there are also drivers that contribute to the status quo. The conducted interviews reveal that 
there are decisions that are not easily overturned and therefore it can be challenging to 
determine the isomorphic tendencies from the beginning. Decisions on the governance 
structure and the planned program duration are worth mentioning in this regard. Furthermore, 
129 
we also found drivers of isomorphism that are routed in the raison d’être, the informal and 
formal influences from the corporate mother. As Souitaris et al. (2012) report, some of the 
addressed drivers are easy to influence and therefore offer decision makers the option to 
adjust and regulate the degree of isomorphism. For instance, our interview data supported the 
findings of Dokko and Gaba (2012) and Gaba and Dokko (2016) that the staff of a CVC unit 
shapes its structures and investment behavior. Furthermore, we found widely accepted 
consensus in our case studies that the salary of the investment manager poses challenges. 
There is a thin line between offering a remuneration package that fits with the corporate 
mother’s scales, while simultaneously being attractive enough to hire the right people with 
experience in the IVC industry. This research thus bridges the gap between isomorphism and 
studies with a focus on CVC managers’ salaries (Hill et al., 2009; Dushnitsky & Shapira, 
2010; Yang, 2012). We also found that the prevalent entrepreneurial culture can influence not 
only the survival rate of the CVC, as mentioned by Teppo and Wüstenhagen (2009), but also 
its isomorphic tendencies. Several statements mentioned the poor relationship between a 
corporate mother’s business unit and the CVC vehicles. Often CVC managers are faced with 
the “not-invented-here syndrome” or the general lack of motivation to participate in a startup 
cooperation. Finally, some of our interviewees reported being forced into endoisomorphic 
behavior owing to the complexity of the startup ecosystem. It is not only the absence of a 
track record that impels a CVC unit toward alignment with the corporate mother, but also the 
fact that regular business units manage key functions such as conducting due diligence, 
ensuring conformity with legal requirements, and sourcing. In one case, the above scenario 
led to the managing director of a CVC being responsible in personal union also for the 
Corporate Development unit of the corporate mother. 
The results of this study show that isomorphism should be discussed in a broader context, 
particularly due to its variances over time. Future researchers should therefore take external 
influences into account that may temporarily push a CVC in one direction. Our proposed way 
of measuring isomorphic tendencies also offers a basis from which to holistically observe the 
influence of isomorphism on performance, a relationship that is also noted to be important by 
Souitaris et al. (2012). We also call for future research that takes isomorphic tendencies into 
account, when discussing other aspects of CVCs. By constructing a holistic framework, the 
tendencies toward one organizational setting can situate published insights in a broader 
theoretical context. The influence of isomorphism is not limited to the relationships of CVC 
units but also affects other organizational settings where companies are confronted with two 
different environments, such as joint ventures or spin-offs. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
Through its use of a mixed-method approach, this section provides unique insights into 
the ongoing discussion of isomorphic tendencies in the CVC context. Consequently, we 
showed that CVCs tend to seek alignment either with their corporate parent or with the startup 
ecosystem. The tendency to favor one or the other is not only driven by initial decisions made 
during the starting phase of a CVC unit, but also by mimetic processes occurring in the 
lifespan of such vehicles. To disentangle the tendencies of 22 US-based CVCs, we introduced 
a unique measure based on the Jaccard index, a textual-based measurement that compares the 
overlaps of two written organizational excerpts. The results indicate that there are three 
groups of CVCs with isomorphic profiles that vary over time. Besides endoisomorphic (i.e., 
alignment with the corporate mother) and exoisomorphic (i.e., alignment with the startup 
ecosystem) tendencies we also found investment vehicles that adhere to the status quo. To 
extend the work of Souitaris et al. (2012), we also conducted interviews with prestigious CVC 
units from Germany, exploring additional drivers that influence a CVC’s decision to favor 
one organizational setting, and found evidence that mimetic processes, path dependency, and 
formal and informal influences are all drivers of isomorphism over time. The current research 
therefore extends the work on isomorphism in the CVC context by establishing a measure that 
is not limited to the field of CVC but is also a potentially useful instrument to stimulate the 
debate in other related contexts.  
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7 Discussion of results and avenues for future research 
After presenting the dissertation’s underlying studies, this section seeks to summarize 
their main contributions and combine those with potential avenues for future research. The 
theoretical contributions are reviewed as follows: Section 7.1 discusses the influence for the 
CVC research field as such, while Section 7.2 focuses on the motivational aspects within the 
CVC dyad. Section 7.3 elaborates on the findings in the context of the concept of 
isomorphism. Section 7.4 closes the dissertation. 
 
7.1 The CVC research front per se 
The articles discussed in this dissertation contribute to the ongoing debate in multiple 
ways. Accordingly, the structured literature review (Section 2) provides a solid foundation for 
this dissertation but also serves as an initial reference point for guidance on the status quo. 
Based on a set of 65 empirical articles the study contributes to the literature by visualizing 
document-based networks and the identification of contentual topics. The study also reveals 
several under-researched topics and shortcomings worthy of consideration. In this vein, this 
dissertation goes beyond the identified shortcomings by using various statistical research 
methods (e.g., CATA, HLM, Zelner plots), unique data samples, and a strong focus on 
transparency with respect to data-cleaning procedures. Following the call for more academic 
rigor with regard to the underlying definitions and the handling of data, my co-authors and I 
introduced a date-driven procedure to identify CVC investors from among the records of 
commercial data providers, namely Thomson and Dow Jones. The proposed procedure draws 
on four extensive data samples, ranging from 2000 to 2015, and provides the researcher with 
arguments to support decisions on the time-frame chosen and the definition of a CVC unit. It 
should be mentioned that only a minority of authors consider the cyclical nature of CVC 
activities (e.g., Gompers & Lerner, 2000) when describing their underlying sample period. By 
proposing the data-cleaning procedure for Eikon and VentureSource, the study contributes in 
several ways to resolving a widely overlooked issue (Lerner 1994, 1995; Kaplan et al., 2002; 
Maats et al., 2011) related to databases: First, a common definition can increase the 
comparability, quality, and replicability of future and previously-published results. Second, 
the study stimulates the awareness of the need for greater transparency regarding definitional 
and data-cleaning aspects for both authors and reviewers. Third, the coverage of 16 
consecutive years means we can provide a valid decision-making criterion for the selection of 
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a specific database and time-frame. However, as mentioned in Section 2, the bias toward US-
based samples remains an issue within the CVC literature. Due to the fact that Europe is 
highly diverse in terms of cultural aspects (e.g., language) this dissertation also draws its 
analysis on samples from US industry. I am well aware of this limitation and hope future 
scholars enrich the debate with insights from Europe and other geographical contexts. 
 
7.2 Motivation in a CVC dyad 
As outlined in the dissertation’s introduction, two studies use text analysis to consider 
motivational questions within the CVC dyad. While Section 3 focuses on the investment 
motivation of CVCs, Section 4 emphasizes the concept of E/E from corporate mothers. It is 
important to note, that both studies examine the motivational influences at various levels. 
While the concept of E/E is used to observe the underlying orientation of a corporate mother, 
the results presented in Section 3 illustrate how CVCs interpret their corporate mission. In this 
regard, prior research used to explain the relationship between a CVC’s motivation and the 
creation of corporate value (Dushnitsky & Lenox 2006) by drawing solely on an either-or 
approach of financial or strategic motivation, thus overlooking possible interactions. This 
study extends the findings of existing publications (e.g., Ernst et al., 2005; Dushnitsky & 
Lenox, 2006; Battistini, Hacklin, & Baschera, 2013) in that it uses a unique dataset in 
combination with CATA, cluster analysis, and HLM to shed light on the motivational aspects 
of CVCs and their impact on a startup’s valuation. The study finds that the motivation of 
CVCs can be categorized in four distinct forms: mostly strategic, mostly financial, analytical, 
and unfocused. Furthermore, the identification of different motivational types influences the 
assigned startup valuations and thereby enriches the startup valuation literature in general 
(e.g., Köhn, 2018) and the findings of Heughebaert and Manigart (2012) in particular. The 
study shows that strategic (unfocused) motivated CVCs attract lower (higher) valuations than 
analytically-oriented ones. By introducing CATA to measure a CVC’s motivation based on 
written organizational mission statements we also provided a new way to measure 
organizational constructs without using surveys. This is important because the VC industry 
has proved reluctant to engage with survey data collection methods (e.g., Maula et al., 2003; 
Kuckertz et al., 2015). Another motivation-based research issue addressed in this dissertation 
was that of disentangling the relationship between a corporation’s degree of E/E and the 
likelihood of acquiring a startup previously funded through the corporation’s CVC unit. This 
study therefore contributes to several research streams simultaneously, including 
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entrepreneurial exits (e.g., Andersson & Xiao, 2016), acquisitions of prior CVC-backed 
startups (Dimitrova, 2015), the use of multiple ECV instruments (e.g., Van de Vrande et al., 
2011), and the E/E literature (e.g., Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Sirén et al., 2012). 
 
To capture the extent of E/E among corporate mothers, my co-authors and I once again 
draw on text analysis and a unique data sample comprising US-based CVC transactions. 
Having developed theory-driven hypotheses, we calculated several regressions to show how 
the degree of E/E influences the probability of a CVC acquisition and what moderating effects 
arise when taking the product market relatedness between corporate mother and the startups 
into account. The study complements the view of Titus et al. (2015) and contributes to the 
literature dealing with the importance of overlapping resources in the CVC triad (e.g., 
Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005b; Schildt et al., 2005; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Van de Vrande 
et al., 2011; Smith & Shah, 2013). Ultimately, by answering the call of King et al. (2000) and 
Hoetker (2007) we promote a graphical depiction of the interaction effects in non-linear 
models, based on the simulation approach of Zelner (2009). 
 
7.3 Isomorphism 
Finally, this dissertation also captures the concept of isomorphism. As mentioned in 
Section 6, there is evidence of isomorphic processes gathered from corporations acting in 
different environments (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007). By examining isomorphism in the 
CVC context, Souitaris et al. (2012) proved that the CVC setting provides optimal conditions 
for further investigation. The study presented in Section 6 answers the question of if and why 
isomorphic tendencies of CVC units vary over time. In doing so, we proposed a text-based 
measure of the overlap between a CVC unit and the corresponding corporate mother. The 
Jaccard index helps investigate isomorphic tendencies not only in the CVC context but also in 
other research settings. However, the proposed measurement still cannot answer the question 
of whether a CVC with a low level of endoisomorphism will automatically have a high level 
of exoisomorphism and vice versa. Therefore, the second part of the study contributes to the 
work of Souitaris et al. (2012) by revealing several drivers that influence isomorphic 
tendencies over time. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation sheds light on several aspects of the CVC phenomenon 
by drawing on a wealth of statistical methods. Besides the motivational aspects of CVCs, this 
dissertation also focuses on the development of the research field as such, by developing a 
data-driven cleaning procedure to identify CVC investors from among the records of the two 
most powerful data providers. By also highlighting shortcomings and under-researched topics 
as well as introducing a new form of measurement, this dissertation can play an important role 
in the further development of the research front.  
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